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FOREWORD  
s the unfolding banking crisis continues to deepen in Europe, the 
necessity to restructure the banking sector becomes increasingly 
blatant. Despite unprecedented levels of state aid and liquidity 
support provided to them by the European Central Bank, EU banks are still 
undercapitalised and exposed to potentially large future losses. 
Furthermore, structural vulnerabilities that were at the core of the 2008 
crisis have not gone away: high leverage, excessive reliance on unstable 
funding and large derivative positions remain intrinsic features of the 
largest EU banks' business model. Most troubling of all is the ever-more 
concentration in the banking sector that increases systemic risk and 
hampers the diversification of banking activities.  
Yet, up to now, the EU has failed to deliver a regulatory response in 
line with the magnitude of the stakes. Four years after the outbreak of the 
crisis, it is barely in the process of completing the negotiations on the new 
CRD IV-CRR framework, which aims at transposing the minimum capital 
and liquidity standards agreed under Basel III into EU law.  
This is not only too slow, but also too little. Certainly, higher capital 
requirements for banks are essential to enhance their loss-absorbency 
capacity. But such prudential rules necessarily need to be complemented 
with adequate structural reforms. It is indeed senseless to strengthen EU 
banks’ resilience to economic shocks without, at the same time, introducing 
structural changes to remove systemic risk from the financial system.  
Both the US and UK governments have precisely made this 
assessment. Besides the implementation of capital rules, they have 
undertaken structural reforms to limit contagion within and across their 
financial institutions. While the US – through the so-called ‘Volcker rule’ – 
has decided to prohibit commercial banks from trading for their own 
accounts, the UK has opted for a ring-fencing approach, which requires 
A
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banks to insulate their retail operations from their risky investment-
banking activities.  
Despite the US and UK’s decisive moves towards restructuring their 
banking industry, the EU has failed to come up yet with any concrete 
proposals in this field. With a view to address this legislative void, 
Commissioner Michel Barnier set up in November 2011 an expert group – 
chaired by Erkki Liikanen – to examine possible reforms to the structure of 
the EU's banking sector. The group is due to present its final report by the 
end of summer 2012. 
While the European Greens look forward to the Liikanen group’s 
recommendations, they haven’t waited for the Commission initiative to 
explore issues related to structural reforms. Already as from 2010 onwards, 
the Greens had commissioned a study from CEPS on the screening of 26 
large European banks, with the aim to provide fact-based and objective 
inputs into their future legislative work on banking regulation.  
Needless to say, the CEPS report – published in September 2011 – 
represented a major breakthrough in developing a methodology for 
analysing bank business models and bank risk, performance, governance 
and transparency on a continuing basis. One of the main findings of the 
CEPS study was the assignment of each of the sampled banks to one of 
three distinct business models, namely: retail banks (using customer 
deposits as primary source of funding and providing predominantly 
customer loans), investment banks (more engaged in trading and 
derivatives activities) and wholesale banks (more active in interbank 
markets).  
The present report – commissioned by the Greens - constitutes the 
second phase of CEPS' pioneering work. Building on a larger sample of 
banks (74 banks) and a wider set of cluster analysis tools, this new study 
not only delves further into the categorisation of business models, but 
provides also guidance on the regulatory framework in European banking.  
Regarding the updated screening of European banks, the present 
report provides four key findings. Firstly, it adds a new category of 
business models to the three previously identified, namely: 'diversified 
retail banks' (using diversified sources of funding and providing 
predominantly customer loans). Secondly, it provides evidence that 
diversified retail and retail-focused business models are clearly safer than 
others, as measured by the distance from default (Z-score), amount of loss-
absorbing capital and the long-term liquidity risks (NSF ratio). In line with 
the previous study, it also confirms that investment-oriented banks seem to 
BANK REGULATION OF EUROPEAN BANKS AND BUSINESS MODELS | iii 
engage in regulatory arbitrage to reduce their risk-weights without 
shedding any risks. Finally, the report highlights a certain discrepancy 
between declared intentions and practice within the EU banking industry. 
Although banks such as BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank or Société Générale 
define themselves as retail-oriented institutions for marketing purposes, 
the report provides indeed evidence that their business model is in fact 
closer to investment banking.  
On the regulatory side, the report calls for heavier capital 
requirements (exceeding the Basel III common equity Tier 1 requirement of 
4.5%) on some of the less diversified banks, including the retail-focused, 
wholesale and investment banks. It also recommends a binding leverage 
ratio in order to curb excessive leverage in the banking sector. In this 
respect, the findings highlight that wholesale- and investment-oriented 
banks, as well as some diversified retail banks tend to be more heavily 
leveraged than their retail-focused counterparts. In terms of liquidity 
management, the report proposes several provisions to better calibrate the 
liquidity coverage requirement (LCR), including the exclusion of bonds 
issued by any financial institution (bank or non-bank) from qualifying 
liquid assets. It also calls for the introduction of a binding net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR) beyond a basic disclosure standard. Finally, the 
report includes various measures to enhance disclosure requirements, such 
as the obligation for all banks to make publically available their quarterly 
balance sheet, income statement and liquidity conditions, or the need to 
develop – through the European Banking Authority (EBA) – a standardised 
set of items to be reported.  
To conclude, the CEPS banks business model approach provides the 
legislator with valuable empirical data to devise well-balanced banking 
reforms at EU level. Contrary to a one-size-fits-all approach that necessarily 
leads to a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’, it opens up the possibility of 
enacting prudential rules differentiated according to the risk profile of 
banks. In other words, it paves the way for the future establishment of an 
EU banking legislation that penalises excessive risk-taking activities, while 
promoting those that focus on serving the real economy.  
Philippe Lamberts 
Member of the European Parliament (The Greens) 
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FOREWORD  
he timing of this book is ideal. In order to have sound and coherent 
post-crisis banking regulation, it is imperative to assess the risk 
implications of strategic choices that banks make. This book 
performs this task judiciously by empirically examining the performance 
and risk implications of different bank business models and by confronting 
various proposals for a new regulatory regime with these empirical 
insights. The result is a set of coherent and well-founded recommendations 
to strengthen the new regulatory framework for banks in Europe. 
Let there be no doubt. Some banks have made big mistakes in the 
run-up to the financial crisis. I agree that there is no single smoking gun; it 
has been a mixture of lax risk standards, wrong incentives and the absence 
of checks and balances both within banks and in the supervisory 
framework. In that environment, banks have made strategic choices and 
have sometimes rapidly shifted between business models which, for some, 
turned out disastrously. Some were characterised by unchecked growth of 
complex and hence risky assets. Some even elected to fund opaque 
investments with an increasing reliance on potentially volatile market 
funding. And others diversified into untested revenue sources but quite 
often without having the required skills to manage their risks. These 
business model choices were sometimes deliberate, but often ad hoc and 
driven by herd behaviour and demands for outsized returns. Some 
supervisors attempted to enforce countercyclical tools and some 
supranational authorities issued warnings. But it has largely been in vain; 
liquidity and solvency risks combined into a lethal cocktail. 
Now the financial system needs rebuilding and the regulatory and 
supervisory framework needs to be strengthened. The inadequate crisis 
infrastructure in Europe has resulted in negative feedback loops between 
banks and sovereigns, provoking an existential crisis of the euro area. 
Hence, irrespective of the economic environment in the coming years, the 
T
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European economy is facing a lengthy process of de-risking and 
deleveraging, in all sectors of the economy. Restoring the soundness of the 
banking system is one of the key ingredients for a return to sustainable 
growth. 
It is clear that the riskiness of the financial system will need to be 
monitored much more closely than in the past and that pro-active remedial 
action will have to be taken and enforced by competent supervisors. 
European supervision, strong capital and liquidity buffers and an effective 
crisis management and resolution framework are key. In order to enforce 
sound banking rules, supervisors will need to assess the health of the 
banking systems under their jurisdiction with diligence and adequate 
knowledge. This book is an important contribution to the advancement of 
our knowledge in this area by focusing on the performance and risk 
characteristics of different bank business models. Only a solid knowledge 
of the return and risk consequences of the key strategic choices that banks 
are facing ensures that supervisors will be able to detect sources of 
individual as well as systemic risk in time. 
Developing, maintaining and applying a careful and diligent 
monitoring system of bank business models will therefore be a key 
strategic task for bank supervisors. The empirical evidence presented in 
this book provides a useful framework to further create a workable early 
warning system. This kind of empirical work should be updated regularly 
in order to capture fundamental changes in bank behaviour and guide 
policy-makers and supervisors. 
Rudi Vander Vennet 
Professor of Banking  
University of Ghent 
European Banking Authority Stakeholders’ Group  
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PREFACE 
his volume, which follows an earlier study by the same research 
team at CEPS and which is based on state-of-the-art methodology 
and statistical techniques, could hardly be more timely. This is 
because bank business models and the future shape of regulation are 
inextricably linked with causation working in both directions. The aim of 
the research is to highlight the key regulatory gaps that emerge from an 
analysis of banking business models and to provide guidance on the 
evolving regulatory framework in European banking.  
Bank business models are not static and evolve over time and under 
the influence of a complex mix of exogenous and endogenous pressures 
and in particular the scope and intensity of regulation. However, as the 
study indicates, business models have not been homogenous between 
banks – diversity has remained. The study offers an empirical study of 
business models and their implications for risk characteristics, business 
performance, efficiency and the role of regulation. The research specifies 
four business models: investment banks, focused retail banks, diversified 
retail banks and wholesale banks, with the risk characteristics being 
different between the alternative models. 
Banking crises inevitably bring forth more and different regulation of 
banks, and the recent global crisis is no exception. There are many reasons 
why a comprehensive review of regulatory, supervisory and intervention 
arrangements are necessary in the wake of one of the most serious banking 
crises in modern memory. Firstly, given the enormity of the crisis, there 
were evident fault lines in regulatory and supervisory practice: the rules 
enshrined in countless pages behind the Basel Capital Accords did not 
prevent the crisis. Secondly, the crisis imposed substantial costs and risks 
on taxpayers in several countries, which implies a perverse scenario of 
privatising bank profits while socialising bank risks. The European 
Commission indicates that between October 2008 and October 2011, the 
T
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Commission approved €4.5 trillion (equivalent to 37% of EU GDP) of state 
aid to financial institutions. Thirdly, regulatory arbitrage always finds 
routes around particular regulations, which leaves open the question 
whether detailed and prescriptive rules are necessarily the right approach. 
Fourthly, it has become evident that a reform strategy needs to be framed 
in terms of a risk matrix that considers measures both to lower the 
probability of bank failures and the cost of those failures that do occur. 
Furthermore, the need to address the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem has become 
increasingly evident. 
As a result, there is likely to evolve one of the biggest-ever reforms in 
the regulatory regime and, most especially with respect to the EU, also in 
the basic regulatory architecture. Regulation is at a turning point as the 
trend towards de-regulation and ‘light-touch’ supervision has given way to 
more intensive and extensive regulation and supervision. In effect, faith in 
markets has given way to faith in regulation. 
Since a structure of complex and extensive regulation did not prevent 
the recent crisis, a key issue is whether the failure was due to fault-lines in 
the regulatory regime or whether the underlying methodology of 
regulation has been inappropriate. The research in this study discusses the 
‘endogeneity’ problem whereby, through financial innovation and the 
incentive structures created, problems such as excessive risk-taking by 
banks may be partly endogenous to the regulatory regime itself.  
It might be tempting to assume that the failures revealed in the 
banking crisis can in some sense be solved by yet further detailed 
elaborations of the existing regulatory structure. On the contrary, 
regulatory reform needs to be strategic rather than incremental. By strategic 
is meant that the regulatory reform process needs go back to basics and 
focus on what the ultimate objectives of the regulatory regime are. Two 
broad objectives of any regime need to be considered: to reduce the 
probability of bank failures (Objective 1) and to lower the cost of those 
failures that do occur (Objective 2). It must include the full range of 
instruments within the regulatory regime to address these two basic 
objectives. This contrasts with an incremental approach of refining the 
existing regulatory regime which, in terms of capital requirements, would 
take us from Basel 1 to Basel 2 and now to Basel 3 and eventually to Basel 
N. In practice, this alone will not suffice, not least because of the 
‘endogeneity’ problem. 
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My own view regarding regulatory strategy is that most, if not all, of 
the objectives of the regulatory regime can be achieved without major 
structural measures, but through a combination of: 
 A significant rise in equity capital requirements applied to banks. 
With respect to capital, the study suggests that the risk weights in the 
Basel Accord are at best a poor indicator of underlying risk, and 
different business models are prone to a different structure of risks 
which should, perhaps, be reflected in regulatory capital 
requirements. 
 Differential capital requirements applied to banks that are regarded 
as systemically significant. 
 More stringent liquidity requirements on banks related both to asset 
holding and funding positions. 
 More timely and intensive supervision of banks to encompass a 
greater focus on business models and strategies, the testing and 
monitoring of risk analysis and management systems of banks, earlier 
direct intervention by supervisory agencies, governance 
arrangements of banks, internal incentive structures and a particular 
focus on high-impact institutions.  
 Measures to make Pillar 3 of the Basel Accord more effective 
including a focus on internal incentive structures within banks, and 
more use to be made of market metrics in supervisory and 
intervention processes.  
 Tax and insurance impositions on banks to cover the costs of past 
bail-outs (ex post) and also to fund possible future rescue operations 
(ex ante).  
 A commitment to prompt corrective action and structured early 
intervention and resolution strategies, implying early and decisive 
direct intervention by supervisory agencies. 
 The requirement for major banks to have ‘living wills’ incorporating 
recovery and resolution plans.  
 Clearly-defined and credible resolution arrangements. The objective 
is to allow banks to fail without disturbing business and customer 
relationships, and to ensure that the costs of default fall on equity and 
bond holders and other non-secured creditors. 
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 Resolution arrangements at the international level to be covered in a 
Pillar 4 of the Basel Capital Accord. In this regard, in June 2012, the 
European Commission issued a draft Directive focused on bank 
resolution arrangements in the EU. 
This strategy implies greater emphasis and effectiveness of Pillars 2 
and 3, and the addition of a Pillar 4. Pillars 1-3 focus predominantly on 
Objective 1, while the proposed Pillar 4 is relevant for Objective 2. 
Bringing together the two strands of the study (bank business models 
and regulation), the crisis will prove to be transformational in several 
dimensions and three in particular: the size of the banking industry, bank 
business models and the cost of bank services. Post-crisis business models 
are likely to be dominated by three pressures: the unwinding of pre-crisis 
unsustainable business models and practices, the specific lessons of the 
crisis and a substantially more demanding regulatory environment. 
The European banking industry has reached something of a turning 
point where major regulatory changes will impact the size, growth, future 
business models and the structure of the financial system as a whole. The 
evolution of European banking and its business models over the coming 
years is likely to be dominated by the legacy of the crisis and the regulatory 
and supervisory responses to it. 
David T. Llewellyn 
Professor of Money and Banking 
Loughborough University 
European Banking Authority Stakeholders’ Group  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his study assesses the resilience of different business models of EU 
banks, based on an analysis of approximately two-thirds of EU-27 
banking assets. This executive summary presents our main findings 
and policy recommendations.  
Retail-oriented banks operate with high tangible common equity 
(TCE), use customer deposits for funding, are less likely to default and are 
able to better manage their liquidity risks. A deeper analysis reveals that 
the ‘diversified’ retail banks are less likely to face losses during downturns, 
but the same is not true for the ‘focused’ retail banks. However, these latter 
smaller institutions may absorb these risks if they continue to closely 
monitor their leverage and maintain their levels of capitalisation. 
Wholesale banks, however, carry a range of risks, especially through an 
apparent shortage of liquidity and their failure to build adequate buffers to 
absorb shortfalls arising from these risks.  
The risk-weighted assets (RWA) measure fails to be a good indicator 
for default risks for investment banks, which are mainly active in trading 
and derivatives, even after controlling for capital. Given that these banks 
typically achieve much lower average risk weights than their peers, it is 
very likely that the risk-sensitive capital requirements largely 
underestimate the appropriate amount of capital these banks should hold. 
Our analysis of stressed earnings, however, fails to point to heavier capital 
requirements for this class of banks, which is largely due to the smaller 
sample size for this business model. A longer time-series is needed to draw 
stronger results for this category of banks. 
Some of the risk indicators fail to distinguish between banks business 
models. This is most striking in the case of the Tier-1 ratio and the CDS 
(credit default swaps) spreads. While the former is likely to be a result of 
inadequate binding regulatory requirements that would lead to an 
instrument-wide convergence, the latter could be a realisation of the moral 
T
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hazard risks emanating from the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) phenomenon. If the 
market participants believe that all troubled large banks will be saved, no 
matter what their business model or underlying risks may be, the markets 
will treat them as if they will not fail, leading to an artificial convergence of 
the pricing of risk.  
Although historical evidence suggests that minimum capital 
requirements could be raised for certain business models, the sample size 
and data availability issues need to be addressed before we can make a 
more sound judgement. The relatively limited evidence provided in this 
study shows that diversified retail banks face the least risk of a capital 
shortfall during crisis periods, notwithstanding the precision level or the 
estimation methods. In turn, wholesale and focused retail banks appear to 
face more downturn risks. These results provide some justification for 
imposing stricter regulatory requirements both for focused retail and 
wholesale banks and continued monitoring of all business models, 
although more data are needed to obtain more reliable estimates. As for 
investment banks, although it is not possible to make an objective 
judgement on the need for stricter requirements, the results suggest that 
drastic capital shortfalls are certainly possible, which make this category of 
banks vulnerable to external shocks. 
It should be noted that our results are based on a relatively small 
sample and should therefore be interpreted with caution. For these reasons, 
more policy-oriented analytical research and monitoring are needed to 
better align the regulatory initiatives with the inherent risks of different 
banks’ business models. 
The key regulatory challenges discussed in the study and the 
conclusions reached are summarised below. 
On the minimum capital requirements 
Banks with more shock-absorbing capital have clearly resisted the crisis 
better and have been less likely to receive government support. Thus, 
increasing the quality and quantity of capital, as foreseen under the Capital 
Requirements Directive and Regulation (henceforth, CRD IV-CRR) 
translates into EU law the Basel III standards adopted by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), should improve bank 
resilience and contribute to stability, assuming that the minimum 
requirements are sufficiently strict. 
However, our evidence shows that tail risk differ across bank 
business models. The one-size-fits-all minimum common equity Tier 1 ratio 
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of 4.5%, as proposed in the CRD IV-CRR rules, is not high enough to 
account for the more interconnected and riskier business models of banks 
and hence to prevent widespread failures during downturns.  
The minimum capital requirements should take into account the 
different business models that banks follow. Although a more detailed 
analysis backed with substantially richer data is needed (especially to 
obtain more concrete results on investment-oriented banks), the findings 
call for a tougher stance on some of the less diversified banks, including the 
focused retail and wholesale banks, and investment banks.  
On the design and avenues to improve the risk weighted assets 
In addition, there are several serious gaps that the Basel III Accord and EU 
proposal have overlooked. Perhaps most critically, the new framework 
continues to rely on poorly designed risk-sensitive regulatory capital ratio 
requirements, despite growing evidence that these measures fail to reflect 
the underlying risks, especially in the more sophisticated business models 
such as investment- or wholesale-oriented banks. Moreover, the 
assignment of risk-weights to certain asset classes is not always backed by 
solid reasoning, as is the case for those applicable to sovereign debt in the 
eurozone, real estate exposures or the low effective risk-weights for certain 
off-balance sheet exposures. Aside from weakening the effectiveness of the 
minimum risk-sensitive capital requirements, these practices may be 
contributing to ballooning of public and private debt while at the same 
time providing opportunities for banks to game the system.  
As a first line of response to these concerns, we recommend 
regulators to refrain from using the risk-weights as a political tool. 
Although doing so may put fiscal pressures in some of the periphery 
countries, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the gradual removal of 
the ‘zero-risk weighting’ of sovereign debt and harmonisation with the 
other asset classes are necessary. Similarly, the unjustified preferential 
treatment of other exposures, such as real estate and SME exposures, 
should be aligned with the underlying risks. Last but not least, the evidence 
of this research shows that a one-size-fits-all risk treatment of financial 
institutions is not economically sound; therefore the risk treatment of these 
entities should be differentiated by accounting for their evolving business 
models and subsequent risk profile. 
In addition, the use of the IRB approach and the validity of its 
components should be subject to deeper regulatory oversight and 
monitoring. The risk factors, risk distribution and underlying assumptions 
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must not be left to the discretion of banks. All risk inputs and underlying 
assumptions must be validated and monitored and when necessary, 
adjusted in a coordinated fashion. The screening of risk weights can be 
complementary to existing regulations, and if well-defined and monitored, 
can prevent the accumulation of risks before they spiral out of control. At 
an operational level, banks should respond to a series of hypothetical 
benchmark portfolios of varying underlying risk levels provided by the 
regulators by reporting their own calculated risk model parameters, 
including loss-given default, probability of default and the resulting risk-
weights. 
Provided that the chosen benchmarks are adequately sophisticated, 
regulators will be able to assess the adequacy and coherence of the internal 
models used by individual banks, which would feed into the regular 
supervisory review of the internal risk systems. Moreover, the results from 
the benchmarking exercise may also help test the validity of the risk-weight 
assumptions under the standardised approach. Lastly, the disclosure of the 
results of the benchmarking tests would also supplement market discipline 
by making banks’ risk preferences more transparent.  
On leverage and the leverage ratio 
Many banks have become increasingly leveraged in recent years, owing to 
expansionary monetary policy, the pro-cyclical nature of regulations, 
increasing capital flows and competitive pressures to generate excessive 
returns. Although leverage allows banks to grow and increase their 
profitability, it can also increase risks since even a small perturbation in the 
valuation of assets because of changing correlation matrix can serve to 
wipe out their capital base. Thus, a regulatory limit on leverage (e.g. 3%), as 
envisioned under the Basel III Accord, could address these risks as well as 
some of the shortcomings of the risk-sensitive capital requirements. The 
CRD IV proposal envisages no minimum requirements even though some 
of the compromise texts suggest that the requirements may range from 
1.5% to 5%, depending on the risk profiles of the regulated entities.  
If implemented, these requirements would also fall short of those 
that are in effect in the US. Our findings suggest that the Basel III standards 
could be a serious concern for the wholesale- and investment-oriented 
banks and possibly some of the diversified retail banks. Naturally, apart 
from the business models, the appropriateness of the requirements 
depends crucially on the definition of the leverage ratio in particular with 
respect to the treatment of netting. We recommend the European Banking 
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Authority (EBA) to review whether the suggested requirements would be 
sufficient to constrain the relevant risks in the EU, paying close attention to 
the different bank business models. 
On counter-cyclical requirements   
Faced with plummeting asset valuations and losses during the early phases 
of the crisis, many banks chose to reduce their lending in order to meet the 
minimum capital requirements. Conversely, the excess capital capacity 
generated from increasing asset prices have led to bloating balance sheets 
and an increased taste for risk-taking in the run-up to the crisis. The CRD 
IV-CRR proposal introduces capital buffers to rein in these pro-cyclical 
incentives that have contributed to the formation and bursting of financial 
bubbles. In particular, the counter-cyclical capital requirements require 
banks to build up their capital base during a boom while allowing them to 
shrink during a bust. However, it is not certain whether the indicator 
prescribed in the proposal, the private credit-to-GDP gap, is sufficiently 
sophisticated for detecting bubbles. The requirements also do not consider 
risks related to evolving business models of banks, risks from increased 
interconnectedness, which may need to be addressed beyond the CRD IV-
CRR and within a more general macro-prudential regulatory framework 
that would define the targets, instruments and role of fully-dedicated 
institutions; in particular the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). We 
argue that more targeted research in this area is essential before venturing 
into poorly-designed instruments, which add little to regulators’ arsenal in 
detecting macro-prudential risks and the formation of financial bubbles.  
On liquidity requirements 
Tightening liquidity proved troublesome in various phases of the 
crisis, particularly for banks that rely primarily on short-term market 
funding and the interbank markets. Although the new liquidity 
requirements introduced in the CRD IV-CRR proposal are a step in the 
right direction, their ultimate effectiveness will depend on technical details, 
that will only be available after long transition periods. In particular, the 
proposal provides few details on the measurement of long-term liquidity 
risks, through the proposed Net Stable Funding (NSF) ratio, which will not 
be adopted before 2018, if at all. The proposed measures can also be 
criticised on the same grounds as the risk-sensitive capital requirements, 
i.e. poor design, complexity, potential for manipulation, and last but not 
least complacency. For instance, the treatment of sovereign exposures has 
been maintained as in the past without a requirement to assess underlying 
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country risks, despite being recognised by many as inappropriate. Lastly, 
the new rules may prove too shallow to respond to the build-up of systemic 
(as opposed to individual) liquidity risks, which once again may need to be 
considered in a more general macro-prudential framework.  
On disclosure and market discipline 
Disclosure practices show heterogeneity, both across banks and countries. 
While banks in certain business model categories report more than others, 
in other cases, all banks do very poorly. For example, investment-oriented 
banks report much more information on performance-related indicators 
than do banks following other business models, most likely in response to 
calls from their shareholders who tend to be more disclosure-demanding. 
In turn, the majority of all banks disclose very limited information on their 
risk and off-balance sheet exposures. In the EU, the supervisory reporting 
frameworks for financial reporting (FINREP) and common reporting 
(COREP) have been developed, currently based on non-binding guidelines 
and reporting, both based on XBRL. The proposed regulation can provide 
significant benefits if it clarifies the various reporting frameworks, starting 
with a standardised set of items to be reported, under technical guidance 
from EBA. In addition, establishing a clear legal basis and binding 
requirements for all credit institutions to start reporting using the 
COREP/FINREP frameworks would also be helpful. To that extent, the 
standardised set of items to report should be seen as a first step for a more 
harmonious reporting foreseen under the frameworks. Moreover, the 
quarterly balance sheet, income statement and liquidity conditions on all 
banks, listed or unlisted, should be made available from a central public 
website, free of charge. 
On the role of the EBA 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) should have a more important role 
than simply being a custodian of definitions and guidelines. It should be 
armed with enhanced monitoring and enforcement powers to reach its 
primary aim of safeguarding the stability of the EU’s banking system. This 
is all the more important in light of the growing political pressure to shift to 
an EU- or euro-wide banking union and a centralised supervisory regime. 
Towards a comprehensive framework to regulate EU banks 
Many issues remain to be addressed beyond the piecemeal approach of the 
CRD IV-CRR proposal. These include a more direct regulatory approach to 
systemic risks and macro-prudential policy, crisis management, shadow 
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banking, systemically important financial institutions and enhanced 
international cooperation. Although the Commission’s proposal covers (or 
will be expanded to cover) some of these areas indirectly, there is a need for 
an integrated approach in the EU, much like the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, 
that cover some behavioural and structural changes.  
Last, but not least, moving forward in regulating the banking sector 
globally requires a substantial rethink towards a new conceptual 
framework that considers all the costs and benefits of intervening in 
financial markets through micro- and macro-prudential regulations, 
supervision, monetary policy, crisis resolution and other institutional 
arrangements and structural reforms. The conceptual framework should be 
designed to fulfil two simultaneous objectives of the reform agenda, 
necessary for systemic stability: 1) to lower the probability of bank failures 
and 2) to reduce the costs of those failures that do occur. To some extent 
there is a trade-off between the two objectives in that the more the costs of 
failure can be reduced, the less intensive regulation needs to be to lower the 
probability of failure. The optimal intensity of regulation and structural 
changes will be indeterminate until the arrangements for the resolution 
structures are known. Despite the infant understanding of bank business 
models and practices in Europe, our evidence shows that bank business 
models matter for soundness, systemic stability and hence for the optimal 
design of banking regulation.   
This leads to a complete rethink of the existing one-size-fits-all 
regulatory paradigm that acts on banks’ behaviour. A new regulatory 
paradigm would require a better identification of business models and 
practices of banks and their evolution and would systematically address 
their risks ex ante at any point in the economic cycle and ultimately their 
resolution, in case a crisis develops. Until we witness such a change of 
paradigm, the regulation of EU banks becomes a largely unfinished 
business.  
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INTRODUCTION 
dopted by the European Commission in July 2011, the proposed 
Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (henceforth, CRD 
IV-CRR) translates into EU law the Basel III standards adopted by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).1 Among other things, 
the proposed rules increase the quality and quantity of the minimum 
capital; introduce new rules on liquidity, leverage ratios, counter-cyclical 
buffers, and systemically important financial institutions; and amend the 
definitions of counterparty credit risk and rules for the banking book. The 
rules complement the earlier amendments that strengthened the capital 
and disclosure requirements for the trading book and re-securitisation 
instruments as well as the requirements to ensure that remuneration 
policies do not lead to excessive risk-taking. 
Most European banks have shown enormous resistance against the 
implementation of the new round of reforms, arguing that the stricter 
requirements would lead to a significant contraction of credit to the private 
sector and would thus hurt growth. However, these arguments have been 
called into question by academics and experts who suggest that the hike in 
minimum capital requirements will have little impact on lending levels. 
Indeed, recent research shows that large banks will be able to meet the 
stricter requirements without suffering significant pains, in many cases 
simply by retaining their earnings.2  
Despite its ambitious aims, some observers claim that the CRD IV-
CRR proposal has been watered down, mainly to appease the private 
                                                   
1 The CRD IV-CRR proposal comprises a Directive (COM(2011) 453 final) and a Regulation 
(COM(2011) 452 final), both published 20 July 2011.  
2 See for example, Ötker-Robe & Pazarbaşıoğlu (2010). BCBS’s own impact assessments also 
confirm that reinforced capital and liquidity requirements would have a very limited impact on 
growth (BCBS, 2010a and 2010b).  
A
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interests of financial institutions and the banking industry within Europe. 
Although some of these concerns may be exaggerated, the proposal is less 
far-reaching than the Basel III Accord, effectively stopping short of 
introducing (or committing to introduce) binding rules for leverage and the 
long-term liquidity requirements. Many details, both technical and non-
technical, have been left out to be resolved in the course of a transition 
period lasting up until 2018, inviting the possibility of substantial 
heterogeneity in the regulatory framework within the EU. Moreover, some 
of the emerging regulatory concerns in the post-crisis era, such as the 
macro-prudential and systemic issues and resolution, have remained 
largely vague and have been addressed partially or indirectly at best. Other 
concerns have been only narrowly addressed such as the possibility that 
the new regulations would lead to activity being shifted to unregulated 
conduits, or the ‘shadow banking’ sector. The proposal leaves a large 
margin of manoeuvre to the European Parliament and the Council to fine-
tune the provisions based on the compromise agreements on the key 
aspects of the rules.3 
The aim of this study is to highlight the key regulatory gaps that 
emerge from an analysis of banks’ business models and to provide 
guidance on the evolving regulatory framework in European banking. 
Owing to the timing of the study, which coincides with the EU institutions’ 
‘trialogue’ discussions involving the Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament, a considerable part of the analysis focuses on the key strengths 
and shortcomings of the CRD IV-CRR proposal, which is expected to be 
adopted by the European Parliament in the summer of 2012 and by the 
Council in the fall of 2012 after adopting the compromise amendments. The 
study also draws attention to what remains to be done more broadly 
beyond CRD IV-CRR and offers a comprehensive analysis of potential 
future reforms.  
The study is organised as follows: chapter 1 provides evidence-based 
analysis that aims to identify and analyse the performance and resilience of 
the different business models for EU banks, building on the results and 
methodology developed in Ayadi et al. (2011). Chapter 2 provides an 
assessment of the new Basel rules in the EU and proposes potential 
regulatory adaptations to bank business models with the aim of improving 
future implementation. The final chapter outlines some general principles 
                                                   
3 See Appendix IV summarising the mail points in the ‘trialogue’ policy discussions between the 
European Parliament, European Council and the European Commission during 2012.  
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aimed at guiding the future regulatory reform process and at making a 
distinction between incremental and strategic approaches to reform. In 
addition, the analysis provides a discussion about the ‘endogeneity’ 
problem and reviews the alternative means of reducing the probability of 
bank failures and various options to minimise the costs of bank failures.  
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1. EVOLVING BUSINESS MODELS IN EU 
BANKING: WHAT SOUNDNESS? 
he aim of this chapter is to identify and analyse the resilience and 
performance of the different business models for EU banks, building 
on the results and methodology developed in Ayadi et al. (2011).4  
This factual investigation offers the basis for an informed analysis of 
the EU banking industry, which is essential to understand the resilience 
and performance of the business models and their evolution. The results 
are expected to provide policy-makers and regulators with guidance on 
specific policy and regulatory actions that should be taken to achieve a 
more stable and high-performing banking sector capable of withstanding 
future shocks and contributing to the positive growth of the European 
economy.  
1.1 Data and methodology  
Possibly considered as one of the richest and most diversified groups in the 
world, the European banking industry incorporates a varied array of 
institutions. Large diversified retail banks provide their domestic and 
international clients with a range of retail, investment and insurance 
products. Investment-oriented banks focus more on trading activities, 
relying on various forms of funding, including most notably issued debt. In 
turn, retail-oriented commercial, cooperative, savings and others types of 
banks focus more on traditional services, such as basic deposit accounts, 
consumer credit, mortgages, and simple payment services. Other banks are 
more oriented towards institutional clients, including central and local 
governments, larger firms and financial institutions, and are more active in 
                                                   
4 For a review of the literature on the subject, see Ayadi et al. (2011) and Altunbaş et al. (2011).  
T
REGULATION OF EUROPEAN BANKS AND BUSINESS MODELS | 13 
the debt and wholesale markets. Expanding on our earlier study (Ayadi et 
al., 2011), the present sample under study comprises a total of 74 banks (up 
from 26 banks) with end-of-year data for 2006 to 2010, with 352 bank-year 
observations. The selection overlaps with the selection of banks used by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in its June 2011 stress tests, accounting 
for approximately two-thirds of the EU-27 banking assets. In addition to 
data collected from the annual reports and other online financial 
documents for each bank-year observation, the study uses data made 
available from the EBA stress tests. As in the previous study, the different 
business models are identified using state-of-the-art cluster analysis tools.  
Cluster analysis is a statistical technique for assigning a set of 
observations (in our case, bank/year observations) to distinct clusters (i.e. 
business models) to ensure a certain degree of similarity within each 
cluster. The basis of this assignment is a set of indicators, or more formally 
instruments, to measure the distance of each observation from others. For 
example, if one would want to generate clusters based on the size of 
financial institutions, a natural candidate would be to rely on a bank’s total 
assets, either in absolute or relative values (e.g. as a % of GDP) as the 
primary instrument. The clustering procedures would then group together 
banks that are closest to one another in terms of the selected instrument.  
The formation of clusters follows very closely the techniques used in 
the prior study. To sum up, the clusters are merged sequentially, starting 
from the maximum number of clusters possible (i.e. the total sample size), 
until the most distinct formation of clusters is achieved. The distinctness of 
each clustering solution was evaluated by relying on the Calinski and 
Harabsz pseudo F-index, based on the within-cluster sum of squared errors 
divided by the between-clusters sum of squared errors, (Calinski & 
Harabasz, 1974). More details on the methodological aspects of the 
clustering analysis used in this study can be found in Ayadi et al. (2011, pp. 
23-24).  
The selection of instruments is naturally a key factor in the 
composition of clusters. When the objective of the analysis is broad enough, 
as is the case here, the number of candidate instruments increases. For 
example, to distinguish between retail- and investment-oriented banks, a 
host of variables may be used, ranging from simple balance sheet and 
income statement information, e.g. customer loans or deposits, corporate 
debt held and net interest income, to other structural variables,  such as the 
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number of branches or regional coverage.5 Ideally, the candidate list should 
span all the relevant dimensions that can matter for the objectives of the 
analysis. In our case, this would mean that selected instruments should 
correspond to all the core areas of activity for banks. 
To minimise the possibility that certain functions are left uncovered 
while others are overrepresented, the analysis starts with a large set of 
candidate instruments and evaluates all the possible permutations to select 
the most appropriate subset.6 The selection procedure follows several steps. 
First, all the possible permutations of the collection of instruments are 
ranked according to the ratio of between-to-within-cluster standard errors, 
as measured by the Calinski and Harabsz pseudo F-index, as well as the 
distinctness of the optimal clustering solution from corner cases.7 Second, 
the collections of instruments with the highest ranks are chosen as 
candidates. Third, among the short-listed candidates, the collection of 
instruments with the easiest interpretation was chosen.  
On the selection of the candidate instruments, it is assumed that the 
business models are shaped by the selection of inputs and outputs by bank 
managers. Performance and stability indicators are assumed to be the 
outcomes of these decisions, determined in conjunction with the other 
market, macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, and thus are not part of 
the clustering. For example, banks that rely more on customer deposits will 
tend to have a more stable source of funding when a deposit insurance 
system exists. Conversely, those that rely more on (short-term) wholesale 
funding may face liquidity shortages or abundance, depending on the 
willingness of other financial institutions to provide such funds. Customer 
loans could provide substantial earnings when the economic conditions are 
upbeat and the interest rates are low, implying modest levels of loan losses 
and high interest margins. Lastly, improving asset prices would tend to 
improve the expected earnings from securities trading activities.  
Using the intermediation approach of Sealey & Lindley (1977), the 
inputs and outputs are composed of the funding source decisions, e.g. 
                                                   
5 See Appendix I for a complete list of variables collected.  
6 More specifically, the iterative analysis used a total of 11 indicators including customer loans and 
deposits, bank loans and liabilities, debt liabilities, total derivative exposures, trading assets, common 
equity, liquid assets, domestic assets, and repurchase agreements (repos).  
7 For any given collection of instruments, the optimal solution is the one with the highest Calinski and 
Harabsz measure. To determine the distinctness of the cluster from the extremes, the corner cases of 
two- and ten-cluster solutions were used. The relative distinctness were measured by the minimum of 
the ratio of the Calinski & Harabsz pseudo F-indices between the optimal cluster and the corner cases. 
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customer deposits, issued debt, wholesale or interbank funding, and the 
use of funds, e.g. customer loans, wholesale loans, and trading securities. 
Additional data on repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions as well 
as derivative exposures are also included in the distinction of the business 
models, especially identifying more investment-oriented banks. A more 
granular view of the different funding sources, investment activities, 
maturity transformation functions or risk exposures was not obtainable due 
to the unavailability or incomparability data.  
In order to ensure that the clustering analysis was based on a full 
sample, missing observations were supplied using multiple imputation 
techniques, which complete variables with OLS regression estimates using 
existing relationships within the sample. Potential errors were accounted 
for by producing a total of 10 random imputation estimates, effectively 
multiplying the total sample by a factor of 10. Unlike Ayadi et al. (2011), the 
estimation exercise was improved by relying on a larger set of indicators 
that were found to be better covariates of the used instruments.  
The set of instruments that form the basis of the analysis is different 
from Ayadi et al. (2011) due to the more advanced selection procedures 
explained above. For funding sources and investment activities, the 
clustering relied on transactions with traditional and less traditional 
activities, e.g. intra-bank exposures, debt liabilities and derivative 
transactions. Most likely due to the high correlation with included 
instruments, customer deposits and trading assets did not appear to 
improve the distinctiveness of the clusters substantially and were thus not 
selected as instruments. Moreover, the domestic assets variable was not 
available for many bank-year observations in the enlarged sample and thus 
had to be excluded from the clustering analysis, even though some 
descriptive results are provided below. With the removal of these variables 
and the addition of two new instruments, debt liabilities and bank loans, 
the total indicator set was reduced to five (down from six in the previous 
study).  
The instrument selection procedure led to the following collection as 
the most distinct and easiest to interpret, which was used in the clustering 
analysis:8  
1. Bank liabilities (as a % of assets). Identifies the share of liabilities of other 
banks, including deposits and issued debt. Banks with greater 
                                                   
8 See Ayadi et al. (2011) for the construction of the variables used in the study.  
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interbank funding requirements, often due to an excessive reliance on 
short-term funding, have faced severe problems in the earlier phases of 
the crisis. 
2. Bank loans (as % of assets). The instrument shows the share of total assets 
held as loans to other banks, which is expected to be greater for banks 
that are more active lenders in the wholesale markets. Much like 
wholesale funding exposures, wholesale lending exposures could imply 
risks emanating from interconnectedness. It is important to note that 
not all banks are active in the wholesale markets as both borrowers and 
lenders, which is the reason that the instrument was selected.  
3. Debt liabilities (as % of assets). Calculated by netting customer deposits, 
bank liabilities, total equity and negative fair values of all derivative 
transactions from total liabilities. The instrument is strongly (and 
negatively) correlated with customer deposit funding. While bank 
liabilities are comprised of short-term interbank debt, the broader debt 
liabilities indicator provides a general insight into the bank’s exposure 
to market funding.  
4. Total derivative exposures (as % of assets). This instrument captures all 
positive and negative (fair value) exposures, incorporating interest, 
currency, equity, over-the-counter, hedge and trading derivatives, 
which represent the more volatile parts of the balance sheets of 
investment-oriented banks. 
5. Tangible common equity (as % of tangible assets). Tangible common equity 
focuses on the most loss-absorbing part of a bank’s capital, which is 
expected to remain high in banks that are more risk-averse. The 
calculation nets out intangible assets and goodwill from common 
equity, which comprises common stocks, retained earnings and equity 
reserves. The instrument is a good proxy for the leverage ratio.  
Although the arbitrary nature of instrument selection was addressed, 
the analysis nonetheless remains dependent on the methodological choices, 
including most notably the distance metric, procedures for forming clusters 
and the ’stopping rule’ used to determine the optimal number of clusters. 
Alternative configurations were tested to confirm that the results were not 
excessively dependent on these aspects. However, the multiplicity of the 
potential clustering procedures and a general lack of theory on the 
performance of these models imply that the results should be treated with 
care.  
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1.2 What business models for EU banking? 
The procedures summarised in the prior subsection were used to identify 
the most distinct business models in European banking. The analysis 
identified four models as the most distinct form of clustering.9 Table 1.1 
gives the descriptive statistics for the four models resulting from the cluster 
analysis based on selected balance sheet indicators. Next, we provide an 
overview of the main structural and financial attributes of the clusters. It is 
important to highlight once again that the instruments used in the 
clustering are a subset of the entire set of variables in the sample.  
Figure 1.1 Comparison of clusters, standardised scores 
 
Notes: Indicators marked with an asterisk (*) were used as instruments in the cluster analysis. The 
figures represent the number of standard deviations from the sample mean. Customer loans and 
customer deposits represent balance sheet share of deposits from and loans to non-bank private 
customers, respectively. Bank liabilities and bank loans identify the share of liabilities of and loans to 
other banks, including bank deposits, issued debt, interbank transactions, and use of central bank 
facilities. Debt liabilities are calculated by netting customer deposits, bank liabilities, total equity and 
negative fair values of all derivative transactions from total liabilities. Derivative exposures captures 
all positive and negative (fair value) exposures. Trading assets are defined as total assets minus liquid 
assets (cash & deposits at central bank) minus total loans minus intangible assets. (Tangible) common 
equity is defined as common equity minus intangible assets and treasury shares as a share of tangible 
assets (i.e. total assets minus intangible assets). 
                                                   
9 The clustering methodology is part of CEPS’ ongoing research on monitoring of business models in 
European banking.  
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics for the four clusters 
  
Customer 
deposits 
(% assets) 
Customer 
loans 
(% assets) 
Bank 
liabilities 
(% assets) 
Bank 
loans 
(% assets) 
Debt 
liabilities 
(% assets) 
Derivative 
exposures 
(% assets) 
Trading 
assets 
(% assets) 
Tangible 
common eq. 
(% tang. assets) 
Model 1 
(31 obs.) 
Mean 29.7% 38.3% 9.3% 6.3% 37.9% 38.3% 52.8% 2.6% 
St. dev. 0.091*** 0.109** 0.041** 0.034** 0.084* 0.191*** 0.121*** 0.009** 
Min. 16.3% 22.8% 4.5% 2.3% 21.3% 11.5% 28.7% 1.0% 
Max. 50.0% 63.1% 23.3% 17.1% 52.7% 95.1% 72.9% 4.1% 
Model 2 
(96 obs.) 
Mean 56.5% 60.9% 16.4% 9.2% 17.4% 5.7% 25.7% 5.4% 
St. dev. 0.142*** 0.139** 0.077*** 0.055** 0.104*** 0.062** 0.124** 0.022*** 
Min. 31.2% 10.8% 0.7% 1.3% 1.4% 0.1% 11.0% 1.1% 
Max. 87.1% 80.1% 34.3% 27.0% 43.9% 33.4% 71.3% 13.9% 
Model 3 
(106 
obs.) 
Mean 38.5% 65.0% 8.5% 5.7% 44.3% 6.2% 26.2% 3.8% 
St. dev. 0.128*** 0.098** 0.04** 0.027** 0.123* 0.049** 0.102** 0.015*** 
Min. 2.3% 35.7% 0.0% 0.4% 19.9% 0.0% 6.6% -1.1% 
Max. 63.4% 84.6% 17.5% 11.9% 83.1% 23.2% 56.3% 6.8% 
Model 4 
(79 obs.) 
Mean 24.3% 42.1% 23.2% 16.6% 42.1% 14.2% 39.9% 2.3% 
St. dev. 0.068*** 0.13** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.075* 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.007** 
Min. 12.0% 18.1% 8.7% 4.7% 22.8% 2.3% 23.9% 0.6% 
Max. 40.7% 68.1% 42.4% 44.2% 62.7% 47.9% 61.1% 3.6% 
All 
banks 
(312 
obs.) 
Mean 39.5% 55.3% 14.7% 9.6% 34.8% 11.3% 32.1% 3.8% 
St. dev. 0.171 0.161 0.088 0.072 0.156 0.131 0.142 0.02 
Min. 2.3% 10.8% 0.0% 0.4% 1.4% 0.0% 6.6% -1.1% 
Max. 87.1% 84.6% 42.4% 44.2% 83.1% 95.1% 72.9% 13.9% 
Notes: The independence of clusters was tested using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at 5% significance. According to 
the results of these tests, the number of asterisks (*,**,or ***) stands for the statistical difference of any given cluster from that number of other 
clusters for that indicator. For example, two asterisks (**) implies that the cluster is statistically different from two other clusters but not the third 
(closest) one. Variables in bold highlight the instruments used in forming the clusters. 
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Model 1 groups together large investment-oriented banks, which is 
by far the largest group by size, both in terms of total and average assets.10 
The average size of a bank in this cluster was approximately €1.5 trillion in 
2010, more than the quadruple for an average wholesale or diversified 
retail bank and representing a substantial proportion of the financial 
activities in the country they are headquartered in.  
In what follows, Model 1 will be referred to the cluster of ‘investment 
banks’. As is clear from the name, these banks have substantial trading 
activities. The cluster averages for trading assets and derivative 
exposures—representing 52.8% and 38.3% of total assets, respectively—
stand one and a half standard deviations above the relevant sample means. 
The investment banks are more internationally-oriented, with nearly half of 
total assets located outside the home country, which is an additional 
explanation of their relative sizes (see Table 1.2). In funding, the focus is on 
less stable and less traditional sources, such as debt liabilities and more 
importantly repurchase agreements, which have come under severe stress 
during the financial crisis (Gorton & Metrick, forthcoming). The investment 
banks also tend to be highly leveraged, with an average tangible common 
equity ratio of 2.6%. 
Model 2 is composed of retail-oriented banks, which are heavily 
concentrated on traditional activities.11 In particular, customer deposits and 
loans respectively account for 56.5% and 60.9% of the total balance sheet on 
average, surpassing the sample averages. The reliance on debt issuance is 
more than one standard deviation below the sample average, with debt 
liabilities representing only 17.4% of the balance sheet total. The banks are 
substantially better capitalised than all other groups, with an average 
tangible common equity to assets ratio of 5.4%. Similarly, the ratio of cash 
and cash-like liquid assets remains above the sample average at 3.0% (see 
Table 1.3).  
                                                   
10 All of the banks identified as investment banks in Ayadi et al. (2011) were identified as such in this 
study, although the inverse is not true. Most notably, two banks originally identified as retail banks 
and one bank as wholesale bank in the previous study were identified here as investment banks. To 
some extent, the results are due to the fact that the instruments used here have been selected to pick 
the most distinct clustering solution, as opposed to the prior study where no alternative evaluations 
were made.  
11 More than two-thirds of the banks falling under the ‘retail’ banking model were not included in the 
sample in Ayadi et al. (2011) due to their smaller sizes.  
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Table 1.2. Evolution of the sizes of business models 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Sum of total assets (€ billion) Total assets of average bank (€ billion) 
Model 1. ‘Investment’ 6,628 7,453 10,839 8,693 8,968 1,105 1,242 1,548 1,449 1,495 
Model 2. ’Retail – focused’ 1,947 3,006 1,900 3,416 3,178 102 150 112 171 159 
Model 3. ‘Retail – divers.’ 4,448 5,185 5,965 6,988 8,195 247 236 271 333 356 
Model 4. ‘Wholesale’ 6,479 6,210 7,535 5,597 4,990 360 414 419 373 384 
All banks 19,502 21,854 26,239 24,695 25,331 340 398 426 406 416 
Note: All figures correspond to the year-end observations for the relevant sub-sample. 
 
Table 1.3. Other attributes across business models 
 Model 1 - 
Investment 
Model 2 –
Retail–focus. 
Model 3 -
Retail–divers. 
Model 4 - 
Wholesale 
All banks 
Size (% of GDP) 105.0%*** 55.3%*** 59.2%*** 45.7%*** 59.1% 
Domestic assets (% of assets) 55.2%*** 79.4%* 84.8%* 80.5%* 79.1% 
Personnel expenditures (% of assets) 7.2** 10.4*** 8.2** 4.3*** 7.8% 
Liquid assets (% of assets) 1.8%** 3.0%*** 2.0%** 1.0%*** 2.0% 
Rev. repurchase (% of assets) 8.4% 6.3% 4.4% 6.1% 6.5% 
Repurchase (% of assets) 8.9%** 5.7%** 4.0%** 6.0%** 5.7% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sub-sample. The independence of clusters was tested using 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at 5% significance. According to the results of these tests, the number of asterisks (*,** 
or ***) stands for the statistical difference of any given cluster from that number of other clusters for that indicator. For example, two asterisks (**) 
implies that the cluster is statistically different from two other clusters but not the third (closest) one. 
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On a more structural note, the average size of a predominantly retail-
oriented bank under Model 2, as measured by average total assets, tends to 
be half of the sample average, by far the smallest banks in our sample. Most 
of these banks are located in smaller countries, with the total assets of an 
average bank representing over half of the GDP of the countries in which 
they are headquartered. Lastly, the staff expenditures remain high, possibly 
pointing at a larger geographical coverage through a larger number of 
branches and personnel.  
Model 3 shares several similarities with Model 2. First, and foremost, 
the group is comprised of retail-oriented banks, with traditional customer 
loans representing on average two-thirds of the balance sheet totals in both 
groups. These banks also tend to be relatively well-capitalised, implying a 
relatively high average tangible common equity ratio corresponding to a 
low leverage multiple. However, the two models do differ on funding 
sources. While the Model 2 banks rely purely on customer deposits, the 
Model 3 banks have more reliance on debt markets. The greater 
diversification of funding sources is most possibly an attempt to maintain a 
larger size. In line with this description, the Model 3 banks have continued 
to expand during the crisis, implying that the reliance on multiple sources 
of financing has reinforced the group’s growth prospects.  
In order to distinguish between the two retail-oriented groups, the 
models 2 and 3 will be referred to as the ‘retail – focused’ and ‘retail – 
diversified’ models, respectively.12 
Model 4 includes banks with a heavy reliance on interbank funding 
and lending.13 The liabilities of an average bank under this bank model to 
other banks, including both deposits and other interbank debt, represent 
nearly one-quarter of the total balance sheet, towering above the interbank 
liabilities of other bank models. In turn, traditional customer deposits 
represent only one-quarter of the total balance sheet—the lowest among the 
four groups. Other funding sources come from debt liabilities, which 
exclude traditional deposits and interbank funding.  
The Model 4 banks, which will henceforth be referred to as 
‘wholesale’, are also very active in non-traditional uses of these funds, 
                                                   
12 In Ayadi et al. (2011), the banks under models 2 and 3 were grouped together as a single retail bank 
cluster due to the limited coverage of the smaller retail banks in the sample of the prior study.  
13 The group of banks identified as wholesale banks have not changed substantially from Ayadi et al. 
(2011). In particular, nearly 91% bank/year observations identified as wholesale banks in the earlier 
study were identically grouped here.  
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including trading assets (i.e. all assets excluding cash, loans and intangible 
assets), which account on average for 40% of their balance sheets, and 
derivative exposures, which represent 14.2% of total assets. They are 
substantially more leveraged than their peers, with the lowest tangible 
common equity ratio of 2.3% among the four clusters studied. The total size 
of the wholesale banking group has declined over time, partly as a result of 
shrinking average sizes in the midst of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009,. 
Lastly, the expenditures on staff is the lowest for the wholesale banking 
group, with average personnel expenditures remaining at €4.3 per €1,000 of 
assets, nearly half of the sample average. 
Table 1.4. Model transition matrix, share of banks (%) 
 Current period (t) 
Prior period 
(t-1) 
Model 1 - 
Investment 
Model 2 - 
Retail-focus. 
Model 3 - 
Retail-divers. 
Model 4 - 
Wholesale 
Model 1 96.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Model 2 0.0% 86.3% 12.3% 1.4% 
Model 3 0.0% 9.8% 87.8% 2.4% 
Model 4 0.0% 1.6% 9.4% 89.1% 
Note: The figures show the share of banks that start under a given business model in the prior period 
and moving to another model in the current period.  
 
Although the composition of banks under the different models 
remain relatively steady over time, transitions do occur and more so in 
some models than in others.14 Table 1.4 provides the transition matrix for 
the four models through the years 2006 to 2010. The assignment of banks to 
the investment models shows striking persistence. In particular, 
approximately all of the investment banks remain within the same model 
throughout the sampled years. Moreover, no single bank becomes an 
investment bank over the entire sample. However, the transition 
probabilities are relatively high for the focused and diversified retail 
groups, with 10% or more of all banks that start in one group moving to the 
other model in the subsequent period. In addition, approximately 9.4% of 
all banks that start as a wholesale bank become a diversified retail bank 
subsequently although the opposite is true for only 2.4% of the diversified 
retail banks. The fact that an equally forceful opposing trend does not exist 
suggests that the wholesale-to-diversified retail transitions are more likely 
                                                   
14 See Appendix 5 for a complete list of banks surveyed, grouped by business model. 
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to be evidence of changing business models, also confirmed by the 
reduction in the size of the wholesale group over time (see Table 1.2).15  
The results provided above give an insight into the main areas of 
activity and inherent characteristics of the four different bank business 
models: on the one hand are banks that engage in more risky and less 
stable funding and trading activities; on the other hand are banks, which 
remain closer to their traditional roots, relying more on retail funding and 
customer loans. The next two sections will consider whether these basic 
characteristics are confirmed by a detailed analysis of the financial, 
economic performance and risk attributes of the four models.  
1.3 What performance and contribution to the real economy? 
The comparative performances of the four business models are 
summarised in Table 1.5. As is clear from the figures, wholesale banks 
appear to do relatively badly among the four models in all of measures 
depicted, including return-on-assets (RoA), return-on-equity (RoE), and 
cost-to-income ratios (CIR).  
Table 1.5. Performance indicators across business models 
 Model 1 - 
Investment 
Model 2 – 
Retail- 
focused 
Model 3 –  
Retail-
diversified 
Model 4 – 
Wholesale 
All 
Return on 
assets (RoA) 
0.48%** 0.85%*** 0.65%** 0.16%*** 0.57% 
Return on 
equity (RoE) 
12.10%* 9.24%* 12.07%* 3.51%*** 9.03% 
Cost-to-
income (CIR) 
64.41%* 55.82%*** 58.97%** 118.11%** 73.57% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sub-sample. The 
independence of clusters was tested using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample 
tests at 5% significance. According to the results of these tests, the number of asterisks (*,** or ***) 
stands for the statistical difference of any given cluster from that number of other clusters for that 
indicator. For example, two asterisks (**) implies that the cluster is statistically different from two 
(furthest) clusters but not the third (closest) one.  
 
                                                   
15 An analysis of the year-by-year transitions (not provided here) shows that the transitions from the 
wholesale to diversified retail models were particularly high in 2007 and 2009, both prior to and 
during the crisis.  
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In particular, although the statistical tests performed above fail to 
distinguish among the investment and retail-oriented models, they do set 
apart the wholesale bank group as the poorest performer. At the same time, 
the focused retail banks generally do better than their peers in profitability 
and cost efficiency measures. Diversified retail banks also do relatively 
well, although their performance in certain measures (e.g. RoE and CIR) is 
comparable to that of investment banks. Lastly, due to substantial 
variability in cost efficiency figures, the wholesale and investment banks 
are not distinguishable statistically, despite substantial differences in their 
mean values.  
The average performances of the four business models given in Table 
1.5  hide the evolution of profits over recent years, in particular over the 
crisis years of 2008 and 2009. As depicted in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, when the 
time series of the profit indicators are considered, wholesale banks 
continue to clearly lag behind their peers, with profits turning into negative 
territory during the crisis. Interestingly, despite the heavy hit that other 
banks have taken, most groups manage to obtain positive results for all 
years.16 Only focused retail banks have suffered substantially negative 
results in 2010, which are due to the large losses suffered by a single retail 
bank, Allied Irish Banks.17 Investments banks did suffer from low profits in 
2008, but their profits quickly bounced back in 2009, putting them above 
their peers in both profitability measures by 2010. A similar but less elastic 
response of profitability to the crisis is also observed for diversified retail 
banks, whose profits dropped to a sample minimum in 2009, only to 
slightly improve in 2010. The rebounding of profits is further evidence that 
most banks, with the potential exception of smaller, focused retail-driven 
ones, can increase their capital levels by retaining earnings.  
                                                   
16 The relative robustness of the earnings of the investment banks during the crisis contrasts with the 
more mixed picture presented in Ayadi et al. (2011). However, the improved results for the 
investment banks in this study are entirely due to a more consistent identification of the investment 
bank group in this study.  
17 Allied Irish Banks was recapitalised by the Irish government in 2009. In 2010, the Irish government 
took a majority stake in the bank and has received a total of nearly €20 billion in state funds since the 
onset of the Irish banking crisis in 2008, mostly in the aftermath of the 2010 year-end losses of €11.9 
billion.  
A deeper assessment shows that retail banks would achieve lower profits than their peers even if the 
Allied Irish Banks was excluded from the sample. More specifically, the exclusion of Allied Irish 
Banks from the sample would increase the RoE for 2010 to 3.3%, which remains below the averages 
for other groups. In turn, for RoA, the exclusion of the bank from the sample would put the retail 
banks on top of the earnings table, along with investment banks. 
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Figure 1.2 Evolution of return on assets (RoA) 
 
Figure 1.3 Evolution of return on equity (RoE) 
 
A more detailed analysis of the breakdown of incomes reveals a 
mixed picture. In particular, Figure 1.4 shows that investment banks clearly 
have substantial non-interest earnings, most notably from fees, trading and 
other earnings, which include insurance earnings. Meanwhile, focused 
retail banks rely substantially more on interest income.  
The figures also highlight several less straight-forward results. In 
particular, all business models on average earn nearly one-quarter of their 
net incomes in commissions and fees. Similarly, although wholesale banks 
have been shown to have substantial trading and derivative exposures, 
they achieve negative returns from those activities, with the trading losses 
of 0.7% of total incomes. Instead, the net interest incomes are more stable 
for wholesale banks, which is paradoxical due to the lesser importance of 
traditional banking activities for this category of banks. Conversely, 
diversified retail banks, which have low trading and derivative exposures, 
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appear to earn from these activities a relative amount that is comparable to 
investment banks.  
Figure 1.4 Main income sources across business models, 2006-10 
 
Note: Since annual results are substantially varied, the figures represent the aggregate proportions 
obtained by summing up the year-end observations for each income item and business model. 
Figure 1.5 Evolution of trading income across business models 
 
Note: Since annual results are substantially varied, the figures represent the aggregate proportions 
obtained by summing up the year-end observations for each income item and business model.  
 
Why do the shares of trading earnings fail to identify the underlying 
models?  
An analysis of the evolution of trading incomes depicted in Figure 1.5 
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from trading, with the investment banks clearly coming on top, followed 
by diversified retail and wholesale-oriented banks, respectively. The 
ranking changes considerably during the crisis, with wholesale banks 
posting breathtaking losses of over 50% of net incomes in 2008.18 
Investment banks’ trading earnings also took a hit, albeit to a lesser extent. 
In contrast, diversified retail banks managed to obtain above-average 
returns in most years, surpassing the performances of all other banking 
models, including the investment banks, during and after the crisis. In 
short, the share of trading incomes fails to identify correctly the business 
models in our sample precisely due to heavy losses suffered by the 
wholesale and investment banks, which traditionally have greater trading 
exposures than other models.  
To a large extent, the concentrated losses in the wholesale banking 
sector were due to the write-downs on US subprime exposures in the early 
phases of the financial crisis in 2008, in some cases well before the fall of 
Lehman Brothers. The write-downs by the wholesale banking group that 
were made public by August 2008, including most notably the state-owned 
German Landesbanken, added up to approximately €29 billion, nearly two-
thirds of the year-end trading losses reported by all the wholesale banks.19 
The previous results show that . income characteristics may serve as a 
poor indicator for assessing bank business models. For example, the share 
of commissions and fees, often used to distinguish investment-oriented 
banks, is similar across the four models on average.20 In addition, the 
volatility of earnings renders the assessment of business models using 
income characteristics less reliable. Indeed, the share of trading income 
would not be able to identify correctly the set of investment or wholesale-
oriented banks, as already noted above. In addition, the results highlight 
the relative stability of retail-oriented banks, including diversified retail 
                                                   
18 The trading losses suffered by the wholesale banking group are not due to the presence of outlier 
observations, with six banks posting losses of more than 100% of net incomes between the years 2008 
and 2010, including DZ Bank, Dexia, Hsh Nordbank, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, 
Oesterreichische Volksbank, and Wgz Bank. More strikingly, with the exception of a single entity, 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, all of the wholesale banks have posted trading losses in 2008, 
adding up to aggregate losses of €44 billion or nearly 30% of the tangible capital equity for the group 
as a whole. In contrast, among the investment banks, only two of the seven banks recorded losses for 
those years, representing less than 5% of aggregate capital. 
19 The data on losses were obtained from Bloomberg, Banks' Subprime Losses, 12 August 2008 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8sW0n1Cs1tY).  
20 See Stiroh (2004 and 2006) for the use of income characteristics to distinguish among the different 
business models.  
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banks, which appear to outperform their peers in cost efficiency and 
performance.  
An additional question that remains to be answered is the extent to 
which the different business models continued to contribute to economic 
activity by providing loans. Faced with eroding capital bases, banks may 
turn to either raising more capital or de-leveraging. Booked losses and 
dropping asset prices often make it difficult for banks with low levels of 
capital to raise further capital, making the reduction of balance sheet size 
the more optimal choice (Myers, 1977; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Moreover, 
crisis conditions increase credit costs across the board, leading to higher 
agency costs of lending, pushing the less-diversified banks to engage in 
‘flight to quality’ in search of more stable securities than loans (Lang & 
Nakamura, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1996). Thus, due to various difficulties, 
banks may choose to shrink their balance sheets by rationing loans and 
other investments.21  
To what extent the slowing down of loan growth or deleveraging has 
occurred depends crucially on the risk characteristics and capital levels 
associated with the different bank business models. Based on the 
arguments outlined above, there is reason to suspect that banks with less 
diversified credit risks (such as focused retail-oriented banks) and 
inadequate capital levels (such as wholesale banks) would slow their 
supply of credit more than others.  
Figure 1.6 shows that the growth of loans has subsided substantially 
after 2008 across all business models and has failed to take-off in 2010. In 
particular, the results confirm that outstanding customer loans have shrunk 
dramatically for wholesale banks, turning negative in 2009. For focused 
retail banks, the growth of loans have also slowed down substantially, 
stopped completely in 2009. All groups managed to expand their 
outstanding loans in 2010, although the gains for wholesale banks remain 
relatively small. In turn, the larger investment banks have continued to 
expand their loan books despite the crisis, although generally at a much 
slower rate than other banks. More strikingly, diversified retail banks have 
                                                   
21 It should not be forgotten that a decline in credit growth may not necessarily be a negative 
outcome, largely the result of a realignment of asset prices with fundamentals. See Borio & Lowe 
(2002) and Reinhart & Rogoff (2009), who show that rapid credit growth, in conjunction with rising 
real estate prices, can lead to financial instability and are the primary drivers of crises. Several authors 
suggest that various macro-prudential and monetary policy tools should be used to respond to these 
challenges and to the build-up of risk over time. See Allen & Carletti (2011) for an excellent 
discussion and literature review on these issues.  
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continued to expand their lending despite the crisis, although at gradually 
lower rates over the years. 
Figure 1.6 Growth in outstanding customer loans (% change from past year) 
 
To sum up, the results presented in this section show that retail-
oriented banks have generally outperformed their peers in terms of cost 
efficiency and performance measures. Wholesale banks and to a lesser 
extent investment banks have suffered substantial trading losses amidst the 
crisis, which has contributed to their less stable performances. The results 
also show that credit growth has slowed down for all banks and business 
models, in some cases leading to deleveraging. This is especially the case 
for the smaller focused retail banks and the inadequately capitalised 
wholesale banks. In turn, diversified retail banks have continued to extend 
credit despite the financial crisis. Lastly, the income characteristics are 
shown to be poor proxies for identifying the business models, due largely 
to the variability and responsiveness of earnings to market conditions.  
1.4 What risks and how are they mitigated? 
The key risk indicators are summarised in Table 1.6. For the most part, the 
results confirm earlier arguments on the risk attributes of various models. 
In particular, banks that rely more on non-stable forms of funding and 
risky investments, such as wholesale and investment banks, tend to face 
greater estimated default risks and lower liquidity. The focused retail banks 
face comparable default risks, although these risks appear to be well 
shielded by relatively strong capital levels and limited liquidity mismatch 
risks, at least on average. The diversified retail banking model does well 
under most measures, with low default risks, an average level of 
capitalisation and moderate liquidity risks. 
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Table 1.6. Risk indicators across business models 
 Model 1 - Investment 
Model 2 – 
Retail-
focused 
Model 3 –  
Retail-
divers. 
Model 4 – 
Wholesale All 
Z-score (std.dev. 
from default) 
15.1* 16.1* 21.5* 12.2*** 16.8 
Risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) (% assets) 
34.5%** 57.9%** 54.1%** 37.3%** 49.6% 
CDS spread (senior, 
annual avg., bps.) 
69.2 143.5 96.5 109.9 101.7 
Tier-1 capital ratio 
(% of RWA) 
9.6% 9.8% 9.0% 9.7% 9.5% 
Tang. common eq. 
(% of tang. assets)  
2.6%** 5.4%*** 3.8%*** 2.3%** 3.8% 
NSFR (Avail./req. 
funding) 
60.2%*** 93.6%*** 84.1%*** 72.0%*** 81.0% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sub-sample. The 
independence of clusters was tested using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests 
at 5% significance. According to the results of these tests, the number of asterisks (*,** or ***) 
stands for the statistical difference of any given cluster from that number of other clusters for that 
indicator. For example, two asterisks (**) implies that the cluster is statistically different from two 
(furthest) clusters but not the third (closest) one. See Appendix II for the assumptions pertaining to 
the construction of the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) measure.  
 
The first indicator, Z-score, provides an estimate of a bank’s distance 
to default.22 In essence, the risk measure uses historical earnings volatility 
and current capital levels to construct the level of a (one-time) shock 
beyond the historical average that would lead to default. The greater the Z-
score, the less probable is the likelihood of a default. The diversified retail 
banks appear safer, with a higher distance to default and a high level of net 
stable funding. However, statistical analysis reveals that the distributions 
of Z-scores for diversified retail, investment and focused retail banks 
cannot be distinguished. In turn, wholesale banks have effectively the 
lower Z-scores, implying the highest risks.  
The second indicator, the ratio of risk-weighted assets (RWA) to total 
assets, or the average risk-weights, provides a regulatory measure of risk. 
Banks with higher RWA are expected to be prone to risks and are thus 
required to hold more regulatory capital to account for their risk-weighted 
                                                   
22 See Appendix III for calculation of the Z-score. 
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balance sheet. According to the statistical analysis, the wholesale and 
investment models as well as the two retail-oriented models share the same 
underlying distributions for these variables. In particular, both wholesale 
and investment banks appear to be less risky, with an average risk weight 
of approximately 35%, which is substantially smaller than the average risk 
weights of the retail-oriented banks (approximately 55%). The finding that 
wholesale banks have less exposure to risks in their assets is intriguing and 
clearly inconsistent with the Z-score findings, which indicated higher 
default risks.23  
The third indicator, the average CDS spreads for senior securities, 
displays some variation among the four groups, most notably for the 
wholesale and focused retail banking groups, for which the averages are 
relatively high. However, the statistical analysis is unable to uncover any 
statistical significance, implying that the underlying distributions may be 
identical. Echoing the results in Ayadi et al. (2011), the market participants 
do not appear to distinguish between the four models in terms of their 
inherent risks. Provided that other indicators do find substantial 
differences for the underlying risks, it is likely that the market participants 
have already factored in the likelihood of bail-outs, resulting in the 
comparability of the markets’ perception of default risks. Once again, these 
findings give support to the elevation of moral hazard risks due to the 
dilution of market discipline in the eventuality of bank bail-outs or state 
guarantees (Calomiris & Kahn, 1991).  
The fourth and fifth indicators measure the loss-absorption capacity 
of banks, under the current Basel II rules. For any given level of risk, 
holding more capital could imply greater stability. The results show that 
the Tier-1 ratios are statistically indistinguishable among the four banking 
groups, implying a more or less identical absorption capacity. Retail banks 
hold substantially more tangible common equity, which is likely to make 
them safer at least for the period of observation under investigation. The 
fact that this added level of safety is not reflected in the Tier-1 ratios is 
intriguing and invites the possibility that the main regulatory instrument 
currently in use may not be adequately for capturing (or signalling) the 
loss-absorption capacity of a bank.  
The sixth indicator, net stable funding (NSF) ratio, is an estimate of 
the proposed long-term liquidity risk measure proposed under the Basel III 
                                                   
23 See below for a deeper inquiry into why the regulatory and estimated risk measures may differ so 
radically.  
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rules, (BCBS, 2010c). Expressed simply, the measure gives an estimate of 
the available stable funding sources as a share of required stable funding, 
which is constructed with available data. Although the measure should be 
interpreted with caution, a greater value should point to lower liquidity 
risks.24 The figures show that the retail oriented banking models face 
relatively lower liquidity risks, while investment banks may face higher 
risks. It is important to note that no single bank satisfies the 100% funding 
requirement on average, as proposed under Basel III. Moreover, Figure 1.7 
shows that liquidity conditions have gradually worsened for all models in 
recent years, particularly for the investment and wholesale banks that took 
severe liquidity hits in 2008.  
Figure 1.7 Evolution of net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
 
Note: See Appendix II for the assumptions pertaining to the construction of the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR). 
 
An alternative assessment of default risks follows the ‘top-down’ 
approach to calibrating regulatory minimum capital requirements under 
stress conditions, as described in BCBS (2010d). More specifically, the 
quantiles of the return to risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) are used to 
                                                   
24 See Appendix II for a detailed description of the measure used in this study. Note that the 
developed indicator suffers substantially from the unavailability of detailed information. In particular, 
the disclosure requirements that are currently applicable do not require banks to distinguish between 
different maturities, secured transactions and many specific asset and liability classes that are relevant 
for determining liquidity in an institution.  
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construct expected losses that banks may face under a stress scenario. If the 
most loss-absorbing parts of equity (i.e. the tangible common capital ratio) 
remain below or close to such a measure, then the likelihood of a default 
would be equally higher under those stress conditions.  
As an illustrative example, consider a bank that achieves 3% RoRWA 
in normal years. Let us assume that in a bad year, which occurs randomly 
once every 20 years, the bank faces a 7% loss. Note that the loss 
corresponds precisely to the 5th percentile of the distribution function. 
Although average earnings (2.5% RoRWA) may be considered healthy, the 
bank will nevertheless default if its risk-adjusted capital level is below 7% 
in a bad year. Assuming a similar distribution for other banks, the 
regulators should ensure that the banks have at least this amount of capital 
at all times to cope with stress when needed. 
Figure 1.8 Distribution of risk-weighted returns (RoRWA) 
 
Note: This figure depicts the quantile distribution (in 5-percentile bars) and the estimated kernel 
density (dark line) for all banks covered in the study for the years 2006 to 2010.  
 
Naturally, the distribution of returns of actual banks is substantially 
more varied than the example above. In particular, Figure 1.8 provides an 
illustration of the distribution of the risk-weighted returns for all banks and 
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kernel estimates) is around 1% RoRWA, implying health returns for most 
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banks in normal years. Assuming that a bad year is defined as a once in a 
10-year event, i.e. lower 10th percentile losses, banks face RoRWA losses of 
0.6% (see also Table 1.7). If a bad year is defined to be a rarer and thus a 
more destructive event, i.e. lower 5th percentile, the potential losses increase 
to 1.9%.25  
Using such estimates for different business models, one can assess the 
adequacy of the capital requirements to cope with stress conditions. 
For our sample, the number of observations is largely insufficient to 
produce consistent estimates for the 1st and 5th percentiles, especially for 
individual business models. The limited sample size thus increases the 
likelihood of estimation errors. Moreover, the relevant order statistics may 
be substantially biased if the underlying distribution is not normal. In order 
to address the latter concern, the distribution-free quantile estimator first 
proposed by Harrell & Davis (1982) was used to generate alternative 
estimates for the lower percentiles, in addition to the statistics obtained 
from the original sample.26 The estimation results should nevertheless be 
interpreted with caution due to potential estimation errors. 
The lower percentile estimates depicted in Table 1.7 provide an 
insight into the potential losses that banks have faced in recent years. When 
the entire sample is considered, the risk-adjusted losses, as measured by 
RoRWA, are approximately 4.2% at the 1st percentile.27 Losses are 
substantially greater during the crisis years, with the pooled sample of 
banks facing risk-adjusted 1st percentile losses of 6.3%. In turn, if the crisis 
years were not considered, an average bank in our sample is expected to 
attain a 0.1% RoRWA.28  
                                                   
25 Assuming that earnings are randomly and independently distributed, the estimates would imply that 
a bank with risk-adjusted capital less than 1.9% would face a default likelihood of 5% at any given 
point in time. However, the earnings distributions of different banks are typically highly correlated, 
especially when interbank activities and common exposures are substantial. It is also assumed that 
losses are not correlated over time, which is also not likely to be the case. Based on these 
shortcomings, the actual default likelihoods are likely to be much higher than the levels implied by 
the percentile estimates.  
26 Harrell & Davis (1982) provide a kernel quantile estimator in which the order statistics (i.e. 
smallest observations) used in traditional nonparametric estimators are given the greatest weight. 
27 The pooled sample statistics for 1st percentile are largely in line with the figures provided in BCBS 
(2010d), which estimate RoRWA losses of 4%.  
28 Although the estimates for different years can clearly not be used to build the scenarios, the 
substantial differences highlight the need for a balanced data. Whether and the extent to which the 
crisis years are included in the dataset have a substantial impact on the severity of the stress scenarios 
and the relevant capital requirements.  
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The distinction between the sample statistics and the Harrell-Davis 
estimates hint that concerns over the consistency of estimates could be 
well-placed. Even for the entire sample (with 328 observations), all of the 
depicted percentile estimates differ from the original figures. In particular, 
the estimated RoRWA loss at the 1st percentile is 5.4%, implying that banks 
with lower capital ratios are likely to default under such a stress event.  
 
Table 1.7. Lower percentile estimates for return on risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) 
  Sample statistics Harrell-Davis estimates 
 Obs. 1st 5
th 10th 1st 5th 10th 
ALL YEARS (2006-
10)        
Model 1 - Investment 31 -6.3% -0.5% 0.2% -5.8% -2.6% -0.3% 
…w/o RBS 28 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6% 
Model 2 – Retail 
focus. 92 -12.0% -2.2% 0.0% -9.3% -2.4% -0.3% 
…w/o Allied Irish 88 -4.1% -1.2% 0.3% -3.9% -1.5% 0.1% 
Model 3 – Retail 
divers. 106 -1.5% -0.5% 0.0% -2.0% -0.7% -0.1% 
Model 4 - Wholesale 64 -3.2% -2.0% -1.5% -3.1% -2.3% -1.6% 
All banks 328 -4.2% -1.9% -0.6% -5.4% -2.0% -0.8% 
PRE-CRISIS (2006-7)        
Model 1 - Investment 12 0.6% 0.6% 1.8% 0.6% 0.7% 1.2% 
Model 2 – Retail 
focus. 36 0.8% 0.9% 1.4% 0.8% 0.9% 1.3% 
Model 3 – Retail 
divers. 40 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 0.8% 0.9% 1.2% 
Model 4 - Wholesale 28 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 
All banks 129 0.1% 0.6% 0.9% -0.7% 0.0% 0.8% 
CRISIS (2008-9)        
Model 1 - Investment 19 -6.3% -6.3% -0.5% -6.0% -4.2% -1.8% 
…w/o RBS 16 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 
Model 2 – Retail 
focus. 56 -12.0% -3.9% -1.8% -10.6% -4.2% -1.8% 
…w/o Allied Irish 54 -4.1% -3.2% -0.2% -4.0% -2.7% -0.1% 
Model 3 – Retail 
divers. 66 -2.5% -1.2% -0.5% -2.3% -1.1% -0.5% 
Model 4 - Wholesale 36 -3.2% -2.8% -2.0% -3.1% -2.7% -2.2% 
All banks 199 -6.3% -2.8% -1.8% -7.3% -2.8% -1.7% 
Note: The figures correspond to the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile estimates of the distribution of the 
RoRWA, conditional on the business models and time periods across the sample.  
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Turning to the comparison of different business models, the figures 
show that diversified retail banks faced the least losses both before and 
during the crisis. The estimates of the 1st and 5th percentile losses for the 
diversified retail banks are relatively precise, ranging between 2.3-2.5% and 
1.1-1.2%. The same also applies to wholesale banks, albeit to a lesser extent, 
where the respective estimates range between 3.1-3.2% and 2.7-2.8%. Based 
on the 10th percentile results, wholesale banks clearly face the largest risks, 
scoring below all other business models in all of the estimated provided in 
Table 1.7. In turn, according to the 1st and 5th percentile estimates, both 
investment and focused retail banks have been subject to large losses.  
The outliers appear to play an important role in some of these results. 
One investment bank, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), has suffered RoRWA 
losses of 6.3% in 2008, with continued loss-making through 2010. Although 
dropping this observation substantially improves the results substantially, 
the relative small size of the investment bank cluster makes the 
comparisons less credible. The negative result for the focused retail banks is 
also partly driven by a single bank, the Allied Irish Banks, with a RoRWA 
loss of 12% in 2010. However, focused retail banks remain more risky than 
their diversified peers (and wholesale banks for 1st percentile losses in crisis 
years) even when the outlier observation is removed from the sample.  
Comparison of the mean loss values for RoRWA (Table 1.8) shows 
that the distinctions between clusters is far from clear when tested using 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests. Indeed, the 
results for all years (49 observations) show that the wholesale and 
diversified retail models are distinct from the focused retail model. 
However, the same result does not hold in crisis years; indeed, the 
available data do not allow us to distinguish the losses across business 
models when crisis years are considered, most likely due to the smaller 
qualifying sample. In particular, although the investment model appears to 
experience the largest losses, these occurred in only three observations in 
the entire sample. As a consequence, the non-parametric test is unable to 
identify the sample as statistically distinct from others.  
The findings show clear distinctions across business models in terms 
of riskiness. In particular, the average risk weights (as measured by RWA 
as a % of total assets) do not seem to be a good indicator of the underlying 
risks. In particular, wholesale banks face severe default risks (as measured 
by a low Z-score, or proximity to default) but appear to also enjoy low 
average risk weights (see Table 1.6).  
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Table 1.8 Mean RoRWA losses across business models 
 Model 1 - Investment 
Model 2 – 
Retail-focused 
Model 3 –  
Retail-
diversified 
Model 4 – 
Wholesale 
All years (2006-10) -2.3% -3.6%* -0.8%* -1.4%* 
Crisis years (2008-09) -3.4% -2.4% -0.7% -1.5% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for loss-making banks. The independence of clusters was 
tested using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at 5% significance. The 
number of asterisks (*,**, or ***) stands for the statistical difference of any given cluster from that 
number of other clusters for that indicator. For example, a single asterisk (*) implies that the cluster is 
statistically different from the furthest cluster but not the other two.  
 
One explanation for the finding that regulatory measures appear to 
be misaligned with underlying risks is the possibility that greater risk-
weights are associated with more capital. If banks with greater RWA also 
hold more capital, partly due to binding regulatory requirements, they may 
face lower default risks, possibly explaining the perverse relationship.29  
An alternative explanation is that banks may be engaging in ’risk 
optimisation’ to reduce their risk-weights (and the implied capital charges) 
without shedding any risks. Indeed, despite sound arguments for making 
capital requirements risk-sensitive, the complexity and flexibility of these 
rules have led to concerns over the potential for regulatory arbitrage.30 
Since raising capital is not always possible during the crisis periods, banks 
often choose to respond to regulatory shortfalls by decreasing their risk-
weighted assets. There is growing concern that such transactions need not 
always imply lower levels of risk and involve ‘cosmetic’ arrangements (i.e. 
regulatory arbitrage) that are motivated solely to optimise capital 
requirements.31 
                                                   
29 A closer examination reveals that for the relationship between RWA and distance to default to be 
positive, banks should respond to higher risk weights by holding substantially more capital than 
before, surpassing the adjustments implied by binding capital requirements. In other words, banks 
with higher RWA should hold substantially more capital than the minimum required amounts, and 
vice versa.  
30 The theoretical literature provides a simple argument for making capital requirements risk-
sensitive. Faced with purely linear (i.e. risk-insensitive) capital requirements, banks may shift their 
portfolios towards riskier assets, offsetting their losses from higher capital levels by increasing their 
portfolio risks (Kahane, 1977; Koehn & Santomero, 1980; Kim & Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). 
Empirical studies have confirmed that fixed capital requirements may increase risks, conditional on 
the size and the adequate capitalisation of the bank (Furlong & Keeley, 1989; Gennotte & Pyle, 1991; 
Calem & Rob, 1999). 
31 Jones (2000) discusses several forms of ‘cosmetic’ adjustments that banks can undertake to reduce 
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The empirical evidence on the potential misalignment of risk-
sensitive capital requirements remains relatively limited. In Ayadi et al. 
(2011), we provided evidence of a negative relationship between average 
risk weights and a number of risk factors for the EU’s top banks in recent 
years, including estimates of default likelihood, tier-1 ratio and earnings 
volatility. Supplemental evidence from the study also shows that 
investment-oriented banks may have found ways to take on more risk than 
their regulatory risk measures would reflect. More recently, Das & Sy 
(2012) have shown that banks with lower average risk-weights (measured 
by the risk-weighted-assets to asset ratio) do a poor job in predicting 
market measures of risk, especially during the crisis.  
Table 1.9 provides the results of censored regression regressions to 
assess whether the average risk weights explain distance from default (Z-
Score). In addition to univariate regressions across the different business 
models, additional regressions that control for the tangible capital equity 
are also included (even-numbered columns). If the regulatory risk 
measures are good indicators of underlying risk, the relationship should be 
negative, implying that banks with a higher RWA are closer to default, 
controlling for capital levels.  
The estimation results given in columns III, V and VII show the 
presence of a persistent but insignificant negative relationship for most 
models. However, for the investment bank model (column I) and the 
pooled sample (column IX), the relationship is significant and positive, 
which implies that RWA are perversely related to underlying risks. The 
relationship becomes stronger and more negative when capital is controlled 
in the wholesale (column VIII) and diversified retail banking (column IV) 
models as well as the pooled sample (column X). Nevertheless, the 
proportionality of capital to RWA does not appear to be a good explanatory 
factor for investment banks, for which the relationship remains in the 
positive territory, even after losing its significance, once capital is 
controlled for (column VI). 
 
                                                                                                                                 
risk weights, including the concentration of assets in highest risk classes for a given risk weight, 
various forms of credit enhancements, remote-origination, and structured transactions. More recently, 
some observers note that the introduction of the IRB approach under Basel II has effectively enlarged 
the opportunities of the more sophisticated banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage, (Blundell-Wignall 
& Atkinson, 2010; Dewatripont et al., 2010; ICB, 2011). More specifically, there is substantial 
evidence from the financial crisis of 2007-09 that losses from off-balance sheet asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits have remained with the originating banks (Acharya et al., 2010). 
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Table 1.9 Relationship between Z-score and RWA across business models, 2006-10 
 Model 1 - Investment 
Model 2 –  
Retail – focused 
Model 3 –  
Retail - diversified 
Model 4 –  
Wholesale 
All  
banks 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
RWA 24.3** 14.2 -4.6 -8.8 -0.6 -8.2** -5.9 -7.3* 5.5*** -5.1*** 
 -10.5 -12.5 -5.9 -5.3 -3.9 -3.3 -4.1 -3.8 (1.7) (1.9) 
TCE   202.3   124.3***   226.6***   225.1***  175.6*** 
   -134.4   -28.7   -30   -76.6  (16.2) 
Cons. 2.1 0.3 13.6*** 9.7** 11.8*** 7.1*** 9.8*** 5.3*** 7.2*** 5.8*** 
 -3.5 -3.2 -3.8 -3.8 -2.4 -2 -1.4 -1.9 (0.9) (0.7) 
Obs. 31 31 88 88 101 101 63 63 318 317 
Log L. -93.77 -92.24 -285.5 -280.2 -337 -325.1 -179 -174.8 -1028 -990.5 
F-stat. 5.381 5.297 0.61 10.42 0.0254 28.45 2.086 5.1 10.68 82.61 
p-value 0.027 0.011 0.437 0 0.874 0 0.154 0.009 0.001 0.000 
Notes: Regressions present results for Tobit univariate regressions with the Z-score as the dependent variable and left-censored at zero. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * signify significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% p-values. RWA: risk-weighted-assets as % of total assets; TCE: 
tangible common equity as % of tangible assets; Log L.: log likelihood ratio. 
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The findings give support to the idea that the responsiveness of 
capital levels to increased RWA may be partly offsetting the impact on 
increased default risks. In other words, banks with greater RWA may be 
holding more capital, which may make them equally sound as banks with a 
lower risk profile. Moreover, the regulatory risk measure (RWA relative to 
total assets) appears to capture the underlying risks for the wholesale, 
diversified retail and the focused retail banking models. In turn, the 
relationship between the two measures of risk is at best ambiguous for 
investment banks, even after controlling for capital, strengthening the case 
for the alternative explanation of regulatory arbitrage. Due to the complex 
and often cross-border nature of the transactions involved, the investment 
banks also have more opportunities than their peers to engage in such 
cosmetic transactions to optimise their capital charges. Although the results 
cannot be used as strong evidence of regulatory arbitrage, further research 
with a larger sample and over a longer period should be used to confirm 
whether regulatory arbitrage may indeed be in play, at least for the more 
investment-oriented banks.  
1.5 Summary of main findings 
The results outlined in this section highlight several risks associated with 
the different business models of EU banks, which are relevant to the 
discussion of regulatory conditions that will be presented in the next 
chapter.  
First, the two retail-oriented models appear to be safer than others, as 
measured by the distance from default (Z-score) and the long-term 
liquidity risks (NSFR ratio). A deeper analysis reveals that although the 
diversified retail banks are less likely to face losses during downturns, the 
same is not true for the focused retail banks. However, these smaller 
institutions may absorb these risks if they continue controlling their 
leverage and being well-capitalised. Wholesale banks, instead, carry a 
range of risks, especially through an apparent shortage of liquidity and 
failure to build adequate buffers to absorb shortfalls arising from these 
risks.  
Second, some of the risk indicators fail to distinguish between 
business models. This is most strikingly the case for Tier-1 ratio and the 
CDS spreads. While the former is likely to be the result of inadequate 
binding regulatory requirements that lead to an instrument-wide 
convergence, the latter could be a realisation of the moral hazard risks 
emanating from the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) phenomenon. If the market 
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participants believe that all troubled large banks will be saved, no matter 
what their business model or underlying risks may be, the markets will 
treat them as if they will not fail, leading to an artificial convergence of the 
pricing of risk. It is entirely possible that the same explanation could also be 
behind the relatively superior performance and the low loss-making 
potential of the larger investment banks.  
Third, although historical evidence suggests that minimum capital 
requirements could be raised for certain business models, the sample size 
and data availability issues need to be addressed before making a more 
sound judgement. The relatively limited evidence provided in this study 
shows that diversified retail banks face the least risk of a capital shortfall 
during crisis periods, notwithstanding the precision level or the estimation 
methods. In turn, wholesale and focused retail banks appear to face more 
risks during downturns, even after removing outliers. These results 
provide some justification for imposing stricter regulatory requirements for 
both focused retail and wholesale banks, although more data are needed 
for more reliable estimates, and continued monitoring of all business 
models. As for investment banks, although it is not possible to make an 
objective judgement on the need for stricter requirements, the results 
suggest that drastic capital shortfalls are certainly possible, which make 
this category of banks vulnerable to external shocks. 
Lastly, the RWA ratio fails to be a good indicator for default risks for 
investment banks, even after controlling for capital. Given that these banks 
typically achieve much lower average risk weights than their peers, it is 
very likely that the risk-sensitive capital requirements fail to direct these 
banks to hold an appropriate amount of capital. However, our analysis of 
stressed earnings fails to point to heavier capital requirements for this class 
of banks, which is largely due to the smaller sample size for the business 
model. A longer time-series is needed to draw stronger results for this 
group.32 
 
  
                                                   
32 Part of this ongoing monitoring exercise will be undertaken by CEPS, starting in the second half of 
2012 and reported in forthcoming Business Model Monitor reports. 
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2. THE NEW BASEL RULES IN THE EU:  
DO BANK BUSINESS MODELS MATTER?  
imed at addressing the regulatory deficiencies enshrined in the 
previous Basel Accords and ultimately at reducing the probability 
of future bank failures, the new European version of the future 
banking rules introduced once again a number of ‘incremental’ changes. 
These changes impose specific regulatory requirements that are supposed 
to create incentives for more prudent bank behaviour. 
In a nutshell, the proposed rules increase the quality and quantity of the 
minimum capital; introduce new rules on liquidity, leverage ratios, 
counter-cyclical buffers, and systemically important financial institutions; 
and amend the definitions of counterparty credit risk and rules for the 
banking book. The rules complement the earlier amendments that 
strengthened the capital and disclosure requirements for the trading book 
and re-securitisation instruments as well as requirements to ensure that 
remuneration policies do not lead to excessive risk-taking. 
This chapter provides a preliminary diagnosis and an assessment of 
these Basel rules in the EU and proposes potential regulatory adaptations 
to bank business models with the aim of improving future implementation.  
2.1 Minimum capital requirements 
The recent financial crisis has amply demonstrated that existing capital 
cushions are far from adequate to absorb losses or prevent widespread 
panic, inducing governments and monetary authorities to step in to 
support the financial institutions. Indeed, many of the rescued banks were 
seemingly in compliance with the minimum capital requirements before 
the troubles emerged. The core of the criticism has been the increased 
reliance on lower-quality capital, especially on non-tangible equity and 
hybrid forms of Tier-2 capital, which may fail to absorb losses as a bank 
A
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continues to operate (Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 2010; Viñals et al., 
2010).  
The loss-absorption capacity of regulatory capital has been one of the 
central innovations of the Basel III framework and the CRD IV-CRR 
proposal. The proposed changes aim to ensure that the strictest definition 
of regulatory capital (i.e. the Tier-1 capital) is truly loss-absorbing and can 
support a bank to operate as a going-concern. In the case of some of the 
hybrid convertible instruments that have been accepted as Tier 1 capital 
under Basel II and its European variant, conversion to equity required a 
failure event to occur. However, rescues by national authorities meant that 
such an event never took place, calling into question the effective loss-
absorption of such instruments. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed a 
number measures to strengthen the definition of capital. In implementing 
these agreements, the CRD IV-CRR proposal aims at harmonising the 
definition of capital within the EU while opting for some divergences from 
the original Basel framework.  
In a nutshell, the common equity Tier 1 capital is introduced as the 
most junior and restrictive form of regulatory capital.33 Additional Tier 1 
instruments comprised equity-like instruments that can absorb losses when 
the entity is solvent (e.g. going-concern capital), leaving some of the less 
loss-absorbing convertible instruments to Tier 2 (i.e. gone-concern capital). 
The new rules eliminate the use of Tier 3 capital instruments, which were 
introduced in the Basel II framework to cover market risks.  
Although the Regulation goes to great length to characterise criteria 
for qualifying instruments, there may be inconsistencies among member 
states, due to a number of reasons ranging from legal to political ones. One 
specific example is the convertible instruments (e.g. ‘silent participations’) 
that were used by public authorities in Germany to inject capital into 
troubled banks. These instruments have been the subject of some 
controversy after the European Banking Authority (EBA) initially decided 
                                                   
33 The common equity Tier 1 is composed of equity that is paid-up, perpetual, not repayable with the 
exception of liquidation, excluding preferential shares, with distributions that are payable once all 
obligations are met, taking the first and largest share of losses, entitling owners to residual assets, and 
with the paid-in amount not secured by any arrangement to enhance the seniority of the claim (Art. 
26(1)). In addition, a number of deductions are made, including current losses, intangible assets and 
goodwill, deferred tax assets on future tax-related earnings, expected loss amounts for institutions that 
use the internal-risk basis (IRB) approach, minority interests, and own- or cross-holdings of own 
common equity Tier 1 instruments (to avoid double counting) (Arts 33-43).  
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not to treat them as core Tier 1 equity under its July 2011 stress tests. The 
main reason behind the EBA’s decision was that the instruments do not 
qualify as paid-in equity or first-loss absorbing equity, as they do not 
convert to equity in normal times (i.e. for going-concern banks).34  
For the moment, the CRD IV proposal leaves some areas regarding 
the definition of qualifying instruments grey. For example, it is not entirely 
clear whether the EBA will have the mandate to develop definitions for all 
or only a subset of the qualifying instruments. The European Parliament’s 
compromise of May 2012 requires the EBA to have a say on a series of 
broad concepts, including most notably what ‘first-loss absorbing equity’ 
may mean. However, the Council’s compromise appears to do the 
opposite, leaving the definition and monitoring of qualifying instruments 
to national authorities. With no clear responsibility to be the ultimate 
standard bearer on qualifying capital, it is questionable whether the EBA 
can challenge the use of certain instruments by certain member states. To 
avoid increasing discretion between competent authorities, the EBA should 
be given the ultimate responsibility to devise the technical standards on the 
nature and definitions of all qualifying instruments and monitor whether 
the national practices comply with these EU-wide definitions. 
In addition, the proposed EU rules continue to allow competent 
authorities to give consent to an alternative method of consolidation for 
insurance and re-insurance entities, as provisioned under Directive 
2002/87/EC. However, under the Basel III proposal, significant 
investments outside the scope of regulatory consolidation (i.e. with more 
than 10% but less than 50% ownership stakes) in banking, insurance and 
financial entities will be deducted from the common equity Tier 1 capital 
base. The deduction is motivated by the principle that any equity held in 
banking, insurance or financial entities that are not wholly-owned (and 
thus not fully controlled) should correspond only to the risks that are 
particular to those activities. The divergence from the internationally-
agreed Basel III standard may fail to address the inherent interconnectivity 
risks, especially in the bank-assurance groups. 
In terms of the minimum regulatory requirements, the EU rules 
envisaged for the common equity Tier 1 would start at 3.5% of risk-
                                                   
34 Accordingly, the CRD IV proposal allows grandfathering of all state-aid instruments (CRR, Art. 
462), effectively allowing silent participations to be counted as common equity Tier-1 (CET1) as long 
as the instruments were issued before July 2011, a date that was extended to April 2012 under the 
April 2012 Council compromise.  
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weighted assets in 2013, to be gradually raised to 4% in 2014 and to 4.5% in 
2015 onwards. Likewise, minimum Tier 1 capital requirements would 
commence at 4.5% in 2013, 5.5% in 2014 and 6% in 2015 and onwards. Total 
minimum capital requirements will remain at 8% for the entire period.35  
A central issue behind the increase of the quality and quantity of 
capital is the extent to which (if at all) the imposed capital requirements are 
a real cost either to banks or to the society generally. It is often claimed 
(mainly by bankers) that to impose higher capital requirements (in quantity 
and quality) would lead to a rise in the costs of banking and financial 
intermediation services, lower bank lending and lower rates of return on 
equity and hence returns to shareholders. We argue the case for a 
substantial rise in bank (equity) capital as a major contribution to lowering 
the probability of bank failures and enhancing systemic stability, which in 
the long-run benefit both banks and society. This is based in part on the 
proposition that many concerns about raising equity capital requirements 
are unfounded when the systemic and long-term perspectives (rather than 
the short-term interests of banks and shareholders) are adopted. 
Various models (e.g. Admati et al., 2010) suggest that a rise in equity 
capital ratios should produce at least some offsetting fall in risk premia 
(both in equity and debt) as the bank becomes less risky. This in turn 
lowers the required rate of return on equity to satisfy shareholders. Overall, 
whilst the impact of higher equity ratios on the overall cost of capital might 
be modest, the offset is unlikely to be total (Llewellyn, 2011). Nevertheless, 
empirical research shows that large banks will be able to meet the stricter 
requirements without significant pain, in many cases simply by retaining 
their earnings (Ötker-Robe & Pazarbaşıoğlu, 2010).36  
Even if higher capital requirements increase regulatory costs, the 
social benefits of a potentially more stable banking system need to be 
considered as part of the equation of balancing costs and benefits over time. 
Such benefits include the avoidance of the costs of bank crises, lower costs 
to taxpayers associated with bank failures and a greater confidence in the 
banking system, which should also contribute to lowering the cost of 
capital.37 In addition, higher equity ratios are likely to create more powerful 
                                                   
35 The competent authorities are allowed to set limits that are closer to the ultimate minimum 
restrictions within the transition period (CRR, Art. 488). 
36 BCBS’s own impact assessments also confirm that the impact of the reinforced capital and liquidity 
requirements would have a very limited impact on growth (BCBS, 2010a and b). 
37 Admati et al. (2010) argue that higher capital requirements are likely to produce more stable returns 
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incentives for private monitoring and reduce moral hazard risks as equity 
holders have more to lose, which compensates the cost of monitoring and 
assuming no implicit guarantees.  
Higher capital requirements can also counteract the preferential tax 
treatment of debt, which could be contributing to increased use of debt 
instruments (as opposed to equity) among banks.  
One question that emerges from this discussion is what the appropriate 
level of capital should be. The evidence provided in the calibration of 
regulatory minimum capital requirements in BCBS (2010d) show that the 
minimum common equity Tier 1 ratio of 4.5% is a reasonable starting point 
but not necessarily high enough to prevent widespread failures during 
downturns and in the more interconnected business models. 
Figure 2.1 Return on risk-weighted assets (lower percentile estimates) 
 
Notes: The graph shows the Harrell-Davis lower percentile estimates for the distribution of returns on 
risk-weighted assets (RoRWA), representing the worst losses that banks would face in rare events. 
The estimates are drawn from the entire sample years and banks. Loss estimates for the 10th 
percentile correspond to losses that would materialise in a once-in-a-decade bad event, as opposed to 
losses in a once-in-20 years (5th percentile) and once-in-a-century events. 
 
Based on the results discussed in section 1.4 of chapter 1, Figure 2.1 
shows that many banks in our sample would suffer greater risk-adjusted 
losses than 4.5%. For example, a once-in-a-century stress event 
                                                                                                                                 
to bank shareholders albeit lower in buoyant times but higher in distressed times because of a lower 
appetite for risk. 
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(corresponding to lower 1st percentile) would lead to risk-adjusted losses of 
5.4% on average, exceeding the minimum common equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
requirement of 4.5% and getting close to the minimum Tier 1 requirement 
of 6%.  
Across different business models, the tail risks are particularly acute 
for the focused retail banks and investment-oriented banks, although the 
limited sample size (as noted in chapter 1) does not allow us to make a 
more general and forceful conclusion. Although the 1st percentile losses of 
wholesale banks are not substantially greater than other models, the losses 
remain relatively high under less-rare stress conditions, reflecting the 
inherent risks and the potential for sequential losses associated (as opposed 
to ‘one-time’ losses assumed here) with the wholesale banking model.38 In 
particular, even a once-in-a-decade event (corresponding to the 10th 
percentile loss) is likely to wipe out nearly 1.6% of the capital of an average 
wholesale bank, which is substantially more than all other models. The 
diversified retail banks face the least losses under alternative stress 
assumptions, possibly reflecting the diversification benefits. In short, 
although the usual data limitations apply, the evidence provided above 
suggests that the proposed capital requirements might be too lenient, both 
on average and for specific business models.  
The minimum capital requirements should take into account the 
different business models that banks follow. Although a more detailed 
analysis backed with substantially richer data is needed (especially to 
obtain more concrete results on investment-oriented banks), the findings 
call for a tougher stance on some of the less diversified banks, including the 
focused retail and wholesale banks and investment banks. Provided that 
the focused retail banks appear to be adequately capitalised, these 
requirements are likely to be binding mostly for the larger wholesale and 
investment banks.  
To some extent, the additional buffers that are likely to be applicable 
to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) could be seen as a 
means to distinguish between different business models, at least for the 
sizeable institutions.39 Although these requirements are mostly macro-
                                                   
38 Although a longer time-series is needed for a complete assessment, the returns of wholesale banks 
appear to be highly auto-correlated, with an auto-correlation coefficient of approximately 0.50.  
39 According to the compromise adopted by the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON) on 14 May 2012, SIFIs will be identified by a number of factors, including 
their cross-border activity, size, interconnectedness and complexity, identified either by national 
authorities or the ESRB. Assuming that the final legislation also carries a similar provision, the SIFIs 
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prudential in nature, they can equally be seen as a buffer against micro-
prudential risks. However, a simple empirical assessment based on our 
sample shows that the selected factors are likely to be poor determinants of 
risk-adjusted losses. In particular, both bank size (relative to country GDP) 
and international activities (share of international assets in total assets) fail 
to be significant determinants of risk-adjusted returns for loss-making 
banks.40 Thus, although SIFI charges may serve an important macro-
prudential purpose, they are unlikely to respond to the need for distinct 
capital requirements for different business models. Moreover, the charges 
are unlikely to have an impact on smaller banks, such as some of the 
focused retail banks in our sample.  
The previous arguments highlight that a distinction should be made 
between private and social costs when adjusting regulatory capital 
requirements. The cost of capital is likely to rise if the perception is that 
risks are shifted from taxpayers to shareholders. In turn, social costs would 
not increase if banks are required to pay a fair price for the subsidies and 
implicit guarantees they receive. Our results are based in part on the 
proposition that many of the concerns about raising equity capital 
requirements are unfounded when the banks’ business models as well as 
systemic and long-term prospects are considered. 
2.2 Risk-weighted assets 
Starting with Basel I, the minimum capital requirements have been risk-
sensitive, implying that a bank would have to hold more capital the greater 
its risk exposures.41 Provided that they are measured correctly, the average 
risk weight, i.e. the ratio of RWA-to-total-assets, should ideally be a good 
                                                                                                                                 
will be classified into five different risk groups, corresponding to five incremental common equity 
Tier-1 buffers ranging from 1 to 3% of risk-weighted assets, with the possibility of heavier charges 
for the highest risk group. 
40 In particular, censored regressions of risk-adjusted losses on total assets-to-GDP ratio and the share 
of international assets (in total assets) result in coefficient estimates of -0.002 (0.005) and -0.014 
(0.018), respectively, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
41 In contrast to recent calls, there is good reason to make capital requirements risk-sensitive. Indeed, 
faced with purely linear (i.e. risk-insensitive) capital requirements, banks may shift their portfolios 
towards riskier assets, offsetting their losses from higher capital levels by increasing their portfolio 
risks (Kahane, 1977; Koehn & Santomero, 1980; Kim & Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). Empirical 
studies have confirmed that fixed capital requirements may increase risks, although the findings are 
far from unanimous, conditional on the size and the adequate capitalisation of the bank (Furlong & 
Keeley, 1989; Gennotte & Pyle, 1991; Calem & Rob, 1999). 
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indicator of portfolio risk on its own if it reflects the true risk profile of the 
bank’s balance and off-balance sheet. However, there is concern that 
regulatory arbitrage and politically driven policies have put the 
appropriateness of risk-sensitive regulations in question.  
The evidence provided in section 1.4 in chapter 1 suggests that 
regulatory arbitrage may be real and utilised extensively, especially by 
investment banks that are more disposed and inclined to use sophisticated 
derivatives instruments to divert the risks away from their balance sheets. 
In particular, the evidence shows that the average risk weights are 
positively correlated with distance from default, as measured by Z-score. 
Earlier findings from Ayadi et al. (2011) show that the same perverse 
relationship may hold for tier-1 capital ratio and earnings volatility as well. 
Other recent studies also suggest that regulatory arbitrage through RWA-
optimisation in the banking sector may be a serious threat (Acharya et al., 
2010; Das & Sy, 2012). These findings alone imply that the risk-sensitive 
approach may be seriously biased, possibly underestimating the 
appropriate level of capital to be held. 
Other studies also suggest that regulatory arbitrage through RWA-
optimisation in the banking sector may be a serious threat (Acharya et al., 
2010; Das & Sy, 2012; Le Leslé & Avramova, 2012). Many observers have 
also noted that the simplistic ‘single risk factor model’ underlining the IRB 
approach allows banks substantial freedom in minimising their RWA to 
reduce the required capital charges (Calem & LaCour-Little, 2004; Blundell-
Wignall & Atkinson, 2010). More generally, banks may use the risk-
sensitive requirements for their own benefit to ‘optimise capital’ in a 
number of ways. 42  
Larger banks and in particular investment banks tend to have more 
specialisation in the proven methods to reduce their RWA without truly 
mitigating risks. There is thus the possibility that the internal assessment of 
the required capital charges for those banks is biased downwards. This 
imprudent behaviour is a consequence of the banks’ widely-held 
interpretation of what is risk management, which is more understood as 
risk transfer with no risk retention on-balance sheet.  
                                                   
42 In his seminal article, Jones (2000) discussed several forms of ‘cosmetic’ adjustments that banks 
can undertake to reduce risk weights, including the concentration of assets in the highest risk classes 
for a given risk weight, various forms of credit enhancements, remote-origination and structured 
transactions. 
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The ability of larger banks to calculate their own risk charges through 
the internal rating based (IRB) approach is most likely the principal reason 
behind the misalignment of the regulatory risk measures. Undoubtedly, 
providing flexibility in measuring regulatory capital, which represents a 
true cost for banks, is a highly accommodative approach introduced under 
the Basel II framework. Banks have incentives to operate with minimum 
capital to satisfy the shareholder value creation constraint, which overlooks 
any micro-prudential or long-term stability considerations (Ayadi, 2012). 
Moreover, supervisors often lack the necessary resources to adequately 
verify the models.  
Regulators have also contributed to the ill-designed policies for 
political reasons. The risk weights used under the standardised approach, 
the alternative to the internal ratings (IRB) approach, have also been 
challenged on this account. In particular, the risk weights show a highly 
preferential treatment of real estate and sovereign exposures.43 They have 
also not paid sufficient attention to off-balance sheet risk exposures, most 
notably through securitisation transactions.44 Last but not least, they have 
not accounted for the underlying risk of banks’ business models. Much like 
the potential loopholes in the IRB approach, these practices guide banks to 
allocate financial resources without paying due attention to the real risk 
profile.  
Most of these concerns remain unaddressed. In particular, the CRD 
IV-CRR proposal continues to assign a zero-weight to exposures to EU 
member states’ central governments and central banks that are 
denominated and funded in the domestic currencies, notwithstanding the 
                                                   
43 There remains a fundamental misalignment of the risk weights in the treatment of 
sovereign debt and other exposures such as real estate. The CRD IV proposal continues to 
assign a zero-weight to all exposures to EU member states’ central governments and central 
banks that are denominated and funded in the domestic currencies, notwithstanding the 
credit ratings for the relevant securities. More crucially, the standardised zero-weight is 
available as a default option even for institutions using the IRB approach (i.e. ‘permanent 
partial use’), effectively providing a flexibility that is otherwise not generally available in 
other exposure classes. 
44 Under the CRD IV proposal, only the risk-weights for exposures to securitised assets are increased. 
Rules on exposures to securitisation transactions were tightened under an earlier amendment (CRD 
II), requiring originating banks to retain a ‘net economic interest’ by holding on to at least 5% of the 
nominal value of the securitised tranches sold or transferred. Although some suggest a further 
tightening of the ‘skin in the game’ rules, it should not be forgotten that issuers may hedge the 
corresponding risks from retained parts and may thus offload the own risks from a higher retention 
rate (Dewatripont et al., 2010).  
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credit ratings for the relevant securities. The standardised zero-weight is 
available as a default option even for institutions using the IRB approach 
(through the ‘permanent partial use’), effectively providing a flexibility that 
is not available in other exposure classes. Earlier amendments put forward 
by the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs (ECON) has sought to address these concerns by instigating a 
potential re-adjustment of the risk-weights. 45 Nevertheless, it is uncertain 
whether the review process will be adopted in the final legislation. 
Moreover, it is even more questionable whether such a process will lead to 
more realistic charges for the lower-rated sovereigns, given the on-going 
sovereign debt crisis or to the risks underlined in the banks’ business 
models in Europe or elsewhere.  
The CRD IV-CRR proposal also continues to treat retail and real 
estate exposures in a preferential manner. In particular, exposures to 
natural persons or small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) continue to 
receive lower risk-weights than unrated corporate exposures.46 In addition, 
secured mortgage exposures on real estate are awarded a lower rating than 
higher-rated corporate exposures.47 It is likely that the risk-weights will 
even be further reduced in the ultimate legislation, leading to a greater 
divergence between the risk-weights and the actual underlying risks.48  
                                                   
45 The amendment requires the Commission to “submit a to the European Parliament and the Council 
proposing options to adjust that risk weight accordingly as soon as possible, while taking into account 
potentially destabilising effects of tabling such proposals during periods of market stress” 
(Amendment for a draft report, 16 April 2012, Recital 69b). The Council under the Danish presidency 
has not put forward comparable elements as of the writing of this report.  
46 The CRD IV proposal assigns a risk-weight of 75% for all retail exposures to natural persons or 
SMEs, provided that the total amount owed does not exceed €1 million (CRR, Art. 118). Meanwhile, 
unrated corporate exposures continue to receive a risk-weight of 100%. One argument for lower risk-
weights on retail loans would be the ability of banks to mitigate their risks. Although the proposal 
requires the retail exposures to be adequately diversified (CRR, Art. 218(b)), there is no attempt to 
define what that desired level might be. This omission is unfortunate as one of the key lessons learnt 
from the subprime crisis (and earlier crises) was the need for heightened monitoring of diversification 
and the resulting systemic risks posed on the entire financial system (Hellwig, 2009).  
47 Under the CRD IV proposal, residential property exposures that are “fully and completely secured 
by mortgages on residential property which is or shall be occupied” are assigned a risk-weight of 35% 
(CRR, Art. 120). The secured exposures to commercial real estate are assigned a higher, 50% risk 
weight (CRR, Art. 121). In comparison, A-rated corporate exposures (corresponding to credit quality 
step 2, or A+/A/A- under Standard & Poor’s terminology) are assigned a risk-weight of 50% (CRR, 
Art. 117). 
48 Under the compromise adopted by the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs (ECON) on 14 May 2012, the risk-weights for SME exposures were further 
dropped from the original proposed amount of 75% to 50%, while the total allowed exposure was 
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The CRD IV-CRR proposal continues to rely heavily on the IRB 
approaches (‘foundation’ and ‘advanced’), which allow banks to compute 
their risk factors and lead to potential misalignment of the risk-weights 
with the underlying risks. As noted above, the IRB approaches give banks a 
substantial freedom to engage in various forms of regulatory arbitrage to 
satisfy the shareholder value creation constraint, which remains above any 
long-term stability consideration. Furthermore, the distinctions among 
methods, with several means to estimate risk distributions and factors, 
make comparability a challenging if not largely an improbable task. The 
IRB approaches might have also suffered from overly optimistic 
assumptions, limited treatment of other risks such as liquidity and systemic 
risks. Lastly, bank supervisors may lack the resources or the capabilities to 
verify the models, thus calling into question whether the capital ratios 
published by banks are sufficiently robust to cover all the risks.  
Various aspects of the standardised approach could also be 
problematic. The discussion above has already highlighted instances where 
the standardised risk-weights may fail to reflect the underlying risk 
profiles. However, an excessive reliance on credit ratings may also lead to 
partial risk sensitivity, since not all exposures are rated. More importantly, 
under the current proposal, highly risky corporate exposures would be 
better off in terms of capital charges if they simply were left unrated, 
leading to a clear ‘lemons problem’ for such exposures. This adverse 
selection problem can be overcome by enhancing the incentives to broaden 
external ratings. However, the performance of external ratings by credit 
rating agencies has been widely criticised in the context of the financial 
crisis, which puts in question the reliability of the external ratings for 
regulatory purposes.  
To sum up, the proposed rules fall well short of adequately 
addressing the fundamental flaws underlying the use of the RWA and the 
calculation of minimum capital requirements, considered as the 
cornerstone of banking regulation.  
As a first line of response to these concerns, the use of the IRB 
approaches and the validity of their components should be subject to 
deeper and regular monitoring by the supervisors. The risk distribution 
and risk factors calculation must not be left to the discretion of banks.49 All 
risk inputs and underlying assumptions must be validated and monitored 
                                                                                                                                 
expanded to €2 million. 
49 Nearly 80% of the 74 banks in our sample were using the IRB approach at the end of 2010.  
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and if necessary adjusted in a coordinated fashion. The screening of risk 
weights can be complementary to existing regulations, and if well defined 
and monitored, can prevent the accumulation of risks.  
At an operational level, banks should respond to a series of 
hypothetical benchmark portfolios of varying underlying risk levels 
provided by the regulators by reporting their own calculated risk model 
parameters, including loss-given default, probability of default and the 
resulting risk-weights. The reporting would be accomplished both for 
individual exposure classes and at the aggregate level for the entire 
portfolio.50  
Provided that the chosen benchmarks are adequately sophisticated, 
regulators will be able to assess the adequacy and coherence of the internal 
models used by individual banks, which would feed into the regular 
supervisory review of the internal risk systems. Moreover, the results from 
the benchmarking exercise may also help test the validity of the risk 
weights and assumptions under the standardised approach. Lastly, the 
disclosure of the results of the benchmarking tests would also supplement 
market discipline by making banks’ risk preferences more transparent.  
Several principles may need to be considered in the design of the 
proposed benchmarking exercise:  
 The procedures should be developed and regularly updated through 
deep analysis of the exposures of banks, which rely on 
comprehensive data on individual and portfolio banks’ risk 
exposures.  
 The benchmark portfolios should be made public, allowing 
independent experts to scrutinise their appropriateness in an ongoing 
fashion.  
 If data allows it, benchmarks should distinguish between banks’ 
business models and account for likely business model transitions. 
For example, investment banks should be asked to report the risk-
weights for exposures or portfolios that are more in line with their 
activities. At the same time, the focused and diversified retail banks 
                                                   
50 A similar approach has been proposed by Vikram Pundit, the CEO of Citibank, and by Jaime 
Caurana, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). For more details, see 
“Apples vs apples: A new way to measure risk”, by Vikram Pundit, Financial Times, 10 January 
2012; and “The need for effective international collaboration in times of financial stress”, speech by 
Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS, Berlin, 20 January 2012.  
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among which transition likelihoods are relatively high, should report 
on alternative formulations that address the potential model changes.  
 The timing and the nature of the benchmarking exercise is also of 
crucial importance. In order to reduce the regulatory arbitrage 
potential, the benchmarking exercises should take place unexpectedly 
or without allowing a long preparatory time for banks, possibly as 
part of the regular supervisory assessment process under Pillar 2.  
 When benchmarked portfolios are known, banks may be able game 
the system by ‘cosmetically’ concentrating their risks to lower their 
capital charges. To prevent such strategic responses, the banks should 
be provided with a number of instantly generated hypothetical 
portfolios, randomly drawn from a pre-defined distribution around 
the desired portfolio, which should then be fed through their internal 
risk systems that form the backbone of the IRB approaches. 
Compliance should be defined by a comprehensive assessment of the 
performance of the risk assessment framework of each bank.  
 This procedure must also be linked to the capital add-ons under the 
supervisory review process. If for example the internal models do not 
assess adequately the risks in the balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
of a bank, then capital add-ons are imposed by the national 
supervisors.  
 At the EU level, the benchmarking exercise could be led and 
coordinated by the EBA in close collaboration with the ESRB (who 
should have a clear view on the macro-risk indicators). It would also 
form an integral part of stress testing conducted by EBA.  
One of the key challenges standing in the way of introducing the 
proposed benchmark, however, is the potential administrative costs that it 
would impose on both the regulators and the banks. Leaving aside the 
intricacies of constructing appropriate benchmarks for different business 
models, the exercise may prove demanding and time-consuming, 
especially if regular on-site visits are required for verification. A cost-
benefit analysis of the benchmarking exercise is worth pursuing. In Europe, 
the EBA can start with a pilot sample of banks to which the stress tests have 
been applied.  
An alternative and less costly proposal would be to require all banks 
to report the implied risk-weighted assets and capital charges for their 
existing portfolios under a strengthened standardised approach. Although 
this practice may suffer from the same arbitrage opportunities under the 
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standardised approach, the distinction between the actual and benchmark 
results provide a proxy for the amount of capital ‘saved’ for the banks.  
Going further, the regulators should refrain from using the risk-
weights as a political tool. Although doing so may put fiscal pressures in 
some of the periphery countries, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, 
the gradual removal of the ‘zero-risk weighting’ of sovereign debt and 
harmonization with the other asset classes is necessary.51 Similarly, the 
unjustified preferential treatment of other exposures, such as real estate 
loans and SME credit, should be aligned with the underlying risks. These 
practices effectively weaken the ability of capital regulations to respond to 
underlying risks and may effectively contribute to the build-up of asset 
bubbles and excessive growth of debt in the preferred exposure classes.  
In addition to these requirements, an unweighted capital 
requirement, as in the form of a minimum leverage ratio as envisioned 
under the Basel III framework, should also be implemented as a backstop 
for the existing requirements. The next subsection turns to a deeper 
discussion of this valuable tool.  
2.3 Leverage ratio 
One of the key features leading to the crisis has been the excessive build-up 
of leverage in the banking sectors in many developed countries, especially 
among the larger and more investment-oriented institutions (Adrian & 
Shin, 2010; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2011). As is the case for non-financial 
firms, leverage is used to expand a firm’s assets through debt in an attempt 
to make the most of existing capital or to minimise their excess capital.  
Excessive leverage is threatening from a micro-prudential point of 
view because even a small downward perturbation in asset prices can wipe 
off existing capital and lead to insolvency. As a macro-prudential concern, 
heavily leveraged banks tend to rely on or provide less stable forms of 
short-term debt to match the volatility of the valuation of assets. When 
economic conditions worsen, these institutions may fail to roll-over their 
                                                   
51 At the moment, there is little motivation to introduce an amendment of the ‘zero-risk weighting’ of 
the EU sovereign debt, in particular in the absence of a credible EU plan to back ailing eurozone 
countries. The draft report of the European Parliament’s Economics and Monetary Affairs Committee 
of 16 December 2011 included an amendment to introduce a review of the rule by the European 
Commission, “taking into account potentially destabilising effects of tabling such proposals during 
periods of stress”. The Danish Presidency compromise did not include such a revision or amend the 
rule.  
56 | AYADI, ARBAK & DE  GROEN 
debt (or raise capital) or may hoard liquidity. When the share of leveraged 
firms is relatively high, these conditions could lead to a sudden drying up 
of market liquidity, asset price busts, fire sales and further drops in asset 
prices (Geanakoplos, 2010; Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011; Farhi & Tirole, 
forthcoming).  
Figure 2.2 Leverage ratios across banking models 
 
Notes: Leverage ratios as depicted are defined as Tangible Common Equity/(Total assets - Intangible 
Assets). Note that the depicted ratio considers a simple approximation to total exposures and a 
narrower definition of capital than the CRD IV or Basel III framework, which is based on Tier 1 
capital. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that there are substantial differences in leverage 
ratios (defined as tangible equity-to-asset ratio) across different business 
models. The smaller and focused retail banks, for which customer loans 
and customer are clearly the main activities, have also the highest leverage 
ratio (implying the lowest gearing ratio). In turn, wholesale banks, for 
which inter-bank liabilities account for approximately a quarter of total 
activities, have the lowest leverage ratio. This finding most likely reflects 
the fact that the liquidity risks are not adequately factored in the current 
regulations. Albeit improving figures in recent years, the investment-
oriented banks also have relatively low leverage ratios, possibly due to 
their characteristically high derivative activities, which can be used to 
reduce risk-weights. Lastly, the diversified retail banks maintain moderate 
levels of leverage, probably since their underlying model of extending 
customer loans does not allow them to grow as extensively as other bank. 
Faced with risk-sensitive regulatory requirements, many banks have 
found ways to become increasingly leveraged, leading to increased micro- 
and macro-prudential risks. The banks have been able to achieve these 
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outcomes by engaging in transactions to lower their risk-weighted assets to 
remain compliant with the risk-sensitive capital requirements. To the extent 
that these transactions are cosmetic, a leverage ratio may above all put a 
strict limit on the total amount of risks. The requirement could also 
reinforce the regulators’ hand to sanction the banks by ensuring that the 
banks bear a larger proportion of the systemic risks themselves and put a 
price on banks’ contribution to the boom-bust cycles (Blum, 2008). 
The Basel III framework introduced a leverage ratio in an attempt to 
constrain the build-up and to reinforce the existing risk-based capital 
requirements. The proposed measure is defined as an institution’s Tier 1 
capital divided by total exposures reported as an arithmetic mean of 
monthly averages over a quarter. Put simply, the total exposures are 
defined as the sum of all on- and off-balance sheet assets that are not 
deducted from the calculation of the capital measures. The proposed 
Regulation allows the netting arrangements for derivative transactions, 
repurchase agreements, as well as securities and commodities transactions.  
A principal issue relating to the suggested leverage ratio is the 
potential impact of netting, especially through derivatives exposures. 
Derivative transactions represent a significant proportion of the balance 
sheet totals of investment banks. For example, in the past few years, the 
derivative exposures have fluctuated between one-third and one-half of 
Deutsche Bank’s total activities. However, in many cases, derivative 
transactions enter both as assets and liabilities, subject to various forms of 
netting. In Deutsche Bank’s case, the netting arrangements that are 
applicable under the US GAAP rules effectively reduce the total assets of 
Deutsche Bank by one-quarter to one-third.52 Similar netting arrangements 
may give rise to heterogeneity in the measurement of leverage ratio and 
undermine its effectiveness. A deeper look into such divergences may be 
warranted, at least in the form of technical guidance from the EBA. 
As a second issue, and perhaps more crucially, the CRD IV-CRR 
proposal sets out a very long transition period for introducing a leverage 
ratio. Under the Commission’s CRD IV-CRR proposal of July 2011, the tool 
was originally introduced as an additional feature for disclosure “that can 
be applied on individual institutions at the discretion of supervisory 
                                                   
52 Depending on whether the derivatives are netted-out (as under US GAAP) or not (as under IFRS), 
Deutsche Bank’s leverage ratios for the year 2008 would range between 3.6% and 1.0%, respectively. 
In later years, the distinction became smaller due to Deutsche Bank’s takeover of the more retail-
oriented Postbank.  
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authorities,” and “with a view to migrating to a binding requirement” 
(CRR, Recital 68). At the time of writing this report, there is hope that the 
amendments to the proposal will instead introduce a binding commitment 
by 2018, after a lengthy revision and monitoring process.  
Lastly, an important question is the level of leverage ratio 
requirements. Basel III suggests a 3% minimum requirement. The CRD IV-
CRR proposal envisages no minimum requirements, even though some of 
the compromise texts suggest that the requirements may range from 1.5% 
to 5%, depending on the risk profiles of the regulated entities.53 If 
implemented, these requirements also fall short of those that are in effect in 
the US (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1.The US-Dodd Frank Act 
The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, better known as the 
Dodd-Frank Act or DFA, was signed into law by President Barack Obama 
on 21 July 2010. The rules are aimed to respond to the micro- and macro-
prudential concerns that emerged in the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial 
crisis, addressing a vast array of issues, including the capital requirements, 
consolidated supervision, too-big-to-fail institutions, proprietary trading, 
consumer protection, external credit ratings, executive compensation, and 
so on. Unlike the CRD IV proposal, the Dodd Frank Act did not contain a 
fully formed set of legislative proposals but rather loosely defined 
principles and a path for the construction of a new regulatory architecture 
within the US. 
Among other things, DFA creates new institutions and reinforces the 
powers of the existing ones. The supervision and regulation of SIFIs are 
transferred to the Federal Reserve (Fed), including any qualifying bank 
holding company, savings and loan holding company as well as affiliates 
and subsidiaries of a foreign bank. Meanwhile, non-SIFIs continue to be 
subject to the regulation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office 
of Thrift Supervision (OTS). DFA allows the Fed to impose stricter-than-
usual capital, leverage and liquidity standards for SIFIs, including a 
requirement for larger bank holding companies to have convertible 
contingent equity as part of their capital.  
                                                   
53 The leverage ratio bands were adopted under the compromise adopted by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on 14 May 2012. 
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A newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is 
accountable for identifying, monitoring and addressing threats to financial 
stability as well as promoting market discipline. The FSOC is armed with 
policy instruments to subject non-bank financial companies to supervision by 
the Fed and make recommendations regarding the regulation and operation of 
SIFIs. Under the authority of FSOC, SIFIs may also be required to establish 
living wills to provide plans for orderly resolution in the event of illiquidity or 
insolvency.  
An Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) is formed for resolving and 
liquidating insolvent institutions, with the management and enforcement 
powers assigned to the FDIC. The provisions give OLA various tool to resolve 
and eventually liquid a troubled institution through receivership, suspending 
debt payments and creating a bridge-bank, procedures that have already been 
available for FDIC-insured banks. 
Comparison of Dodd-Frank and Basel III requirements 
 Dodd-Frank Basel III 
 Well-capitalised 
Adequately 
capitalised 
Minimum 
requirements 
Common equity Tier 1 (% of RWA) n.a. n.a. 4.5% 
Tier 1 ratio (% of RWA) 6.0% 4.0% 6.0% 
Total capital ratio (% of RWA) 10.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Leverage ratio (% of total exposures) 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 
Like the Basel III framework, the Act provides for minimum capital and 
leverage ratios, which compare well with the Basel III standards. However, a 
side-by-side comparison of the requirements should be treated with caution 
since the definitions of the capital instruments do not always overlap. In 
particular, while the Basel III framework and the CRD IV-CRR proposal 
involve requirements applicable to the most loss-absorbing form of capital, i.e. 
common equity Tier 1 capital, the DFA has no such requirements. In turn, the 
leverage requirements in the US are stricter than the ones proposed by the 
Basel III (and most likely the ultimate CRD IV-CRR requirements). In spite of 
these differences, the DFA, much like the Basel III standards, has chosen to 
exclude certain forms of hybrid equity instruments, most notably trust 
preferred securities, from Tier 1 capital. 
The ‘Volcker rule’ is arguably the most controversial component of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which is structural by nature. The relevant provisions 
prohibit regulated banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading, 
effectively disallowing banks to engage in trading activity for the purpose of 
profiting from short-term price movements. Similarly, the rule limits the ability 
of banks to invest or sponsor private fund (i.e. private equity or hedge fund) 
and investment activities.  
60 | AYADI, ARBAK & DE  GROEN 
Certain activities are exempt from the restrictions, including transactions 
in public securities and entities, investments in entities that serve in the public 
interest, market-making and risk-mitigation hedging activities, as well as 
transactions on behalf of customers. The restrictions are likely to have an 
impact on more investment-oriented banks (Ötker-Robe & Pazarbaşıoğlu, 
2010). Additional provisions relating to mandatory margin, clearing and 
trading requirements for derivatives are also likely to have an impact on 
investment banks.  
 
Our findings suggest that the Basel III standards could be a serious 
concern for the wholesale- and investment-oriented banks and possibly 
some of the diversified retail banks (see Figure 2.2). Naturally, apart from 
the business models, the appropriateness of the requirements depends 
crucially on the definition of the leverage ratio. Thus, the EBA should 
review whether the suggested requirements would be sufficient to 
constrain the relevant risks in the EU, paying close attention to the different 
business models. 
2.4 Counter-cyclical capital buffers 
Many banks faced substantial losses during the financial crisis. As is clear 
from the protracted nature of the current crisis, these losses can lead to 
extensive retrenchment of credit in an attempt to comply with the capital 
requirements, leading to a downturn in the real economy, with future 
feedbacks into the banking sector. In essence, the time invariant nature of 
capital requirements is sufficient to introduce a form of pro-cyclicality by 
subjecting the banks to the same minimum requirements.  
Several studies highlight the business-cycle amplification effects of 
capital requirements and the subsequent ‘capital crunches’ (Bernanke & 
Lown, 1991; Peek & Rosengren, 1995; Kashyap & Stein, 2004; Repullo et al., 
2009). In addition, Repullo & Salas (2011) warn that the pro-cyclicality was 
further reinforced by the entry into force of Basel II through the calculation 
of risk-weights and, in particular, the probability of default estimations. 
Counter-cyclical buffers would offset these effects, requiring banks to hold 
more capital in good times and allowing them to shrink their capital base in 
bad times. The capital buffers could also serve a more macro-prudential 
function in helping prevent the excessive build-up of risks through 
explosive growth of credit.  
Counter-cyclical capital buffers have been introduced under the Basel 
III framework to ensure that banks build buffers that are above the 
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regulatory minimum. The proposed Directive introduces two capital 
buffers beyond the minimum capital requirements to minimise the risk of 
violating the minimum capital requirements. First, a capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5% of the risk-weighted assets (RWA) is introduced. Institutions 
that fall below the buffer face constraints on distributing earnings; the 
restrictions are applied in an increasing manner so that the closer the 
capital ratio is to the minimum requirement the greater are the earnings 
conservation requirements. Second, a countercyclical capital buffer is used 
to expand the capital conservation range (up to 2.5% of RWA) in good 
times to build up an added form of absorption capacity. As is the case for 
the conservation buffer, the restrictions on earnings distributions become 
more apparent as the capital ratios approach the minimum required 
amounts.  
The main concern regarding the capital buffers relates to the method 
for setting the countercyclical buffer rate and the identification method to 
detect financial bubbles. Because of the macro-prudential nature of the task, 
this role must be granted to a macro-prudential authority, which has a 
broad system view on the accumulation of risk at national and regional 
levels. According to the proposed Directive, each member state will 
designate an authority for setting a reference guide based on the deviation 
of credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend. The buffer rate is to be 
revised quarterly from the reference guide and other variables, including 
possibly structural variables. The potential for the selection of distinct 
structural variables is one issue, which can lead to undue heterogeneity in 
the application of the buffers among the member states. In addition, it is 
not entirely clear why structural variables, such as GDP growth, would be 
related to banking sector risk factors.54 The counter-cyclical buffer should 
target the build-up of financial risks, in the form of asset bubbles and busts 
and not necessarily other macroeconomic variables. Lastly, there is little 
empirical backing on the selected methods and instruments for identifying 
financial bubbles. In particular, a detailed analysis by the IMF (2011b) 
reveals that the proposed capital-to-GDP gap is more likely than other 
measures to pick the wrong cycles (Type II error) while failing to pick the 
right ones (Type I error). We argue that more targeted research is this area 
                                                   
54 Although GDP growth may not be the part of the indicator to identify the build-up or bursting of 
bubbles, it may nevertheless have an indirect impact through other variables, most notably the 
selected indicator. Maintaining this possibility, Repullo & Salas (2011) show that the proposed 
measures may fail to remove the pro-cyclicality due to a statistically significant and negative 
correlation between credit-to-GDP gap and GDP growth.  
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is essential before venturing into poorly-designed instruments which 
would produce no value in detecting the accumulation of financial risks in 
the system and hence the future formation of financial bubbles. Monitoring 
the banks’ business models may provide a view on the accumulation of 
financial risks in the system.    
2.5 Liquidity requirements 
In various phases of the financial crisis in 2007-09, banks that relied 
extensively on short-term funding faced severe stress during the early 
phases of the financial crisis, due to the rapid reversal in the availability of 
global liquidity. In Europe, the risks were particularly acute, especially for 
the ‘wholesale’ banks with substantial exposure to short-term liabilities, 
often raised in the interbank markets. For example, Dexia and Hypo Real 
Estate, both identified as wholesale banks in our study due to their large 
exposures to short-term funding, suffered tremendously following the 
collapse of the interbank markets in aftermath of the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. In all the cases, the banks had to eventually be 
backed with central bank liquidity and government support in order to 
remain viable.  
The risks arising from excessive reliance on short-term funding and 
the resulting maturity mismatches, roll-over risks, fire sales and the drying 
up of liquidity have long been established in the literature. The ability of 
depositors to withdraw their money exposes the banks to self-fulfilling 
panic, which may drive the bank into fire sales (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). 
The resulting response by regulators over the past decades was to 
introduce deposit insurance to mitigate such risks, effectively leading to a 
rebranding of customer deposits as a safer form of funding. In the 
interbank and money markets, it has long been noticed that the uninsured 
and often uncollateralised mutual exposures can lead to an amplification of 
contagion risks (Rochet & Tirole, 1996). More recently, the reinforcing 
nature of funding liquidity (i.e. the ability to obtain funding) and market 
liquidity (i.e. ability to sell assets) have been shown as the principal sources 
of illiquidity spirals in the early phases of the crisis, leading to a sudden 
drying up of liquidity and a flight to quality (Brunnermeier, 2009; 
Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009).  
An interesting question is why short-term funding has become so 
dominant in recent years. The simple answer is that more stable funding 
sources, such as customer deposits, can help a bank grow, but only up until 
a point. For many banks, expanding the balance sheets is only possible by 
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relying more on short-term funding, implying greater liquidity risks. In 
addition, this type of funding also allows banks to manage their balance 
sheet sizes actively in a highly pro-cyclical manner (Adrian & Shin, 2008 
and 2010b). Although short-term funding allows banks to grow, it may also 
generate self-reinforcing liquidity shortages, as materialised during the 
crisis.  
Liquidity standards are among the key concepts introduced in the 
Basel III framework. BCBS proposed two measures to reinforce the 
resilience of banks to liquidity risks (BCBS, 2010c).  
The first measure, the so-called liquidity coverage requirement (LCR), 
specifies that the value of qualifying liquid assets should be at least 
sufficient to cover anticipated net outflows during 30 days under stress 
conditions. Banks should meet these standards continuously and hold 
unencumbered (i.e. non-pledged)55 liquid assets to serve as a buffer against 
severe liquidity outflows. In Basel III parlance, high-quality liquid 
unencumbered assets should “be easily and immediately converted into 
cash at little or no loss of value” even in times of stress (BCBS, 2010c, p. 5). 
Net total outflows, on the other hand, comprise total outflows, which 
include less stable funding sources such as potential draw-downs on 
committed credit or liquidity facilities, minus potential inflows, such as 
planned inflows from performing loans.  
The second measure, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), considers a 
one-year horizon to ensure that the (on- and off-balance sheet) maturity 
mismatches between an institution’s assets and liabilities are not too 
excessive. Although the CRD IV-CRR proposal contains few details, the 
standard developed by BCBS requires that the amount of available stable 
funding sources must be at least as much as the required stable funding 
(BCBS, 2010, p. 25).56 As noted in section 1.4, no single model as a whole 
satisfies the 100% stable funding requirements on average, even though the 
focused and diversified retail banks did get much closer than others. In 
                                                   
55 A review by the UK Financial Services Authority revealed that RBS had a LCR of between 18% 
and 32% at the end of August 2008. The shortage of high-quality unencumbered liquid assets at the 
same date was estimated to be between £125 billion and £166 billion. For more details, see FSA 
(2011).  
56 More specifically, available stable funding sources include capital and reserves, customer deposits 
and other liabilities with more than one-year maturities. Required stable funding includes assets that 
cannot be quickly sold off without substantial costs during adverse market conditions lasting up to 
one year. 
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addition, the results show a clear worsening of the liquidity conditions 
during the crisis, which reflects the funding problems faced by most banks. 
A common weakness is that the introduced liquidity measures 
continue to treat EU sovereign exposures as highly liquid. Under the CRD 
IV-CRR proposal, exposures to transferable claims issued or explicitly 
backed by member states are deemed highly liquid, without looking at the 
quality and the actual liquidity conditions for those assets.57 Under the 
general criterion proposed under CRD IV-CRR, the lower trading volumes, 
credit ratings, as well as higher bid/ask spreads applicable to certain 
sovereign bonds would qualify them as being illiquid. As in the case of 
zero risk-weighting of EU sovereign debt, the preferential treatment 
afforded sovereign debt could be troublesome and undermine the timely 
identification of liquidity risks, especially for banks with high public sector 
exposures.58 Moreover, the treatment could undermine the liquidity risks in 
banks that have more public sector exposures (see Box 2). 
Box 2. Liquidity problems in Dexia 
The case of Dexia (rebranded Belfus since 2012) exemplifies the extent of 
liquidity problems that more wholesale-oriented banks may face and 
accordingly deserves a deeper look. Prior to the crisis, Dexia was specialised in 
providing financial services to (local) governments in Belgium and France, 
which accounted for 30-40% of its balance sheet total. To bolster its margin on 
these low-interest loans, the bank relied heavily short-term wholesale funding, 
mainly from the interbank markets and debt securities.  
The drying-up of liquidity that followed the fall of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 led Dexia to seek substantial sums of central bank liquidity 
(including through its US arm) and more than €100 billion in member state 
government guarantees to fulfil its funding needs. Throughout 2009-10, the 
bank reduced its reliance on short-term funding.  
                                                   
57 For third countries, the exposures can also be treated as being liquid to the extent that they are held 
to cover currency risks.  
58 Indeed, the proposed measures would have failed to pick the growing liquidity problems in Dexia. 
Prior to 2011, the bank’s exposures to marketable public debt instruments, mostly issued or backed by 
the Belgian, French, Greek and Italian governments, accounted for approximately 20-25% of the 
bank’s balance sheet. Due to a severe drop in the market prices of EU sovereign debt in 2011, these 
exposures heralded the market liquidity problems and necessitated an ultimate bail-out by Belgium, 
France and Luxembourg. Neither the LCR nor the NSFR (detailed under Basel III) would reveal the 
liquidity troubles early on since the exposures would be deemed as highly liquid, at least up until the 
point that they were pledged as collateral for obtaining central bank liquidity, which occurred in the 
second half of 2011. 
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However, the legacy operations and outstanding public loans continued 
to exert a physical restraint on how quickly the bank could change its business 
model. The resurfacing liquidity shortage in the second half of 2011 due to 
increasing sovereign risks pushed the bank to once again resort to the ECB’s 
marginal lending facility for its daily needs. However, sometime during the fall 
of 2011, the bank depleted all its eligible (unencumbered) assets that could be 
posted as collateral at the ECB and had to turn to the emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA) facility of the National Bank of Belgium. Following continued 
stress, the Belgium government acquired the domestic activities and together 
with France and Luxembourg provided up to €90 billion of government 
guarantees in December 2011.  
The proposed measures would have probably failed to anticipate Dexia’s 
liquidity problems. Most of Dexia’s public-sector exposures are public-finance 
term loans to local and municipal governments in France. Although these loans 
are backed by implicit central government guarantees, they cannot be treated 
as being liquid since they are not marketable. However, Dexia did hold part of 
its public exposures as debt instruments, which are marketable and account for 
a substantial proportion of the bank’s balance sheet. Accordingly, the LCR ratio 
(and in particular the NFS ratio as detailed under Basel III but using CRD IV-
CRR liquidity definitions) would fail to point to troubles, at least not before the 
exposures were used as collateral for obtaining central bank liquidity.  
Second, the proposed liquidity measures could interact with the 
conduct of monetary policy. In particular, LCR gives preferential treatment 
to central bank excess reserves and liquidity.59 These provisions are likely 
to enhance the role of the central banks as an intermediary even in normal 
times, crowding out the interbank and wholesale funding markets, 
undermining the incentives of market participants to monitor the 
borrowing banks and making the exit from current liquidity support 
measures more difficult. Moreover, if the definition of liquid assets under 
the LCR fails to overlap with the criteria for central bank liquidity 
eligibility, banks may engage in a regulatory arbitrage by pledging more 
risky assets as collateral at the central bank and keeping the more liquid 
ones unencumbered.60 Therefore, the design of the liquidity measures 
                                                   
59 In particular, cash and deposits held at the central bank will be reported as being liquid assets under 
the CRD IV proposal (CRR, Art. 404(1)a). These exposures are also likely to qualify for the highest 
quality liquidity once the EBA issues its review on the detailed definitions. In addition, under Basel 
III, funding from the central bank in the form of secured repurchase agreement operations 
collateralised by less liquid assets also receive a more preferential treatment.  
60 Similar points are raised by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, then a member of the Executive Board of the 
ECB, at the International Banking Conference on Matching Stability and Performance: The Impact of 
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should consider their impact on monetary policy, especially through the 
‘risk-taking’ channel (Borio & Zhu, 2008; Adrian & Shin, 2010a). 
Third, LCR fails to capture the broader liquidity risks due to a wealth 
of reasons. To a large extent, the assessment of the liquidity of various asset 
classes, which will be subject to a review by EBA to be conducted by end-
2013, rely extensively on historical trade-based proxies, such as minimum 
traded volume and maximum bid/ask spread. Moreover, liquidity is by 
definition an endogenous concept. When markets tumble, assets once 
deemed liquid can quickly become illiquid due to concentration of risks. 
Since the short-term liquidity concept has to distinguish between different 
asset classes ex-ante, the ensuing endogeneity creates the possibility that 
the LCR can become inadequate in highlighting the illiquidity risks ex-post.  
Fourth, as noted in the Basel III framework document for managing 
liquidity risks, the cross-border availability of liquidity between the parent 
and its subsidiaries may be difficult “when there is a reasonable doubt 
about the availability of such liquidity” (BCBS, 2010c, p. 40). The CRD IV-
CRR proposal disallows the consolidation of liquid assets only when 
currency restrictions exist and a third-country subsidiary is involved. 
However, although currency exchange restrictions are not applicable 
within the EU, another form of restriction, the separation of retail and 
investment banking activities, could nevertheless lead to transfer 
limitations even within the EU. Most notably, if the UK ring-fencing rules 
proposed by the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB, 2011) become 
applicable, non-UK based EU banks with substantial investment arms may 
be prohibited (by the Bank of England) to call on the liquid assets in their 
UK retail subsidiaries.61 The issue can be addressed by engaging in 
coordination between the regulators. 
Lastly, the CRD IV-CRR proposal fails to commit to table a binding 
NSFR requirement beyond a basic disclosure standard. At the time of the 
writing of this report, some of the compromise solutions do include such a 
                                                                                                                                 
New Regulations on Financial Intermediary Management, Milan, 29 September 2010 (see 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100929.en.html).  
61 In a related manner, the intra-group funding gaps that involve cross-border transactions with 
differing currencies may also invite challenges that are not addressed by the Regulation. For example, 
many Austrian and German banks have opened subsidiaries in Eastern European countries over the 
past few years. In keeping up with quick credit growth and limited expansion capacity of deposits, the 
parent entities have used their excess intra-group liquidity prior to the crisis to provide funds to their 
subsidiaries. These operations have reduced the group-wide availability of liquidity during the crisis. 
An amendment in view of addressing intra-group liquidity shortages would be welcome. 
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requirement, including provisions to distinguish between different banks’ 
business models.62 However, there appears to be some divergence of 
opinion within the Council against making NFSR a binding requirement 
beyond a disclosure requirement, at least at the moment. NSFR is a broader 
concept and is less reliant on measures based on narrow asset classes. For 
that reason, it is less likely to be responsive to the inherent endogeneity of 
liquidity and many other problems associated with the LCR. We thus argue 
that the long-term liquidity measure should be a part of the regulatory 
framework, precisely as foreseen under the Basel III framework. A more 
ambitious commitment for its adoption by 2018 (or earlier) is therefore 
essential. 
2.6 Reporting and disclosure requirements 
One of the key lessons from the 2011 CEPS study was that the transparency 
and public disclosure practices of different business models were by and 
large incomplete and incomparable. Although some banks appear to report 
more information than others, there appear to be discrepancies, even for a 
given bank over time. Apart from a handful of general terms, such as total 
assets, a comparison across banks is rendered extremely hard due to a 
general lack of standards on the reported items. Comparable information 
on some of the most basic items, such as risk exposures and liquidity 
conditions, are not available in many cases (see Box 3). These incongruities 
are likely to grow as the reporting and regulatory requirements become 
more numbered over time, as foreseen in the CRD IV-CRR proposal after 
the observation phases of various elements.  
An additional issue is the public availability of quarterly reports. 
While in the US, quarterly individual disclosures of all licensed commercial 
banks (listed or unlisted) obtained from the Reports of Condition and 
Income (“Call Report”) are made public in bulk,63 in the EU no such 
practice exists. These micro-data sets are extremely useful for researchers 
and investors who are attempting to assess and compare key variables 
relating to banks’ structures, performances, stability and profitability and 
                                                   
62 A commitment to implement a binding NFSR requirement distinguishing among business models 
was undertaken under the compromise adopted by the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) on 14 May 2012. 
63See http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/commercial 
_bank_data.cfm. A timelier updated site also exists at FFIEC Central Data Repository's Public Data 
Distribution (PDD) site (https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.  
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most importantly to examine changing business models. These reports are 
required to be submitted by all regulated financial institutions and 
collected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Since 2005, 
the reporting has been done in the extensible business reporting language 
(XBRL), which is an open-source global standard for exchanging business 
information. In the EU, the supervisory reporting frameworks for financial 
reporting (FINREP) and common reporting (COREP) have been developed, 
currently based on non-binding guidelines and reporting, both based on 
XBRL.  
Box 3.Weaknesses in homogeneity of disclosed data 
The data collection exercise conducted for the study revealed substantial 
differences in the definition of the simplest items even though all the banks 
in the sample applied the same International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). The differences are large between countries; however, the analysis 
revealed significant divergences even within the same country. Some of the 
supposedly straightforward items show substantial inconsistencies and lack 
of sufficiently detailed information.  
Cash, for instance, is often used to calculate the liquidity position of a 
bank. For many banks, cash is presented as ‘cash and balances with central 
banks’, ‘cash and cash equivalents’ or ‘cash reserves’ on the balance sheets. 
All of these items include cash in hand and balances with central banks. 
However, in some cases some of the ‘cash and cash equivalents’ are also 
included, covering money market loans. Meanwhile, cash reserves include 
debt issued by public-sector borrowers and bills of exchange re-discountable 
at the central banks. The ‘balances with central banks’ consist of mandatory 
reserve requirement, which cannot always be freely used as well as the other 
cash components when serving as collateral. These add-ons could inflate the 
reported cash items substantially while at the same time not being equally 
liquid as simple cash or cash reserves.  
A second example of the lack of disclosure harmonisation involves the 
various items reported under the heading of ‘customer deposits’. For one 
thing, the amount of customer deposits cannot always be retrieved from 
some banks’ financial statements. An investment bank in the sample, for 
instance, only reported ‘total deposits’, including bank deposits, which tend 
to have a much shorter maturity, higher turnover and, more importantly, 
outside the scope of the deposit guarantee scheme. Another bank in the 
sample included ‘central bank funds’ as an add-on for the customer deposits 
figures. Some banks only report customer liabilities, which tend to include 
debt issued by corporations.  
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In addition, a group of banks also report ‘repurchase agreements’ as 
customer deposits, which do not share even the most basic attributes of 
deposits. Moreover, only a handful of banks disclose the division of deposits 
between difference counter-parties, i.e. non bank financial customers, 
individual customers and corporations. Cross-border exposures and 
currency risks are also reported generally, which render monitoring of risks 
extremely difficult. In the context of CRD IV-CRR, harmonisation is of the 
utmost importance since reliable and comparable information on customer 
deposits is needed to make a good assessment of the stable funding.  
2.7 Concluding remarks 
Implementing the international Basel III standards into EU law, the CRD 
IV-CRR proposal is certainly a game changer for many banks, regulators 
and market participants. However, the assessment provided in this chapter 
reveals that the proposed rules are not as ambitious as they claim to be.  
In particular, the proposal and the ongoing compromises fail to make 
a clear commitment to introduce binding requirements on leverage ratio or 
the closely linked concept of net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The literature 
and recent evidence show that such a tool can play a key role in mitigating 
systemic risks and restraining excessive growth and more generally the 
self-reinforcing dynamics of boom-bust cycles. Without a clear commitment 
to the NSFR, the regulators and legislators will miss an opportunity to 
address liquidity problems as seen during early phases of the crisis.  
Second, much like the Basel III framework, the CRD IV-CRR 
continues to rely excessively on the risk-sensitive approach with no 
verification or validation. The present evidence and the literature show that 
the risk-weighted asset measure is at best a poor indicator of underlying 
risks. To the extent that the misalignment is due to regulatory arbitrage, a 
more coordinated validation and monitoring of the internal risk models in 
particular through benchmarking is needed. Furthermore, a leverage ratio 
could also reduce the reliance on risk-sensitive capital requirements, 
provided that it is binding.  
Third, the politically-oriented provisions in CRD IV-CRR should be 
gradually removed. The criticism is particularly applicable for the zero-risk 
weighting of EU sovereign debt risks, which induces an overly optimistic 
view of credit and liquidity risks. Similarly, the highly preferential 
treatment of real estate exposures (or SME loans as suggested under some 
amending versions) can lead to asset bubbles, paving the way for the next 
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crisis. Also, the one-size-fits-all risk treatment of EU financial institutions 
should be revisited by accounting for the underlying risks related to 
different business models. The regulators should refrain from using 
financial regulations to meet political ends. 
Fourth, the European Banking Authority should have a more 
important role than simply being a bookkeeper of definitions and 
guidelines. It should be armed with enhanced monitoring and enforcement 
powers to reach its primary aim of safeguarding the stability of the EU’s 
banking system. This is all the more important as there is increasing 
political pressure to shift to an EU- or euro-wide banking union and a 
centralised supervisory regime.  
Fifth, the proposal makes no attempt to substantially improve 
disclosure standards. The study clearly shows that reliable and consistent 
information on even the most basic items, such as risk exposures and 
liquidity conditions, are lacking. With most of the attention on Pillars 1 and 
2, the CRD IV-CRR and Basel III have overlooked the prospect of 
substantially improving disclosure standards and reinforcing private 
monitoring of banks.  
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the study shows that different 
business models are prone to different sorts of risks. More concretely, the 
wholesale- and investment-oriented banks in the EU appear to have the 
lowest leverage ratios among their peers, well below the 3% leverage ratio 
suggested under Basel III. As for the appropriate minimum capital 
requirements, our results show that both the focused retail and wholesale-
oriented models suffer from substantial tail shocks and should therefore be 
subject to heavier requirements. However, our results are based on a 
relatively small sample and should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
For these reasons, more policy-oriented analytical research and monitoring 
is needed to better align the regulatory initiatives with the inherent risks of 
different banks’ business models. 
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3. TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE 
FRAMEWORK TO REGULATE EU BANKS  
iven that the present structure of complex and extensive regulation 
(most especially enshrined in the Basel Capital Accords) failed to 
prevent the recent crisis, one must ask whether the failure was due 
to fault-lines in the regulatory regime or whether the underlying 
methodology of regulation has been inappropriate. This chapter outlines 
some general principles aimed at guiding the regulatory reform process 
and at distinguishing between incremental and strategic approaches to 
reform. A Regulation Matrix is presented based on the two central 
objectives of any regulatory regime that need to be addressed in parallel: 1) 
lowering the probability of bank failures and 2) minimising the costs (to 
society) of those failures that do occur. The nature of a possible trade-off 
between the two objectives is reviewed. In addition the analysis provides a 
discussion about the ‘endogeneity’ problem64 and about the alternative 
means of reducing the probability of bank failures and various options to 
minimise the costs of bank failures.  
To some extent there is a trade-off between these two objectives of the 
reform agenda in that the more the costs of failure can be reduced, the less 
intensive regulation needs to be in order to lower the probability of failure. 
The optimal intensity of regulation is indeterminate until the arrangements 
for the resolution structures are known. The danger is that the two are 
addressed separately with a resultant potential for over-regulation to 
achieve objective 2. Because of this, regulatory reform needs to be strategic 
(addressing both objectives simultaneously) rather than incremental 
                                                   
64 Whereby, through financial innovations and the incentive structures created in recent decades of 
deregulation, problems such as excessive risk-taking by banks may be partly endogenous to the 
regulatory regime itself (Llewellyn, 2011). 
G
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(refining the existing regulatory regime), which is what has been pursued 
so far. 
Within this strategic approach, more emphasis than in the past needs 
to be given to minimising the social costs of bank failures making use of 
resolution of failing (failed) banks. Undoubtedly, for resolution to succeed, 
it is essential that business models of banks are understood, adequately 
regulated and monitored over time.  
3.1 Driving principles  
Several structural features of the pre-crisis environment have proved to be 
unsustainable and themselves contributory causes of the crisis. A basic 
perversity was that in good times the profits were treated as private; 
however, in bad times, the losses were socialised, with the taxpayer 
effectively acting as an ‘insurer-of-last-resort’ on the basis of an inefficient 
contract, as no ex-ante premia were extracted. Overall, as there was a 
reluctance to require creditors to absorb a proportionate share of the costs 
of bank distress and failures, burden-sharing was disproportionate with an 
excessive share borne by taxpayers, although it is yet to be determined 
what the final cost will prove to be.  
The perception of banks being too big to fail (TBTF) because of the 
absence of resolution arrangements weakened the incentives for private 
monitoring of banks. Given the increased cross-border inter-connectedness 
that developed over the decade or so before the onset of the crisis, the 
absence of agreed cross-border resolution arrangements surfaced as a 
particular issue that needed to be addressed. The low level of equity capital 
(and high gearing) of many banks, in particular the investment and 
wholesale banks, depicted in the previous sections was in part a product of 
an artificially low cost of debt compared with equity induced by favourable 
tax treatment of the former. 
In the absence of credible and predictable resolution arrangements for 
failing banks, in many cases there was little choice about whether bail-outs 
and official support operations for TBTF banks should be undertaken. 
Given the potential costs of bank failures (largely due to the absence of 
credible resolution arrangements), rescue operations or bail-outs may be 
the least-cost option in the short-run. However, given the time-consistency 
issue, such bail-outs create serious moral hazard for the future. There is, 
therefore, a distinction between short-run and long-run optimality with 
respect to rescue operations. Only if the costs of bank failures can be 
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minimised will a no-bail-out policy be credible or even desirable. It is 
argued below that this is a major unsustainable feature that needs to be 
corrected. In effect, arrangements need to be in place that allow banks to 
fail without imposing substantial systemic and social costs and taxpayer 
liability. 
3.2 Strategic versus incremental regulatory reforms  
A central issue is that regulatory reform needs to be strategic rather than 
incremental, which implies that regulatory reform goes back to basics 
including considering what the ultimate objectives of regulation are. This 
requires a different paradigm than with incremental reform, which restricts 
itself to refining existing regulatory requirements (capital ratios, RWA, 
liquidity, etc.). Abstracting from issues of consumer protection, the two 
broad objectives of any regulatory regime are:  
1) to reduce the probability of bank failures, and  
2) to lower the social cost when failures do occur.  
In a regulation matrix (Figure 3.1), the probability of a bank failing is 
measured on the horizontal axis, and the costs of failure are identified on 
the vertical axis. The social costs of bank failures relate to those incurred 
directly or indirectly by inter alia the system as a whole (the systemic 
stability dimension), taxpayers who might be called upon to finance rescue 
operations, depositors, deposit insurance and customers in general if 
banking services are disrupted and uncertainty is created.  
Figure 3.1 Regulatory matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The matrix illustrates the possibility of a trade-off between the two: if 
the social costs of failure can be lowered, there need be less concern about 
the probability of failures. In the extreme (totally unrealistic) case, if the costs 
of bank failures could be reduced to zero, the probability of failures would 
 Probability of Failure 
Cost of 
failure 
 Low High 
Low √  
High Crisis potential Х 
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be of no concern, there would be no potential taxpayer liability, no need for 
bail-outs and no moral hazard attached to bail-outs. Furthermore, there 
would be no need for regulation to reduce the probability of bank failures. 
Of course, such a utopia is just that! Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate the 
nature of the trade-off implicit in the regulation matrix. 
The objective of regulatory reform strategy is to optimise the risk 
matrix by considering both objectives simultaneously. The danger is that 
each of the two objectives are treated independently which, because the 
optimal level of regulatory intensity for objective 1 is indeterminate until 
the arrangements for objective 2 are determined, means that a degree of 
over-regulation is likely to emerge. As already argued, the greater the 
extent to which the costs of failures can be reduced, the less intensive need 
be regulation for Objective 1. 
There may, therefore, be less need for measures to lower the cost of 
failures if their probability were to be reduced to a low level. Conversely, if 
this were to be either impossible (or achievable only with draconian and 
high-cost regulation), the greater will be the need to have in place measures 
to minimise the social costs of those bank failures that do occur.  
The central strategic issue in any comprehensive regulatory and 
institutional reform programme is the positioning to be made on the 
regulation matrix. 
Historically, the focus of the regulatory regime has been on reducing 
the probability of failures rather than minimising their costs. Indeed, in 
many countries the second issue has only been addressed in a serious way 
since the current crisis.65  
Given that all regulatory measures to reduce the probability of bank 
failures have costs, the trade-off between the two dimensions is central to 
decisions about the optimal intensity of regulation. Greater emphasis needs 
to be given to Objective 2 (lowering social costs of failures) under the 
following circumstances: 1) when lowering the probability of failures 
entails excessively onerous regulation, or 2) when the costs of regulating 
                                                   
65 In June 2012, the European Commission released its proposal for a Directive establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010. In 2009, the UK adopted a Special Resolution Regime in the context of the 
absence of any special insolvency arrangements for banks, and weak and ill-defined 
institutional arrangements for dealing with failing institutions. 
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are too high. The central strategic issue in any holistic regulatory and 
institutional reform is the positioning to be made on the regulation matrix. 
The less confidence there is that the probability of bank failures can be 
reduced, the greater the need for institutional arrangements designed to 
reduce the costs of failures. In practice, a combined strategy is likely to be 
optimal.  
3.3 A fundamental endogeneity problem in regulation  
Regulatory strategy conventionally assumes that the problems to be 
addressed, e.g. excessive risk-taking by banks, are exogenous to the 
regulatory process. In this case, a problem is observed and a regulatory 
response is made to deal with it: i.e. to reduce the probability of it 
happening. Exogeneity is a bold assumption because problems may be at 
least partly endogenous to regulation, i.e. caused by the very regulation 
designed to reduce the probability of problems emerging. This arises as 
banks seek to circumvent regulation through financial innovation and by 
changing the way that business is conducted. This in turn calls for more 
regulation: Kane’s Regulatory Dialectic (Kane, 1987).  
As regulation responds to the endogeneity problem by successive 
adjustments, the cost of regulation rises. As the costs of regulation designed 
to lower the probability of bank failure rise, the trade-off between the two 
objectives in the risk matrix changes in favour of minimising the cost of 
bank failures rather than their probability. The endogeneity problem is 
likely to raise the cost of effective regulation because it engenders a rules-
escalation strategy. However, in a complex cost-benefit analysis, the costs 
of measures for Objective 2 also need to be considered.  
As the process of regulatory arbitrage diverts the nature of the 
problem, regulation is often shooting at a moving target, and the target 
moves partly because of regulation itself. For instance, the Basel II capital 
regime (hailed at the time as a decisive breakthrough) created incentives to 
offload assets from banks’ balance sheets, using securitisation, the creation 
of structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and other off-balance sheet 
vehicles. These practices have led to the development of shadow banking, 
excess gearing and the use of credit risk-shifting derivatives. All of these 
featured as central aspects of the banking crisis (Llewellyn, 2010). It is 
evidently the case that detailed rules at the time did not prevent the crisis. 
The limits of regulation for Objective 1 can be seen in the Basel capital 
regime and hence in any of its applications in particular in the EU. Many of 
the banks that got into serious trouble entered the crisis with Basel 
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compliant ratios. These ratios are seemingly risk-sensitive in theory, but 
failed to depict the risk profile of the bank business models because of their 
flawed design. Experience suggests that capital can disappear very quickly 
in particular when capital ratios are poorly designed. An IMF study 
compared successful and unsuccessful banks during the crisis and found 
no significant difference in capital ratios immediately prior to the onset of 
the crisis (IMF, 2009). The lesson is that capital ratios are either not reliable 
indicators and/or the minimum capital can be destroyed very quickly 
which calls into question the reliance on capital regulation to reduce the 
probability of bank failures. Indeed, and apart from the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage, it is possible that, under some circumstances, capital 
requirements may induce banks into more risky business.  
Blundell-Wignall et al. (2008) show a positive correlation between 
losses and banks’ Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio, but a negative 
correlation between losses and the leverage ratio. This suggests that the 
risk-weight approach to capital adequacy may induce banks to incur more 
risk through increased leverage. The reliability of the RWA has been 
questioned in the previous chapters of this study in particular for the 
investments and wholesale-type banks.66 Regulatory arbitrage will always 
be a major feature of bank business models. As noted in Haldane et al. 
(2010), “risks migrate to where regulation is weakest, so there are natural 
limits to what regulatory strategies can reasonably achieve.” 
The endogeneity problem can be considered in the context of the history 
of the Basel Capital Accord. The original Basel regime established in 1988 
was revised in Basel II and again in 2010 in Basel III. One interpretation is 
that subsequent adjustments imply moving towards the perfect model 
(Basel N) by correcting for past errors and making the regulation more 
complex and hence more costly to implement. This will lead to a regulatory 
cost that could even outweigh the cost of failure on a long time span. An 
alternative interpretation is that there are fault-lines in the regulatory 
process itself and that the methodology is flawed because banks will 
always engage in regulatory arbitrage. As was shown in Ayadi (2012), 
banks have strong business incentives to game the regulatory rules, which 
to some extent they contribute to design. In this sense, the view that 
regulators are always ‘behind the curve’ is not a critique of regulators but is 
endemic within the regulatory design and process. Successive adjustments 
over time have not solved the problem of periodic crises. They instead 
                                                   
66 Confirming the conclusions of Ayadi et al. (2011). 
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provide quick fixes to past problems; may not prevent future problems 
from occurring and are more likely to increase the costs of regulation.  
This casts serious doubt on whether the traditional incremental 
approach is appropriate to regulate the financial industry in the post-2007 
financial crisis. An alternative approach and paradigm shift might be more 
fruitful: more targeted and quality focus on incremental measures designed 
to reduce the probability of bank failures, and in parallel more emphasis 
should be given to designing features of the regulatory regime aimed at 
reducing the social costs of those bank failures that do occur. Given the 
weaknesses and limitations of regulation, whilst rules may be a necessary 
part of the regulatory regime, they are not sufficient. A complementary 
approach is to lower the cost of bank failures by keeping risks private 
rather than, as has massively been the case in the recent crisis, socialised by 
shifting risks to taxpayers.  
In practice, both approaches are needed: lowering the probability of 
bank failure and limiting the social costs of failures. The debate about the 
role of regulation and supervision for financial stability should be about the 
appropriate weight to be given to the two dimensions over time. Whilst 
both approaches are needed, more emphasis than in the past needs to be 
given to Objective 2 given that, however carefully constructed, regulation 
will never prevent bank failures and neither should it attempt to do so.  
3.4 Instruments for a comprehensive regulatory strategy  
To lower the probability of bank failure, regulation, supervision, 
intervention and market discipline can be used. Regulation can in turn be 
categorised as either structural or behavioural. 
Structural measures are of two types: 1) prescriptive structural 
measures that prescribe the nature, structure and allowable business of 
banks and other financial firms and 2) ring-fencing regulation that allows a 
wide range of business to be undertaken but in separate subsidiaries.  
The evidence of the crisis indicates that a wide range of different 
types of banks were under distress and/or required government 
intervention: large, small, highly diversified, concentrated, retail banks and 
investment banks. This raises three general questions about prescriptive 
structural measures: whether, in practice, a clear distinction can be made 
between different types of institutions and businesses; whether it is 
possible to define institutions that are systemically important over time, 
and whether issues of size, business lines and models are key in the 
analysis. Prohibiting retail banks from conducting some forms of 
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speculative activity would not reduce it in total if it shifts that activity 
elsewhere in the system, where it is not regulated.  
Several issues should be addressed when imposing prescriptive 
structural measures: it is not always clear what an optimal structure is (e.g. 
the allowable business mix of banks, different business models in the 
system and their interaction), and arbitrage will often be able to circumvent 
them. There are also practical difficulties of making a formal separation 
simply because the distinction between different lines of businesses is 
fuzzy. In fluid markets, and with constant financial re-engineering, it is 
difficult in practice to isolate different types of risks.  
Some of the proposed structural measures, such as narrow banks 
(Kay, 2009a and 2009b), equity banks (Kotlikoff, 2010; Kotlikoff & Leamer, 
2009) and measures to drastically reduce maturity transformation by banks 
could almost amount to solving the problem of bank failures by abolishing 
banks. Maturity transformation, for example, is an integral part of the 
functioning of banks in the financial system. The question arises as to 
whether it is appropriate for regulatory and structural reform to undermine 
the basic functionality of banks.  
Another alternative is the Volcker rule in the US which prohibits 
proprietary trading, effectively disallowing banks to engage in trading 
activity for the purpose of profiting from short-term price movements. 
However, certain activities, including most notably hedging activities and 
principal trading (i.e. transactions on behalf of customers), are exempted. 
Although the distinctions between these activities may be clear in theory, in 
practice it is very difficult to determine whether a transaction is motivated 
by speculative, hedging or principal trading purposes. In the context of the 
huge trading losses faced by JP Morgan Chase, which became public in 
May 2012, the transactions were identified by the bank as a hedging 
strategy against increased volatility in the markets. To that extent, the 
transactions would be exempt from the Volcker rule even though they were 
clearly designed to benefit from price movements. Thus, the concern that 
“the potential for proprietary trading and permitted activities to be 
commingled” appears to be well-founded, leading to questions about the 
ultimate effectiveness of the Volcker rule (FSOC, 2011, p. 15).  
Another approach is to allow the two activities to be conducted 
within the same bank but to have an internal separation between the two. 
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The central idea of ring fencing67 is that those bank services that are critical 
to the economy are to be ring fenced into legally, economically and 
operationally separate subsidiaries: in effect, creating an internal retail 
bank. This would imply, for instance, having dedicated capital assigned to 
the two parts of the business. Under the ICB approach, any excess capital 
within either business can be transferred to the other business providing 
the required minima are kept in each. The principle is that, in the event of 
distress, the investment banking part of the business would not be rescued 
although the core retail banking arm (however that is defined) could be 
rescued if necessary. The central idea is two-fold: retail banking operations 
should not be contaminated by the risks in investment banking, and the 
ring-fenced retail banking operation would be rescued.  
There are, however, practical difficulties with ring fencing that need 
to be recognised. Firstly, it is necessary to define precisely which services 
are ‘crucial to the economy’ and hence to be ring-fenced. Secondly, the 
failure of the wholesale part of the bank may create systemic problems, 
which implies that it is not always clear which parts of a bank need to be 
supported when in distress. Thirdly, in practice there may be links between 
the different subsidiaries of a bank such as, for instance, when a retail bank 
holds securitised assets on its balance sheet. Furthermore, in a crisis, while 
there may be formal separations between different types of banks and 
different subsidiaries within the same bank, all banks can be affected which 
means that ring-fencing can never in practice be complete.  
As was detailed in the previous section, there are behavioural 
regulatory alternatives (e.g. differential capital requirements, constraints on 
leverage, macro-prudential rules, liquidity requirements and transparency) 
that could be imposed on riskier business models such as the wholesale 
and the investment types.68 If they are well designed (in particular in terms 
                                                   
67 Final Report of the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking (ICB, 2011) and endorsed by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
68 A higher degree of regulatory intensity could be applied to such banks such as calibrating 
regulatory requirements on the basis of institutions’ contribution to systemic risk (Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Bernanke, 2009). The Financial Services Board has also 
proposed a global capital charge on systemically important banks. The BIS has argued that the 
rationale of a systemic capital charge would be to create a distribution of capital that reflects the 
systemic risk posed by individual firms (BIS, 2010). Chan-Lau (2010) suggests a practical 
methodology for levying capital charges based on degrees of interconnectedness. These would be 
based on a bank’s incremental contribution to systemic risk and its contribution to increased risk of 
other institutions. The approach is designed as a way of internalising negative externalities associated 
with too-connected-to-fail institutions.  
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of the riskiness of bank business models) and well enforced, these 
regulatory measures may provide the right incentives for a more prudent 
bank-behaviour.  
A key component of any strategy to reduce the probability of failures 
is the nature, timing and form of intervention in the event of a failing bank. 
Intervention strategies can be based on prompt corrective action (PCA) 
programmes (i.e. early intervention), and structured early intervention and 
resolution (SEIR) regimes, as in the US.  
Intervention arrangements have incentive and moral hazard effects 
which potentially influence future behaviour of banks and their customers. 
These arrangements may also have significant implications for the total cost 
of intervention (e.g. initial forbearance often has the effect of raising the 
eventual cost of subsequent intervention) and the distribution of those costs 
between taxpayers and other agents. The issue focuses on when 
intervention is to be made. The experience of banking crises in both 
developed and developing countries indicates that well-defined strategies 
for responding to the possible insolvency of financial institutions are 
needed.  
A key issue relates to rules versus discretion in the event of bank 
distress: the extent to which intervention should be circumscribed by 
clearly-defined rules (so that intervention agencies have no discretion 
about whether, how and when to act), or whether there should always be 
discretion simply because relevant circumstances cannot be set out in 
advance. The obvious prima facie advantage for allowing discretion is that it 
is impossible to foresee all future circumstances and conditions for when a 
bank might become distressed and close to insolvency.  
However, there are strong arguments against allowing discretion and 
in favour of a rules approach to intervention. Firstly, a rules approach 
enhances the credibility of the intervention agency in that market 
participants have a high degree of certainty that action will be taken. 
Secondly, allowing discretion is likely to increase the probability of 
forbearance which usually eventually leads to higher costs when 
intervention is finally made. It guards against hazards associated with risk-
averse regulators who themselves might be disinclined to take action for 
fear that it will be interpreted as a regulatory failure, and the temptation to 
allow a firm to trade-out of its difficulty: a policy that amounts to the 
regulator ‘gambling for resurrection’. Thirdly, a rules-based approach 
removes the danger of undue political interference in the disciplining of 
banks. Fourthly, a rules approach guards against supervisors focusing on 
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the short-term costs of intervention compared with the longer-term costs of 
delaying intervention as supervisors with discretion may be tempted to 
‘gamble for resurrection’. Fifthly, it guards against a ‘collective euphoria’ 
syndrome whereby all agents (including supervisors) are swept along by a 
common euphoria (Llewellyn, 2010). Finally, and related to the first, a rules 
approach to intervention is likely to have a beneficial impact on ex-ante 
behaviour of financial firms and create incentives for management to 
manage banks prudently so as to reduce the probability of insolvency.  
Above all, a rules approach is designed to address the time-
consistency problem and add credibility to a no-bail-out strategy and 
thereby create appropriate incentives within banks. SEIR strategies can, 
therefore, act as a powerful incentive for prudent behaviour. The PCA rules 
in the US specify graduated intervention by the regulators with pre-
determined responses triggered by, inter alia, capital thresholds.  
The role of market discipline needs to be addressed and enhanced (as 
was proposed in the previous chapter) not only via the elements already 
within Pillar 3 of the Basel Accord. Market discipline has to be viewed as an 
important mechanism to induce banks to assess and manage effectively 
their risks and to maintain sufficient levels of capital accordingly. Effective 
market discipline requires not only that relevant information is available to 
investors and to the public as a whole but also that it is possible to use this 
information to discipline institutions. Disclosing harmonised complete 
financial and governance reports and specific aspects of the supervisory 
review process, such as stress tests results, capital add-ons and 
countercyclical requirements, are necessary to achieve this purpose. 
To minimise the cost of failure, the main elements are:1) structural 
measures, 2) ring-fencing, 3) taxation, 4) explicit and predictable resolution 
arrangements and 5) living wills.  
Haldane (2009) suggests that a key issue is how to break out of a 
‘doom loop’: expectations of some banks being TBTF create a moral hazard 
and excess risk, which may lead to failures and the rescue of those banks. 
The resurrected banks are then free to repeat the process. In this vicious 
circle, the apparent solution to one problem sows the seeds of the next. One 
option to deal with banks regarded as potentially systemically important is 
to impose higher capital charges on such institutions as advocated, for 
instance, by Acharya & Richardson (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and 
Bernanke (2009). Chan-Lau (2010) suggests a practical methodology for 
levying capital charges based on degrees of interconnectedness. These 
would be based on a bank’s incremental contribution to systemic risk and 
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its contribution to increased risk of other institutions. The approach is 
designed as a way of internalising negative externalities associated with 
too-connected-to-fail institutions. The BIS has argued that the rationale of a 
systemic capital charge would be to create a distribution of capital that 
reflects the systemic risk posed by individual firms (BIS, 2010). 
The central advantage to ring-fencing is that retail banking operations 
of a financial group would be rescued if necessary whilst the investment 
bank would not be, but while maintaining any economies of scale and 
scope advantages that might exist within a group. Specifically, resolution 
would be made easier because of a simplified business structure, and there 
would be no implicit subsidy to investment banking activity by virtue of a 
bank being judged to be TBTF. In principle, the overall cost of a bank 
failure is reduced as one part of the bank can be allowed to fail without 
undermining core retail banking activity. 
The wide range of intervention measures applied by governments 
and central banks in the wake of the crisis involved a substantial taxpayer 
commitment. Taxpayers became what amounted to an ‘insurer of last 
resort’ but with an inefficient insurance contract in that no ex-ante 
premiums were paid by the insured entities. The contract was implicit. In 
effect, taxpayers became exposed to bank credit risks that they themselves 
had no part in creating and for which no ex-ante premiums were received. 
In order to minimise the cost to taxpayers, banks could be required to pay 
ex-ante premiums and/or ex post for the costs of rescue operations. The 
distribution implications of such a move would be difficult to unravel 
although each bank’s liability to pay could in principle be related to a 
measure of its systemic significance.  
The rationale for imposing special taxation on banks is three-fold: 1) 
to recoup the costs of past bail-outs and intervention, 2) to compensate for 
the effective subsidy received by banks by virtue of possible future bail-
outs and being TBTF and 3) creating incentives to alter funding structures 
and perhaps against becoming ‘too big’. The IMF has made two proposals: 
a financial stability contribution (FSC) and a financial activity tax (FAT).  
Under an FSC, banks would be required to make payments ex ante 
through a levy on their balance sheets to the extent of their contribution to 
financial instability, effectively putting a price on systemic externalities 
arising from excessive reliance on short-term funding, which constitutes 
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the most volatile portion of banks’ balance sheets.69 The FSC systems in 
place (or under consideration) in many countries are also often designed to 
contribute to the maintenance of credible resolution schemes, addressing 
one of the key sources of moral hazard risks.70  
The FAT would instead tax ‘supra-normal’ profits and remuneration 
in an attempt to correct the incentives for increased risk-taking by limiting 
excessive earnings. In this manner, the tax could serve as a substitute for 
the value-added tax (VAT), which is not applicable to financial services due 
to inherent difficulties in charging taxes to margin-based intermediation 
services.71  
Prior to the onset of the recent crisis, many countries did not have 
clearly-defined resolution arrangements in place, or a legal structure giving 
powers of intervention before insolvency is reached. This meant that 
uncertainty was created about how governments would respond to serious 
bank distress. Exceptions were the US, Canada, Italy and Norway with the 
latter having put in place special resolution arrangements following the 
banking crisis in the 1990s. In the EU, it was only in June 2012, more than 
five years since the eruption of the financial crisis, that the European 
Commission released the resolution framework, which was obviously too 
late to act on the successive banking crises in the EU. To avoid this 
uncertainty, the regulatory regime needs to encompass credible, 
predictable, and timely resolution arrangements for failed institutions 
which limit the potential liability imposed on tax-payers, maintains 
systemic stability, and protects depositors.  
                                                   
69 Many variants of the FSC exist. Among these, Perotti & Suarez (2009) propose a liquidity risk 
charge, which put a tax on a financial institution’s use of short-term liabilities.  
70 The European Commission has shown its preference for the construction of a resolution fund, 
without clearly a funding method. Charging a levy to uninsured liabilities, effectively acting as a 
simple FSC, is identified as one of the many possible ways to build an ex-ante resolution fund, but 
has been met with criticism, especially from the banking industry. For more details, see the European 
Commission’s Communication on bank resolution funds (COM(2010) 254 final) of October 2010 and 
the Commission’s consultation on crisis management 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/crisis_management/consultation_overview_en.pdf).  
71 Financial institutions provide a number of intermediation services to their clients, which make it 
hard to determine the value-added for a specific service. For example, what is cost of extending loans 
to a client? Would the deposit rate reflect the true cost of funds, given the fact that banks typically 
charge a variety of additional fees to depositors? Even if it did, what proportion of the interest margin 
– the difference between the interest rates for loans and deposits – would be due to the risk premium, 
not subject to taxation? These complicating issues are particularly crucial when the client is a 
business, looking to obtain a credit for VAT paid on these services. For more on the difficulties in and 
arguments for the application of VAT to the financial institutions, see Huizinga (2002). 
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The objective is to allow banks to fail without disturbing business and 
customer relationships, and to ensure that the costs of failure fall on private 
stakeholders (equity and bond holders and other unsecured creditors) 
rather than taxpayers. Bail-outs are to be avoided as they impose costs on 
taxpayers, create serious moral hazard, may support inefficient banks and 
weaken market discipline. A key objective is to minimise the moral hazard 
created by bank rescues.  
The ultimate objective is for resolution arrangements to be in place to 
deal with distressed banks with a minimum of costs and disruption. This 
implies allowing banks to fail without disturbing customer business or 
compromising systemic stability. A basic principle in reducing the cost of 
bank failures is for problems of a failed bank to be addressed quickly. This 
means that insolvency and bankruptcy procedures need to be clear and 
appropriate for the special position of banks.  
Problems emerge when resolution arrangements are not clear. Firstly, 
uncertainty is created for all stakeholders, including depositors and other 
banks in the system. Secondly, it creates time-consistency problems (and 
hence credibility issues) as governments may be induced to behave 
differently over time. Thirdly, stakeholders are inclined to bargain for 
economic rents often (if not usually) at the expense of the taxpayer. 
Fourthly, as argued above, it can lead to political pressures for forbearance 
and the moral hazard attached to it, and can lead to costly and unnecessary 
delays in resolution. Two further considerations in the case of cross-border 
banks is the extent to which countries have different resolution regimes, 
and how burden-sharing is to be distributed. Overall, without predictable 
rules for allocating losses, resolution will almost inevitably be delayed. The 
living wills can serve to enhance credibility if well-designed and approved 
by the regulators.  
Prior to the recent crisis, most countries did not have in place the 
necessary tools to wind down their domestic financial institutions. Huertas 
(2010) argues that living wills can in theory create a financial system that is 
“resilient to shocks and one that assures that banks are not ‘too big’ or ‘too 
interconnected’ to fail.” Living wills can be a superior and more realistic 
alternative to structural measures to address the TBTF issue. Living wills 
seek to prevent the failure of one bank having broad systemic consequences 
leading to the failure of other innocent banks. As put by Huertas (2010): 
“Living wills offer the prospect that society can create a lower 
impact/lower cost solution to the problem posed by large, systemically 
important banks.”  
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The two key components of living wills are recovery and resolution 
arrangements with the resolution component kicking in when the recovery 
component has failed. In principle, clearly-defined and credible recovery 
plans should lower the probability that resolution will be needed because 
such plans outline how a bank is to respond to distress situations. They are 
designed to maintain banks as going concerns. Living wills dictate that a 
bank has in place a clear recovery plan by requiring it to outline in advance 
what is to be done in the event that it falls into extreme stress. As put by 
Huertas (2010): “The bank is forced to think through in advance what it 
would do if the bank were to fall under extreme stress.” In particular, 
banks are required to have plans in place to ensure that, in such 
circumstances, they can maintain adequate capital and liquidity. The 
requirement to have convertible bonds as part of a bank’s capital base 
could be part of living will arrangements with the circumstances under 
which the conversion takes place being specified in advance. Other possible 
routes to recovery include selling parts of the business, exiting from some 
business lines, running down the scale of the bank, selling the entire 
business, etc.  
The essence of living wills is that there are clearly-defined and 
credible recovery plans in advance, resolution arrangements are made 
explicit, and arrangements are in place to enable a bank to be broken up 
when in distress so as to protect core depositors’ business. They amount to 
a form of SEIR. There are further advantages to living wills in the case of 
complex and potentially systemically important institutions. Firstly, to the 
extent that they induce simplified structures in complex banks, 
interconnectedness might be lowered. Secondly, they are designed to lower 
the probability of failure through the recovery component. Thirdly, 
systemic costs of any failures that occur should be lowered because clear 
and credible resolution plans are put in place in advance. Fourthly, the 
resolution process should be made easier and less complex. Fifthly, they 
would give more information to supervisors in the process of resolution 
operations. Finally, there could be general advantages through reducing 
the need for rescues or bail-outs because credible and explicit alternative 
resolution mechanisms would be in place. This should enhance the 
credibility of a no-bail-out policy. The ultimate rationale is that the 
‘recovery’ component should lower the probability that a bank would 
require intervention by the regulatory authorities, and the resolution part 
should lower the costs to society of a bank failure.  
The structural complexity of large financial groups creates particular 
problems for the resolution regime most especially when the objective is to 
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separate the essential parts of a bank (which are to be sustained) from its 
other activities. Living wills need to be designed to give information about 
how any wind down would be executed in practice. They are also designed 
to include mechanisms to separate the components of a financial firm that 
are critical from those that are not (Hupkes, 2009). In particular, deposits, 
some lending business and payments services are to be ring-fenced in the 
event of a resolution. This suggests having simple structures so that parts 
of the bank can easily be sold (Tucker, 2010). The main purpose is to lower 
the cost, and speed up the process, of resolution by making it easier to sell 
different parts of the bank and to protect the taxpayer by giving an 
alternative to bail-outs. It needs to be clear which parts of a bank’s business 
are to be supported and kept solvent. A key feature is that core business 
should be effectively ring-fenced in the event of bank distress.  
To address these issues comprehensively at the EU level, we argue 
for the need to address the prevention and resolution simultaneously and 
in a coordinated fashion to determine the intensity of regulation and its 
costs, relative to the credibility of resolution and its costs.  
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APPENDIX I. LIST OF VARIABLES  
No. Variable 
Cov-
erage No. Variable 
Cov-
erage 
1 Country (headquarter location) 100% 32 Income (interest - expenses) 97% 
2 Reporting currency 100% 33 Income (non-interest) 99% 
3 Accounting date (end of year) 100% 34 Income (commissions - net) 99% 
4 Listed (YES/NO) 99% 35 Income (commissions - income) 92% 
5 Block holder ownership (>5%) 94% 36 Income (commissions - expenses) 92% 
6 Ownership (cooperative, savings..) 100% 37 Income (insurance - net) 56% 
7 Public ownership (%) 30% 38 Income (insurance - income) 50% 
8 Assets (total) 99% 39 Income (insurance - expenses) 50% 
9 Assets (domestic) 98% 40 Income (trading - net) 99% 
10 Assets (% of GDP) 99% 41 Income (dividend) 46% 
11 Cash (& balances with central banks) 99% 42 Income (other) 98% 
12 Intangible assets 98% 43 Expenses (operating - total) 99% 
13 Goodwill 78% 44 Expenses (operating - 
administrative) 
99% 
14 Other intangible assets 78% 45 Expenses (operating - personal) 97% 
15 Loans to banks (total) 99% 46 Expenses (operating - depreciations) 97% 
16 Loans to customers (total) 99% 47 Expenses (operating - other) 97% 
17 Liabilities (banks incl. central banks) 98% 48 Expenses (risk costs) 99% 
18 Liabilities (customers) 92% 49 Expenses (restructuring costs) 12% 
19 Repurchase agreements 77% 50 Expenses (bank levy) 34% 
20 Capital (equity-total) 99% 51 Profit (before tax) 99% 
21 Capital (equity-minority) 99% 52 Income tax 99% 
22 Capital (regulatory capital) 48% 53 Profit (after tax) 99% 
23 Capital (tier I - core) 40% 54 Risk-weighted assets (total) 93% 
24 Capital (tier I - total) 88% 55 Applicable Basel standards (I/II) 99% 
25 Capital (common equity) 99% 56 Basel approach (SA/IRB) 99% 
26 Capital (tangible common equity) 99% 57 CDS spread (senior, average) 52% 
27 Derivatives (total - fair value - 
negative) 
96% 58 CDS spread (senior, year end) 52% 
28 Derivatives (total - fair value - positive) 96% 59 CDS spread (senior, volatility) 52% 
29 Income (total) 99% 60 CDS spread (subordinated, average) 37% 
30 Income (interest - net) 99% 61 CDS spread (subordinated, yr. end) 37% 
31 Income (interest - income) 97% 62 CDS spread (subordinated, 
volatility) 
37% 
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APPENDIX II. ASSUMPTIONS ON NSF 
The assumptions for the net stable funding (NSF) are similar to those put 
forward in IMF (2011a). Introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS, 2010c), the NSF aims to restrict banks from having an 
excessive reliance on short-term funding in an attempt to promote a more 
balanced mid- to long-term financial resources to support the assets 
through stable funding sources. More specifically, the measure requires the 
available stable funding to exceed required stable funding. 
Available stable funding sources include total Tier-1 and Tier-2 
capital as well as reserves that count as part of equity. Stable forms of 
funding, including customer deposits and other liabilities with more than 
one-year maturities, are also included. Lower maturity liabilities, including 
term deposits and retail deposits from non-financial institutions, enter as 
available funding after the application of various haircuts. Short-term 
liabilities to financial institutions and secured wholesale funding are 
generally not included as available, due to substantial rollover risks and 
potential margin calls that may materialize in times of market stress.  
Required stable funding includes assets that cannot be quickly sold 
off without substantial costs during adverse market conditions lasting up 
to one year. Most of customer loans are assumed to have long-term 
maturities and will thus face liquidation costs. All encumbered securities 
that are posted as collateral enter directly into calculation of required stable 
funding as they cannot be sold off without changing the original contract. 
Shorter maturity retail loans are also treated as required funding, albeit 
with an appropriate haircut. In turn, more liquid unencumbered assets, 
such as cash or marketable securities receive lower factors, as they are 
typically readily available for sale without substantial potential losses.  
Since the available data are substantially restricted in nature, 
assumptions regarding many specific items were made. The following table 
provides the assumptions and the relevant multiplicative factors that were 
used to build the NSF measure used in the study. Although comparable to 
the measure developed by IMF (2011a), the validity of the results is likely to 
depend on the assumptions on certain factors more than others. This is 
particularly the case for the debt liabilities and trading assets, which make 
up more than one-third of the balance sheets of most banks, especially the 
investment and wholesale banking models.  
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Balance sheet items Factors 
AVAILABLE STABLE FUNDING  
Customer deposits 85% 
Deposits from banks 0% 
Derivative liabilities (negative, fair-
value) 0% 
Repurchase agreements 0% 
Debt liabilities 50% 
Equity & reserves 100% 
REQUIRED STABLE FUNDING  
Cash 0% 
Customer loans 80% 
Loans to banks 0% 
Derivative assets (positive, fair-value) 90% 
Trading assets 50% 
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APPENDIX III.  
CALCULATION OF Z-SCORE 
The Z-score used in the study is the one derived in Boyd & Runkle (1993), 
which is a simple indicator of the risk of failure or the distance to default. 
To derive the measure, it is assumed that default occurs when the one-time 
losses of bank j in year t exceed its equity, or when  
0 jtjt E .       (A1) 
Then, assuming that the bank’s return on total assets (RoA), or
jtjt TA/ , is normally distributed around the mean j , and standard 
deviation j , the probability of failure is given as  



jtD
jtjtjtjtjtjt drrTAETAprEpr )()//()(  ,  (A2) 
where  represents the standard normal distribution, r is the standardised 
return on assets and D is the default boundary that separates a healthy 
bank from an unhealthy one, described as the normalised equity ratio: 
j
jjtjt
jt
TAE
D



)/(
,    (A3) 
Note that a greater D implies a greater probability of default and, 
therefore, a greater risk for the bank. The average and standard deviation 
calculations were obtained using available data for the years 2006-09.  
Since D admits negative values in most cases, the Z-score is set to be 
represented as a positive number, or as 
.jtjt DZ       (A4) 
This implies that a greater Z-value implies a lower probability of default. 
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APPENDIX IV. TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION 
IN THE ‘TRIALOGUE’ OVER CRD IV-CRR 
Policy area 
CRD IV-CRR 
European Commission European Parliament European Council 
Capital 
requirements 
   
Capital buffers  Capital conservation buffer 
of up to 2.5% and 
countercyclical capital buffer 
of up to 2.5% (CRDIV Article 
123 and 130).  
Introduction of a systemic risk 
buffer on top of the capital 
conservation buffer and 
countercyclical capital buffer. 
The systemic risk buffer 
increases the capital 
requirement by 1 to 10% for 
both global and domestic 
systemic institutions (European 
Parliament compromises AK 
and AL on CRD IV). 
 
Introduction of a systemic 
risk buffer on top of the 
capital conservation buffer 
and countercyclical capital 
buffer. National 
authorities can increase the 
requirement by up to 3% 
with a notification. 
Between 3 and up to 5% 
approval of the European 
Commission is required 
(Council compromise on 
CRD IV Article 124a). 
Risk weighted 
assets 
The risk-weights for SME 
exposures of 75% (CRR 
Article 118). 
The risk-weights for SME 
exposures are dropped to 50% 
(European Parliament 
compromise on CRR Article 
118). 
The risk-weights for SME 
exposures remain 75% 
(Council compromise on 
CRR Article 118). 
Large exposures 
to SMEs 
Maximum single exposure to 
a SME of €1 million (CRR 
Article 118).  
Maximum single exposure to a 
SME of €2 millions (European 
Parliament compromise on CRR 
Article 118). 
Maximum single exposure 
to a SME remains €1 
million (Council 
compromise on CRR 
Article 118). 
Leverage ratio    
Threshold Suggesting leverage ratio of 
3% (CRR Article 482). 
 
Possibly allowing for divergence 
in leverage ratio based on 
riskiness of business model. 
Suggesting leverage ratios 
between 1.5-5% (European 
Parliament compromise on CRR 
Article 482). 
Suggesting leverage ratio 
of 3% (Council 
compromise on CRR 
Article 482) 
 
Off-balance sheet 
exposures 
Risk weight of 10% for ‘low 
risk’ exposures and 100% for 
other off-balance sheet 
exposures (CRR Article 416). 
Introduction of lower weight for 
‘medium risk’ off-balance sheet 
exposures 20-50% (European 
Parliament compromise on CRR 
Article 416). 
Introduction of lower 
weight for ‘medium risk’ 
off-balance sheet 
exposures 20-50% (Council 
compromise on CRR 
Article 416). 
Timetable Disclosure from 2015 
onwards. The ratio might 
mitigate into a binding 
leverage ratio from 2018 
onwards (CRR Article 482). 
Disclosure from 2015 onwards. 
The European Commission 
shall, adopt by July 2017 a 
delegated act on the 
introduction of a binding 
leverage ratio (European 
Parliament compromise on CRR 
Article 482). 
Disclosure from 2015 
onwards; The ratio might 
mitigate into a binding 
leverage ratio from 2018 
onwards (Council 
compromise on CRR 
Article 482). 
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Policy area 
CRD IV-CRR 
European Commission European Parliament European Council 
Liquidity 
coverage 
requirement 
(LCR) 
   
Timetable Disclosure from 2015 
onwards. Suggesting binding 
liquidity coverage ratio from 
2018 onwards (CRR Article 
481). 
Disclosure from 2015 onwards. 
Suggesting binding liquidity 
coverage ratio from 2018 
onwards (European Parliament 
compromise on CRR Article 
481). 
Disclosure from 2015 
onwards. Suggesting 
binding liquidity coverage 
ratio from 2018 onwards 
(Council compromise on 
CRR Article 481). 
Liquid assets At least 60% of the liquid 
assets should be ‘highly 
liquid’ (CRR Article 405).  
At least 40% of the liquid assets 
should be ‘highly liquid’ 
(European Parliament 
compromise on CRR Article 
405). 
No minimum for highly 
liquid assets (Council 
compromise on CRR 
Article 405). 
Net Stable 
Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) 
   
Timetable The European Commission 
will consider proposing a 
stable funding ratio after an 
observation and review 
period in 2018. 
By 31 December 2016, the 
European Commission shall 
adopt a delegated act setting out 
the requirements for a Net 
Stable Funding Ratio.  
The European 
Commission will consider 
proposing a stable funding 
ratio after an observation 
and review period in 2018. 
Compensation  The variable payment of bank 
employees may not exceed the 
fixed pay (European Parliament 
compromise on CRDIV Article 
90). 
 
Other  On shadow banking, securities- 
and repo lending as well as the 
top ten exposures to 
unregulated financial entities 
need to be disclosed. In 
addition, it proposes to 
maximise the exposures to 
unregulated financial entities to 
25% or €150 million (European 
Parliament compromises on 
Articles 483 and 484). 
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APPENDIX V.  
LIST OF BANKS BY BUSINESS MODEL 
Model 1 – Investment  
ABN Amro (2006-2008), Barclays, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank (2007-2008, 2009-2010), 
Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Nordea, Société Générale, The Royal Bank of Scotland, and WestLB. 
Model 2 Retail – Focused 
ABN Amro (2009), Agricultural Bank Of Greece, Allied Irish Banks (2006-2007, 2009-2010), 
Alpha Bank (2006, 2008-2010), Banca Intesa (2006), Banco Comercial Português (2006, 
2010), Banco Popolare (2007), Banco Popular Español (2009, 2010), Bank Of Cyprus, Bank 
Of Ireland, Bank Of Valletta, Banque Et Caisse D'Epargne De L'Etat (2007-2010), Banque 
Populaire (2006-2008), Bayerische Landesbank (2006), BBVA (2007-2010), BFA-Bankia 
(2010), EFG Eurobank Ergasias, Erste Bank, Hellenic Postbank, Intesa Sanpaolo (2007), 
Jyske Bank, KBC (2006-2007), La Caixa (2006, 2007, 2009), Marfin Popular Bank, National 
Bank Of Greece, OTP Bank (2007), Piraeus Bank (2006-2008), PKO Bank Polski, Raiffeisen 
Bank International, Sydbank, UBI Banca (2008-2009), and UniCredit (2009-2010). 
Model 3 Retail – Diversified 
ABN Amro (2010), Allied Irish Banks (2008), Alpha Bank (2007), Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Di Siena, Banco BPI, Banco Comercial Português (2007-2009), Banco Popolare (2008-2010), 
Banco Popular Español (2006-2008), Banco Santander, Bank Of Ireland (2007-2009), BBVA 
(2006), Caixa Geral De Depósitos, Danske Bank (2009-2010), DnB NOR Bank, Espírito Santo 
Financial Group, ING, Intesa Sanpaolo (2008-2010), Irish Life And Permanent (2006-2007), 
KBC (2010), La Caixa (2008, 2010), Lloyds Banking Group (2006-2007, 2009-2010), Nova 
Kreditna Banka Maribor, Nova Ljubljanska Banka, Nykredit, OP-Pohjola, OTP Bank (2006, 
2008-2010), Rabobank (2007-2010), Sanpaolo IMI (2006), Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
(2010), SNS Bank, Svenska Handelsbanken, Swedbank, and UBI Banca (2006-2007, 2010). 
Model 4 Wholesale 
Bank of Ireland (2006), Bayerische Landesbank (2007-2010), BPCE Group (2009-2010), 
Caisse D'Epargne (2006-2008), Commerzbank (2008), Crédit Agricole S.A., Danske Bank, 
Dekabank (2006-2008), Dexia, DZ Bank, Helaba, HSH Nordbank, Hypo Real Estate (2007-
2010), Irish Life And Permanent (2008-2010), KBC (2008-2009), Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg, Landesbank Berlin, Lloyds Banking Group (2008), Norddeutsche 
Landesbank, Oesterreichische Volksbank, Rabobank (2006), Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken (2006-2009), Svenska Handelsbanken (2006), UniCredit (2006-2008), and WGZ 
Bank. 
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APPENDIX VI.  
TANGIBLE EQUITY RATIOS (%) 
 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Erste Bank AT 2.7 2.8 3.2 5.7 6.2 
Oesterreichische 
Volksbank 
AT 3.6 3.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 
Raiffeisen Bank 
International 
AT 6.2 7.7 6.6 8.0 7.1 
Dexia BE 2.8 2.3 0.5 1.7 1.5 
KBC BE 5.1 4.3 3.3 4.3 5.2 
Bank Of Cyprus CY 7.8 10.6 4.4 5.2 5.6 
Marfin Popular Bank CY 7.1 6.4 5.2 5.3 4.9 
Bayerische Landesbank DE 3.6 2.5 2.1 4.1 4.3 
Commerzbank DE 2.2 2.4 3.0 2.8 3.4 
Dekabank DE 2.7 3.0 2.2 2.5 3.1 
Deutsche Bank DE 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.9 1.8 
DZ Bank DE 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.7 
Helaba DE 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.8 3.0 
HSH Nordbank DE 2.2 2.0 0.9 2.4 3.3 
Hypo Real Estate DE .. 0.9 -0.4 1.3 2.3 
Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg 
DE 2.5 2.3 1.1 2.4 2.5 
Landesbank Berlin DE 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.6 
Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
DE 2.6 3.1 2.3 2.4 1.7 
WestLB DE 2.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 2.1 
WGZ Bank DE 3.5 3.2 2.7 3.2 3.2 
Danske Bank DK 3.2 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.6 
Jyske Bank DK 5.8 4.4 4.4 5.5 5.4 
Nykredit DK 5.0 4.7 3.7 3.7 3.9 
Sydbank DK 5.5 5.1 4.5 5.8 6.3 
Banco Popular Español ES 6.1 5.7 5.9 6.2 5.9 
Banco Santander ES 3.7 4.6 3.8 4.3 4.4 
BBVA ES 4.7 4.0 3.4 4.5 5.4 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BFA-Bankia ES .. .. .. .. 5.0 
La Caixa ES 4.0 4.7 4.5 8.0 7.0 
OP-Pohjola FI 6.6 6.8 5.4 6.3 6.7 
BNP Paribas FR 3.0 2.8 2.2 3.3 3.6 
Banque Populaire FR 5.8 4.8 3.6 .. .. 
Caisse D'Epargne FR 3.3 3.1 2.3 .. .. 
BPCE Group FR .. .. .. 3.9 4.3 
Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 1.8 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 
Société Générale FR 2.9 2.3 2.9 3.8 3.7 
Agricultural Bank Of 
Greece 
GR 6.5 6.2 3.1 3.9 2.4 
Alpha Bank GR 7.0 7.6 5.8 8.3 8.4 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias GR 6.1 6.8 4.8 6.7 6.2 
Hellenic Postbank GR 7.0 5.6 3.5 6.8 5.5 
National Bank Of Greece GR 8.5 6.4 5.8 6.6 7.1 
Piraeus Bank GR 5.3 6.6 5.0 .. .. 
OTP Bank HU 8.1 5.4 6.5 7.7 8.9 
Allied Irish Banks IE 5.9 6.0 5.3 6.1 2.9 
Bank Of Ireland IE 2.6 3.1 2.9 3.1 4.2 
Irish Life And 
Permanent 
IE 2.8 3.1 3.0 4.1 3.7 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Di Siena 
IT 4.2 4.1 3.4 4.4 4.1 
Banco Popolare IT .. 3.8 4.2 5.2 5.2 
Sanpaolo IMI IT 3.7 .. .. .. .. 
Banca Intesa IT 5.7 .. .. .. .. 
Intesa Sanpaolo IT .. 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.7 
UBI Banca IT -3.2 6.3 4.1 5.0 4.4 
UniCredit IT 3.3 3.7 3.1 4.1 4.7 
Banque Et Caisse 
D'Epargne De L'Etat 
LU .. 6.6 6.0 7.1 7.4 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank Of Valletta MT 6.7 6.9 6.3 6.9 7.3 
ABN Amro NL 1.7 3.0 2.4 3.9 3.1 
ING NL 3.1 2.6 1.7 2.9 3.4 
Rabobank NL 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.7 5.7 
SNS Bank NL 2.9 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.9 
DnB NOR Bank NO 4.6 4.7 4.0 5.2 5.6 
PKO Bank Polski PL 9.1 10.1 9.5 12.2 11.7 
Banco BPI PT 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.3 
Banco Comercial 
Português 
PT 5.5 5.0 6.1 7.0 6.9 
Caixa Geral De 
Depósitos 
PT 4.6 5.0 4.6 5.6 5.9 
Espírito Santo Financial 
Group 
PT 6.8 7.3 5.8 7.5 7.8 
Nordea SE 3.8 3.8 3.2 3.9 3.7 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken 
SE 2.7 2.6 2.6 3.6 .. 
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 3.0 3.7 3.2 3.6 3.8 
Swedbank SE 3.3 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.7 
Nova Kreditna Banka 
Maribor 
SI 7.0 6.8 6.7 7.0 7.1 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka SI .. 5.1 6.1 5.5 5.0 
Barclays UK 2.0 2.0 1.8 3.6 3.6 
HSBC UK 4.3 4.2 3.0 4.6 5.2 
Lloyds Banking Group UK 2.6 2.8 1.7 3.7 4.2 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK 3.1 2.3 2.5 4.6 4.3 
Investment banks 2.7 2.6 2.3 3.3 3.5 
Retail banks - Focused 6.0 5.9 5.0 6.3 6.0 
Retail banks - Diversified 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.8 5.0 
Wholesale banks 2.9 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.9 
TOTAL  4.2 4.2 3.6 4.6 4.6 
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APPENDIX VII. TIER I RATIOS (%) 
 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Erste Bank AT 6.6 7.0 7.2 10.8 11.8 
Oesterreichische 
Volksbank 
AT 7.7 7.1 7.1 9.2 9.4 
Raiffeisen Bank 
International 
AT 9.0 10.5 8.1 11.0 9.7 
Dexia BE 9.8 9.1 10.6 12.3 13.1 
KBC BE 8.0 8.0 8.9 10.8 12.6 
Bank Of Cyprus CY 9.0 9.7 7.3 8.8 11.0 
Marfin Popular Bank CY 11.5 9.2 8.1 9.1 10.0 
Bayerische Landesbank DE 6.5 6.3 8.0 10.9 11.2 
Commerzbank DE 6.8 7.0 10.8 10.5 11.9 
Dekabank DE .. .. .. .. .. 
Deutsche Bank DE 8.9 8.6 10.1 12.6 11.0 
DZ Bank DE 9.2 7.7 7.4 9.9 10.6 
Helaba DE .. .. .. .. .. 
HSH Nordbank DE 6.1 6.2 8.3 9.8 18.6 
Hypo Real Estate DE .. 7.0 3.4 7.8 34.7 
Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg 
DE 7.4 8.3 6.9 9.8 11.4 
Landesbank Berlin DE .. .. .. .. .. 
Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
DE 7.7 7.0 8.1 8.7 9.1 
WestLB DE 7.6 5.3 6.4 8.2 11.4 
WGZ Bank DE 10.3 9.1 .. .. .. 
Danske Bank DK 8.6 6.4 9.2 14.1 14.8 
Jyske Bank DK .. .. .. .. .. 
Nykredit DK .. .. .. .. .. 
Sydbank DK 8.1 .. .. .. .. 
Banco Popular Español ES 8.0 7.9 8.1 9.1 9.6 
Banco Santander ES 7.4 7.7 8.7 9.4 9.3 
BBVA ES 7.8 6.8 7.9 9.4 10.5 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BFA-Bankia ES .. .. .. .. 7.7 
La Caixa ES 8.3 9.8 10.1 10.4 9.9 
OP-Pohjola FI 12.7 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.8 
BNP Paribas FR 7.2 7.0 7.9 10.1 11.4 
Banque Populaire FR .. 9.1 7.7 .. .. 
Caisse D'Epargne FR .. .. .. .. .. 
BPCE Group FR .. .. .. 9.8 10.7 
Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 8.2 8.1 9.1 9.5 10.6 
Société Générale FR 7.8 6.6 8.8 10.7 10.6 
Agricultural Bank Of 
Greece 
GR 10.9 8.9 6.5 9.1 7.5 
Alpha Bank GR 10.2 9.6 8.0 11.7 11.9 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias GR 8.5 9.2 8.0 11.2 10.6 
Hellenic Postbank GR 13.3 12.1 8.6 17.1 18.5 
National Bank Of Greece GR 12.4 9.2 10.0 11.3 13.1 
Piraeus Bank GR .. .. 8.0 .. .. 
OTP Bank HU .. .. 15.3 18.5 18.4 
Allied Irish Banks IE 8.2 7.5 7.4 7.2 4.3 
Bank Of Ireland IE 7.5 8.2 8.1 12.0 9.7 
Irish Life And 
Permanent 
IE 14.0 13.1 23.0 24.0 23.7 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Di Siena 
IT 6.2 6.1 5.1 7.5 8.4 
Banco Popolare IT .. 5.2 6.4 7.7 7.2 
Sanpaolo IMI IT 7.0 .. .. .. .. 
Banca Intesa IT 4.9 .. .. .. .. 
Intesa Sanpaolo IT .. 6.5 7.1 8.4 9.4 
UBI Banca IT 10.6 7.4 7.7 8.0 7.5 
UniCredit IT 7.0 6.5 6.8 8.6 9.5 
Banque Et Caisse 
D'Epargne De L'Etat 
LU .. 9.4 14.6 14.4 13.1 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank Of Valletta MT .. .. 9.9 11.2 10.5 
ABN Amro NL 8.5 12.4 10.9 19.9 12.8 
ING NL 7.6 7.4 9.3 10.2 12.3 
Rabobank NL 10.7 10.7 12.8 13.8 15.7 
SNS Bank NL 8.2 8.4 10.5 10.7 10.7 
DnB NOR Bank NO 6.7 7.2 6.7 9.3 10.1 
PKO Bank Polski PL 12.9 11.1 13.1 16.8 14.1 
Banco BPI PT 7.4 6.5 9.1 7.8 8.7 
Banco Comercial 
Português 
PT 6.6 5.5 7.1 9.3 9.2 
Caixa Geral De 
Depósitos 
PT 7.4 6.7 7.0 8.5 8.9 
Espírito Santo Financial 
Group 
PT 8.2 7.1 6.5 7.7 8.2 
Nordea SE 7.1 7.0 7.4 10.2 9.8 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken 
SE 8.2 8.6 10.1 13.9 14.2 
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 6.8 10.6 8.7 10.9 11.8 
Swedbank SE 6.5 6.2 8.1 10.4 11.0 
Nova Kreditna Banka 
Maribor 
SI .. .. .. .. .. 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka SI 6.8 5.4 7.9 7.2 6.4 
Barclays UK 7.7 7.6 8.6 13.0 13.5 
HSBC UK 9.4 9.3 8.3 10.8 12.1 
Lloyds Banking Group UK 6.5 6.4 5.6 9.6 11.6 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK 7.5 7.3 10.0 14.1 12.9 
Investment banks 7.8 7.8 8.7 11.1 11.6 
Retail banks - Focused 9.1 8.8 8.8 11.3 10.6 
Retail banks - Diversified 8.2 8.0 8.7 10.3 11.0 
Wholesale banks 8.2 7.5 8.9 11.3 14.8 
TOTAL 8.1 8.8 10.9 11.6 11.6 
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APPENDIX VIII. RETURN ON ASSETS (%)  
 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Erste Bank AT 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Oesterreichische 
Volksbank 
AT 0.5 0.5 -0.8 -2.0 0.2 
Raiffeisen Bank 
International 
AT 2.6 1.7 1.7 0.5 1.0 
Dexia BE 0.6 0.5 -0.6 0.2 0.2 
KBC BE 1.4 1.2 -0.8 -0.9 0.6 
Bank Of Cyprus CY 1.5 1.8 1.5 0.9 0.8 
Marfin Popular Bank CY 0.8 2.3 1.2 0.5 0.3 
Bayerische Landesbank DE 0.4 0.1 -1.2 -0.8 0.3 
Commerzbank DE 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 
Dekabank DE 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.7 
Deutsche Bank DE 0.5 0.4 -0.3 0.3 0.2 
DZ Bank DE 0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.2 0.4 
Helaba DE 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 
HSH Nordbank DE 0.6 0.1 -1.3 -0.7 0.0 
Hypo Real Estate DE .. 0.1 -1.3 -0.6 -0.3 
Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg 
DE 0.3 0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 
Landesbank Berlin DE 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
DE 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
WestLB DE 0.4 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 
WGZ Bank DE 0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.4 0.2 
Danske Bank DK 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Jyske Bank DK 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 
Nykredit DK 0.5 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.4 
Sydbank DK 1.8 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 
Banco Popular Español ES 1.9 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.6 
Banco Santander ES 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 
BBVA ES 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.2 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BFA-Bankia ES .. .. .. .. 0.0 
La Caixa ES 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 
OP-Pohjola FI 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 
BNP Paribas FR 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7 
Banque Populaire FR 1.4 0.4 -0.1 .. .. 
Caisse D'Epargne FR 1.0 0.3 -0.4 .. .. 
BPCE Group FR .. .. .. 0.0 0.5 
Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Société Générale FR 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 
Agricultural Bank Of 
Greece 
GR 1.4 1.3 -1.9 -0.8 -1.3 
Alpha Bank GR 1.6 1.9 1.0 0.7 0.2 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias GR 1.5 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.2 
Hellenic Postbank GR 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 
National Bank Of Greece GR 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.1 0.5 
Piraeus Bank GR 1.8 1.7 0.7 .. .. 
OTP Bank HU 2.9 3.0 3.1 1.7 1.4 
Allied Irish Banks IE 1.7 1.4 0.6 -1.5 -8.2 
Bank Of Ireland IE 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.0 -0.6 
Irish Life And 
Permanent 
IE 0.6 0.6 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Di Siena 
IT 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.1 0.5 
Banco Popolare IT .. 0.9 -0.4 0.4 0.2 
Sanpaolo IMI IT 1.1 .. .. .. .. 
Banca Intesa IT 1.3 .. .. .. .. 
Intesa Sanpaolo IT .. 1.6 0.3 0.6 0.6 
UBI Banca IT 1.5 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
UniCredit IT 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Banque Et Caisse 
D'Epargne De L'Etat 
LU .. 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bank Of Valletta MT 1.6 1.8 0.7 1.3 1.6 
ABN Amro NL 0.5 1.0 0.2 -1.0 -0.1 
ING NL 0.8 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 
Rabobank NL 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
SNS Bank NL 0.6 0.6 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 
DnB NOR Bank NO 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.9 
PKO Bank Polski PL 2.6 3.2 3.5 1.8 2.4 
Banco BPI PT 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Banco Comercial 
Português 
PT 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Caixa Geral De 
Depósitos 
PT 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.3 
Espírito Santo Financial 
Group 
PT 1.5 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Nordea SE 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken 
SE 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.4 
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.7 
Swedbank SE 1.0 1.0 0.9 -0.5 0.5 
Nova Kreditna Banka 
Maribor 
SI 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka SI 1.1 1.0 0.2 -0.4 -1.3 
Barclays UK 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.4 
HSBC UK 1.2 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 
Lloyds Banking Group UK 1.2 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK 1.0 0.6 -1.8 -0.2 -0.1 
Investment banks 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.4 
Retail banks - Focused 1.5 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.1 
Retail banks - Diversified 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 
Wholesale banks 0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 
TOTAL 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 
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APPENDIX IX. RETURN ON EQUITY (%)  
 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Erste Bank AT 14.0 16.8 11.0 7.8 8.8 
Oesterreichische 
Volksbank 
AT 10.9 13.2 -18.1 -44.5 4.4 
Raiffeisen Bank 
International 
AT 32.2 18.7 21.9 5.3 12.4 
Dexia BE 18.5 17.6 -69.0 11.7 8.6 
KBC BE 24.9 23.7 -19.6 -16.3 10.5 
Bank Of Cyprus CY 19.2 17.1 26.8 14.7 12.3 
Marfin Popular Bank CY 6.0 19.7 12.9 5.8 3.1 
Bayerische Landesbank DE 10.6 2.0 -46.0 -19.7 6.4 
Commerzbank DE 15.6 15.5 -2.0 -17.5 4.7 
Dekabank DE 14.7 15.4 -2.0 14.2 20.7 
Deutsche Bank DE 25.4 23.6 -18.0 13.7 7.9 
DZ Bank DE 19.1 9.7 -18.4 8.2 15.1 
Helaba DE 10.9 8.3 -1.2 8.2 7.6 
HSH Nordbank DE 26.7 3.4 -130.3 -28.4 0.3 
Hypo Real Estate DE .. 9.7 .. -48.2 -11.1 
Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg 
DE 12.5 3.3 -43.5 -11.6 -3.2 
Landesbank Berlin DE 29.9 10.2 0.5 12.5 11.6 
Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
DE 22.3 8.0 0.4 -1.6 5.9 
WestLB DE 14.9 -33.9 0.7 -13.5 -3.2 
WGZ Bank DE 10.4 8.8 -12.9 11.8 5.3 
Danske Bank DK 19.4 18.5 2.3 4.7 6.2 
Jyske Bank DK 29.1 23.4 12.0 5.0 7.5 
Nykredit DK 8.6 8.1 -1.7 0.3 8.3 
Sydbank DK 32.3 33.7 11.4 10.9 5.8 
Banco Popular Español ES 29.1 29.3 20.7 12.7 10.1 
Banco Santander ES 22.3 20.8 18.7 14.8 14.9 
BBVA ES 31.5 30.4 25.9 18.6 17.1 
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 Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BFA-Bankia ES .. .. .. .. 0.5 
La Caixa ES 26.6 33.3 11.0 4.6 6.6 
OP-Pohjola FI 15.6 17.8 7.1 7.5 8.5 
BNP Paribas FR 19.3 18.6 6.7 11.2 15.2 
Banque Populaire FR 22.4 7.1 -1.5 .. .. 
Caisse D'Epargne FR 25.6 7.8 -15.2 .. .. 
BPCE Group FR .. .. .. -0.8 11.2 
Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 17.5 10.4 2.5 3.2 5.0 
Société Générale FR 24.2 6.0 9.8 1.7 11.5 
Agricultural Bank Of 
Greece 
GR 20.7 20.8 -57.7 -19.6 -52.6 
Alpha Bank GR 22.2 24.8 15.9 7.7 2.7 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias GR 23.0 19.6 17.7 6.3 2.2 
Hellenic Postbank GR 19.5 6.7 0.5 3.2 0.3 
National Bank Of Greece GR 14.4 22.3 23.4 12.3 5.1 
Piraeus Bank GR 30.4 23.7 12.8 .. .. 
OTP Bank HU 26.4 28.1 27.7 13.8 10.8 
Allied Irish Banks IE 27.6 22.4 10.0 -23.4 -273.0 
Bank Of Ireland IE 29.1 29.0 29.6 -0.1 -12.8 
Irish Life And 
Permanent 
IE 18.4 18.0 2.7 -9.1 -5.9 
Banca Monte Dei Paschi 
Di Siena 
IT 18.4 26.2 0.0 1.5 7.7 
Banco Popolare IT .. 10.3 -4.3 4.1 1.9 
Sanpaolo IMI IT 23.8 .. .. .. .. 
Banca Intesa IT 21.9 .. .. .. .. 
Intesa Sanpaolo IT .. 17.2 4.1 6.7 7.1 
UBI Banca IT 31.8 11.2 3.3 4.8 3.8 
UniCredit IT 19.6 15.0 8.6 4.6 3.2 
Banque Et Caisse 
D'Epargne De L'Etat 
LU .. 8.6 5.1 9.8 9.9 
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Bank Of Valletta MT 24.2 25.4 10.3 18.8 21.1 
ABN Amro NL 19.9 31.2 5.9 -25.5 -2.2 
ING NL 24.1 27.9 -5.1 -3.8 9.5 
Rabobank NL 9.2 9.7 8.5 6.8 8.1 
SNS Bank NL 14.3 15.8 -14.4 1.0 -5.6 
DnB NOR Bank NO 22.6 22.7 17.8 10.3 15.9 
PKO Bank Polski PL 26.1 28.6 33.6 13.7 19.0 
Banco BPI PT 24.4 25.2 11.7 13.9 14.5 
Banco Comercial 
Português 
PT 20.5 14.0 5.5 4.1 4.9 
Caixa Geral De 
Depósitos 
PT 19.7 19.4 12.1 5.2 4.6 
Espírito Santo Financial 
Group 
PT 20.9 14.8 10.2 10.4 9.3 
Nordea SE 24.9 22.6 19.1 13.7 14.8 
Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken 
SE 22.6 22.6 16.8 3.3 8.8 
Svenska Handelsbanken SE 25.2 26.6 23.4 16.0 15.9 
Swedbank SE 23.1 23.3 18.1 -10.2 9.8 
Nova Kreditna Banka 
Maribor 
SI 17.4 19.1 5.5 4.1 4.1 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka SI .. 16.3 2.9 -6.9 -22.0 
Barclays UK 25.7 22.4 14.5 19.4 9.8 
HSBC UK 20.2 19.2 8.8 5.4 12.4 
Lloyds Banking Group UK 36.4 34.5 9.4 2.4 0.6 
The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
UK 19.9 11.4 -54.5 -2.8 -1.3 
Investment banks 21.0 13.7 -0.8 3.5 8.0 
Retail banks - Focused 22.3 20.8 10.3 4.7 -9.1 
Retail banks - Diversified 22.6 20.7 9.5 4.8 6.3 
Wholesale banks 19.1 10.8 -16.8 -6.3 5.5 
TOTAL 21.3 17.4 0.9 1.9 1.7 
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APPENDIX X. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
CDO Collateralised debt obligation 
CDS Credit default swap 
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 
CIR Cost-to-income ratio 
COREP Common reporting 
CRD Capital Requirements Directive 
CRR Capital Requirements Regulation 
DFA Dodd-Frank Act 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECON Economic and monetary affairs committee 
ELA Emergency lending assistance 
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board 
FAT Financial Activities Tax 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FED Federal Reserve System 
FINREP Financial reporting 
FSC Financial stability contribution 
FSOC Financial Stability Oversight Council 
GAAP Generally accepted accounting principles 
GDP Gross domestic product 
ICB Independent Commission on Banking 
IFRS International financial reporting standards 
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IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRB Internal rating based 
LCR Liquidity coverage ratio 
NSFR Net stable funding ratio 
NSF Net stable funding  
OCC The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
OTC Over-the-counter 
OTS Office of thrift supervision 
OLA Orderly Liquidation Authority 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
PCA/ Prompt corrective action 
RoA Return on assets 
RoE Return on equity 
RoRWA Return on risk-weighted assets 
RWA Risk-weighted assets 
SEIR  Structured early intervention and resolution 
SHV Shareholder-value 
SMEs Small- and medium sized enterprises 
SIFI Systemically important financial institution 
SIVs Structured investment vehicle 
SPV Special purpose vehicle 
TCE Tangible capital equity 
TBTF Too-big-to-fail 
VAT Value-added tax 
XBRL eXtensible Business Reporting Language 
